src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.ML
author paulson
Wed Jun 24 10:29:46 1998 +0200 (1998-06-24)
changeset 5073 61e4403023a2
parent 5065 99abb086212e
child 5076 fbc9d95b62ba
permissions -rw-r--r--
Tidying; renaming of Says_Server_message_form to
Says_Server_not_range; removal of junk from analz_spies_tac;
removal of B~:bad premise from no_nonce_YM1_YM2
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Yahalom
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge
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Inductive relation "yahalom" for the Yahalom protocol.
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From page 257 of
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  Burrows, Abadi and Needham.  A Logic of Authentication.
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  Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989)
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*)
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open Yahalom;
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set proof_timing;
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HOL_quantifiers := false;
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Pretty.setdepth 25;
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(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| A ~= B; A ~= Server; B ~= Server |]   \
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\        ==> EX X NB K. EX evs: yahalom.          \
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\               Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (yahalom.Nil RS yahalom.YM1 RS yahalom.YM2 RS yahalom.YM3 RS 
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          yahalom.YM4) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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result();
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(**** Inductive proofs about yahalom ****)
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(*Nobody sends themselves messages*)
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goal thy "!!evs. evs: yahalom ==> ALL A X. Says A A X ~: set evs";
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by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
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by Auto_tac;
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qed_spec_mp "not_Says_to_self";
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Addsimps [not_Says_to_self];
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AddSEs   [not_Says_to_self RSN (2, rev_notE)];
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(** For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages **)
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(*Lets us treat YM4 using a similar argument as for the Fake case.*)
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goal thy "!!evs. Says S A {|Crypt (shrK A) Y, X|} : set evs ==> \
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\                X : analz (spies evs)";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 1);
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qed "YM4_analz_spies";
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bind_thm ("YM4_parts_spies",
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          YM4_analz_spies RS (impOfSubs analz_subset_parts));
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(*Relates to both YM4 and Oops*)
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goal thy "!!evs. Says S A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|B,K,NA,NB|}, X|} : set evs ==> \
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\                K : parts (spies evs)";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs
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                        addSDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
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qed "YM4_Key_parts_spies";
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(*For proving the easier theorems about X ~: parts (spies evs).*)
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fun parts_spies_tac i = 
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    forward_tac [YM4_Key_parts_spies] (i+6) THEN
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    forward_tac [YM4_parts_spies] (i+5)     THEN
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    prove_simple_subgoals_tac  i;
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(*Induction for regularity theorems.  If induction formula has the form
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   X ~: analz (spies evs) --> ... then it shortens the proof by discarding
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   needless information about analz (insert X (spies evs))  *)
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fun parts_induct_tac i = 
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    etac yahalom.induct i
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    THEN 
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    REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL analz_mono_contra_tac)
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    THEN  parts_spies_tac i;
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(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
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    sends messages containing X! **)
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(*Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==> (Key (shrK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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by (ALLGOALS Blast_tac);
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qed "Spy_see_shrK";
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Addsimps [Spy_see_shrK];
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==> (Key (shrK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (auto_tac(claset() addDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts], simpset()));
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qed "Spy_analz_shrK";
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Addsimps [Spy_analz_shrK];
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AddSDs [Spy_see_shrK RSN (2, rev_iffD1), 
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	Spy_analz_shrK RSN (2, rev_iffD1)];
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(*Nobody can have used non-existent keys!  Needed to apply analz_insert_Key*)
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==>          \
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\         Key K ~: used evs --> K ~: keysFor (parts (spies evs))";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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(*Fake*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [keysFor_parts_insert]) 1);
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(*YM2-4: Because Key K is not fresh, etc.*)
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by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs) 1));
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qed_spec_mp "new_keys_not_used";
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bind_thm ("new_keys_not_analzd",
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          [analz_subset_parts RS keysFor_mono,
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           new_keys_not_used] MRS contra_subsetD);
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Addsimps [new_keys_not_used, new_keys_not_analzd];
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(*Describes the form of K when the Server sends this message.  Useful for
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  Oops as well as main secrecy property.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. [| Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|} \
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\             : set evs;                                                   \
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\           evs : yahalom |]                                          \
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\        ==> K ~: range shrK";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
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by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
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by (Blast_tac 1);
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qed "Says_Server_not_range";
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Addsimps [Says_Server_not_range];
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(*For proofs involving analz.*)
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val analz_spies_tac = forward_tac [YM4_analz_spies] 6;
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(****
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 The following is to prove theorems of the form
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  Key K : analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) ==>
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  Key K : analz (spies evs)
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 A more general formula must be proved inductively.
