src/HOL/Auth/Shared.thy
author paulson
Wed Aug 21 13:25:27 1996 +0200 (1996-08-21)
changeset 1934 58573e7041b4
child 1943 20574dca5a3e
permissions -rw-r--r--
Separation of theory Event into two parts:
Shared for general shared-key material
NS_Shared for the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Shared
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge
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Theory of Shared Keys (common to all symmetric-key protocols)
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Server keys; initial states of agents; new nonces and keys; function "sees" 
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*)
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Shared = Message + List + 
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consts
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  serverKey    :: agent => key  (*symmetric keys*)
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rules
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  isSym_serverKey "isSymKey (serverKey A)"
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consts  (*Initial states of agents -- parameter of the construction*)
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  initState :: agent => msg set
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primrec initState agent
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        (*Server knows all keys; other agents know only their own*)
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  initState_Server  "initState Server     = Key `` range serverKey"
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  initState_Friend  "initState (Friend i) = {Key (serverKey (Friend i))}"
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  initState_Enemy   "initState Enemy  = {Key (serverKey Enemy)}"
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datatype  (*Messages, and components of agent stores*)
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  event = Says agent agent msg
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        | Notes agent msg
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consts  
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  sees1 :: [agent, event] => msg set
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primrec sees1 event
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           (*First agent recalls all that it says, but NOT everything
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             that is sent to it; it must note such things if/when received*)
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  sees1_Says  "sees1 A (Says A' B X)  = (if A:{A',Enemy} then {X} else {})"
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          (*part of A's internal state*)
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  sees1_Notes "sees1 A (Notes A' X)   = (if A=A' then {X} else {})"
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consts  
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  sees :: [agent, event list] => msg set
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primrec sees list
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        (*Initial knowledge includes all public keys and own private key*)
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  sees_Nil  "sees A []       = initState A"
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  sees_Cons "sees A (ev#evs) = sees1 A ev Un sees A evs"
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(*Agents generate "random" nonces.  Different traces always yield
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  different nonces.  Same applies for keys.*)
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consts
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  newN :: "event list => nat"
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  newK :: "event list => key"
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rules
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  inj_serverKey "inj serverKey"
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  inj_newN   "inj newN"
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  fresh_newN "Nonce (newN evs) ~: parts (initState B)" 
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  inj_newK   "inj newK"
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  fresh_newK "Key (newK evs) ~: parts (initState B)" 
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  isSym_newK "isSymKey (newK evs)"
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end