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****)
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(** Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys **)
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goal thy  
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 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==>                              \
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\  ALL K KK. KK <= Compl (range shrK) -->               \
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\            (Key K : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \
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\            (K : KK | Key K : analz (spies evs))";
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by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
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by analz_spies_tac;
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by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI]));
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by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac analz_image_freshK_lemma));
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by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac
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	      (analz_image_freshK_ss addsimps [Says_Server_not_range])));
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(*Fake*) 
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by (spy_analz_tac 1);
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qed_spec_mp "analz_image_freshK";
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| evs : yahalom;  KAB ~: range shrK |]              \
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\         ==> Key K : analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) =  \
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\             (K = KAB | Key K : analz (spies evs))";
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by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_freshK_ss addsimps [analz_image_freshK]) 1);
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qed "analz_insert_freshK";
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(*** The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's  message. **)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==>                                     \
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\      EX A' B' na' nb' X'. ALL A B na nb X.                   \
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\          Says Server A                                       \
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\           {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|}   \
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\          : set evs --> A=A' & B=B' & na=na' & nb=nb' & X=X'";
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by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
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by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib])));
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by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
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by (ex_strip_tac 2);
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by (Blast_tac 2);
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(*Remaining case: YM3*)
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by (expand_case_tac "K = ?y" 1);
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by (REPEAT (ares_tac [refl,exI,impI,conjI] 2));
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(*...we assume X is a recent message and handle this case by contradiction*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs
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                        delrules [conjI]    (*no split-up to 4 subgoals*)) 1);
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val lemma = result();
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goal thy 
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"!!evs. [| Says Server A                                                 \
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\            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|} : set evs; \
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\          Says Server A'                                                \
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\            {|Crypt (shrK A') {|Agent B', Key K, na', nb'|}, X'|} : set evs; \
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\          evs : yahalom |]                                    \
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\       ==> A=A' & B=B' & na=na' & nb=nb'";
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by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
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qed "unique_session_keys";
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(** Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg YM3 **)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. [| A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                \
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\        ==> Says Server A                                        \
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\              {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},       \
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\                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}              \
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\             : set evs -->                                       \
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\            Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ~: set evs -->           \
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\            Key K ~: analz (spies evs)";
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by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
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by analz_spies_tac;
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by (ALLGOALS
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    (asm_simp_tac 
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     (simpset() addsimps (split_ifs@pushes)
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	        addsimps [analz_insert_eq, analz_insert_freshK])));
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(*Oops*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [unique_session_keys]) 3);
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(*YM3*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() delrules [impCE]
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                        addSEs spies_partsEs
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                        addIs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts]) 2);
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(*Fake*) 
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by (spy_analz_tac 1);
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val lemma = result() RS mp RS mp RSN(2,rev_notE);
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(*Final version*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. [| Says Server A                                         \
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\              {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},       \
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\                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}              \
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\             : set evs;                                          \
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\           Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ~: set evs;               \
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\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                \
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\        ==> Key K ~: analz (spies evs)";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [lemma]) 1);
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qed "Spy_not_see_encrypted_key";
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(** Security Guarantee for A upon receiving YM3 **)
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(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} : parts (spies evs); \
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\           A ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                          \
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\         ==> Says Server A                                            \
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\              {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|},            \
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\                Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}                   \
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\             : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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qed "A_trusts_YM3";
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(*The obvious combination of A_trusts_YM3 with Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|} : parts (spies evs); \
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\           Notes Spy {|na, nb, Key K|} ~: set evs;               \
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\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                \
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\        ==> Key K ~: analz (spies evs)";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [A_trusts_YM3, Spy_not_see_encrypted_key]) 1);
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qed "A_gets_good_key";
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(** Security Guarantees for B upon receiving YM4 **)
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(*B knows, by the first part of A's message, that the Server distributed 
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  the key for A and B.  But this part says nothing about nonces.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. [| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} : parts (spies evs);      \
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\           B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                                 \
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\        ==> EX NA NB. Says Server A                                    \
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\                        {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,             \
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\                                           Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},       \
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\                          Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}          \
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\                       : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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(*YM3*)
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by (Blast_tac 1);
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qed "B_trusts_YM4_shrK";
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(*B knows, by the second part of A's message, that the Server distributed 
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  the key quoting nonce NB.  This part says nothing about agent names. 
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  Secrecy of NB is crucial.  Note that  Nonce NB  ~: analz (spies evs)  must
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  be the FIRST antecedent of the induction formula.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : yahalom                                          \
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\        ==> Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs) -->                  \
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\            Crypt K (Nonce NB) : parts (spies evs) -->         \
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\            (EX A B NA. Says Server A                          \
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\                        {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,     \
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\                                  Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},        \
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\                          Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}  \
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\                       : set evs)";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
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(*YM3 & Fake*)
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by (Blast_tac 2);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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(*YM4*)
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(*A is uncompromised because NB is secure*)
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by (not_bad_tac "A" 1);
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(*A's certificate guarantees the existence of the Server message*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS parts.Fst RS
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			       A_trusts_YM3]) 1);
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bind_thm ("B_trusts_YM4_newK", result() RS mp RSN (2, rev_mp));
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(**** Towards proving secrecy of Nonce NB ****)
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   312
paulson@3444
   313
(** Lemmas about the predicate KeyWithNonce **)
paulson@3444
   314
paulson@3444
   315
goalw thy [KeyWithNonce_def]
paulson@3444
   316
 "!!evs. Says Server A                                              \
paulson@3444
   317
\            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB|}, X|} \
nipkow@3465
   318
\          : set evs ==> KeyWithNonce K NB evs";
paulson@3444
   319
by (Blast_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   320
qed "KeyWithNonceI";
paulson@3444
   321
paulson@3444
   322
goalw thy [KeyWithNonce_def]
paulson@3444
   323
   "KeyWithNonce K NB (Says S A X # evs) =                                    \
paulson@3444
   324
\    (Server = S &                                                            \
paulson@3444
   325
\     (EX B n X'. X = {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, n, Nonce NB|}, X'|}) \
paulson@3444
   326
\    | KeyWithNonce K NB evs)";
paulson@3444
   327
by (Simp_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   328
by (Blast_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   329
qed "KeyWithNonce_Says";
paulson@3444
   330
Addsimps [KeyWithNonce_Says];
paulson@3444
   331
paulson@4537
   332
goalw thy [KeyWithNonce_def]
paulson@4537
   333
   "KeyWithNonce K NB (Notes A X # evs) = KeyWithNonce K NB evs";
paulson@4537
   334
by (Simp_tac 1);
paulson@4537
   335
qed "KeyWithNonce_Notes";
paulson@4537
   336
Addsimps [KeyWithNonce_Notes];
paulson@4537
   337
paulson@3464
   338
(*A fresh key cannot be associated with any nonce 
paulson@3464
   339
  (with respect to a given trace). *)
paulson@3444
   340
goalw thy [KeyWithNonce_def]
paulson@3444
   341
 "!!evs. Key K ~: used evs ==> ~ KeyWithNonce K NB evs";
wenzelm@4091
   342
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs) 1);
paulson@3444
   343
qed "fresh_not_KeyWithNonce";
paulson@3444
   344
paulson@3444
   345
(*The Server message associates K with NB' and therefore not with any 
paulson@3444
   346
  other nonce NB.*)
paulson@3444
   347
goalw thy [KeyWithNonce_def]
paulson@3444
   348
 "!!evs. [| Says Server A                                                \
paulson@3444
   349
\                {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB'|}, X|} \
paulson@3466
   350
\             : set evs;                                                 \
paulson@5065
   351
\           NB ~= NB';  evs : yahalom |]                                 \
paulson@3444
   352
\        ==> ~ KeyWithNonce K NB evs";
wenzelm@4091
   353
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [unique_session_keys]) 1);
paulson@3444
   354
qed "Says_Server_KeyWithNonce";
paulson@3444
   355
paulson@3444
   356
paulson@3444
   357
(*The only nonces that can be found with the help of session keys are
paulson@3444
   358
  those distributed as nonce NB by the Server.  The form of the theorem
paulson@3444
   359
  recalls analz_image_freshK, but it is much more complicated.*)
paulson@3444
   360
paulson@3444
   361
paulson@3444
   362
(*As with analz_image_freshK, we take some pains to express the property
paulson@3444
   363
  as a logical equivalence so that the simplifier can apply it.*)
paulson@3444
   364
goal thy  
paulson@3444
   365
 "!!evs. P --> (X : analz (G Un H)) --> (X : analz H)  ==> \
paulson@3444
   366
\        P --> (X : analz (G Un H)) = (X : analz H)";
wenzelm@4091
   367
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [impOfSubs analz_mono]) 1);
paulson@3961
   368
val Nonce_secrecy_lemma = result();
paulson@2133
   369
paulson@2133
   370
goal thy 
paulson@5065
   371
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==>                                      \
paulson@5065
   372
\        (ALL KK. KK <= Compl (range shrK) -->                  \
paulson@5065
   373
\             (ALL K: KK. ~ KeyWithNonce K NB evs)   -->        \
paulson@3683
   374
\             (Nonce NB : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) =     \
paulson@3683
   375
\             (Nonce NB : analz (spies evs)))";
paulson@3444
   376
by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
paulson@3683
   377
by analz_spies_tac;
paulson@3444
   378
by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [impI RS allI]));
paulson@3961
   379
by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac Nonce_secrecy_lemma));
paulson@3444
   380
(*For Oops, simplification proves NBa~=NB.  By Says_Server_KeyWithNonce,
paulson@3444
   381
  we get (~ KeyWithNonce K NB evsa); then simplification can apply the
paulson@3444
   382
  induction hypothesis with KK = {K}.*)
paulson@5073
   383
by (ALLGOALS  (*4 seconds*)
paulson@3444
   384
    (asm_simp_tac 
paulson@3961
   385
     (analz_image_freshK_ss 
nipkow@4831
   386
       addsimps split_ifs
paulson@3961
   387
       addsimps [all_conj_distrib, analz_image_freshK,
paulson@4537
   388
		 KeyWithNonce_Says, KeyWithNonce_Notes,
paulson@5073
   389
		 fresh_not_KeyWithNonce, Says_Server_not_range,
paulson@3961
   390
		 imp_disj_not1,		     (*Moves NBa~=NB to the front*)
paulson@3961
   391
		 Says_Server_KeyWithNonce])));
paulson@3444
   392
(*Fake*) 
paulson@3444
   393
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
paulson@4422
   394
(*YM4*)  (** LEVEL 6 **)
paulson@3683
   395
by (not_bad_tac "A" 1);
paulson@3683
   396
by (dtac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS parts.Fst RS A_trusts_YM3) 1
paulson@3444
   397
    THEN REPEAT (assume_tac 1));
wenzelm@4091
   398
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [KeyWithNonceI]) 1);
paulson@3444
   399
qed_spec_mp "Nonce_secrecy";
paulson@3444
   400
paulson@3444
   401
paulson@3444
   402
(*Version required below: if NB can be decrypted using a session key then it
paulson@3444
   403
  was distributed with that key.  The more general form above is required
paulson@3444
   404
  for the induction to carry through.*)
paulson@3444
   405
goal thy 
paulson@5065
   406
 "!!evs. [| Says Server A                                               \
paulson@5065
   407
\            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, na, Nonce NB'|}, X|}  \
paulson@5065
   408
\           : set evs;                                                  \
paulson@5065
   409
\           NB ~= NB';  KAB ~: range shrK;  evs : yahalom |]            \
paulson@5065
   410
\        ==> (Nonce NB : analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs))) =        \
paulson@3683
   411
\            (Nonce NB : analz (spies evs))";
paulson@3444
   412
by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_freshK_ss addsimps 
paulson@3444
   413
		  [Nonce_secrecy, Says_Server_KeyWithNonce]) 1);
paulson@3444
   414
qed "single_Nonce_secrecy";
paulson@3444
   415
paulson@3444
   416
paulson@3444
   417
(*** The Nonce NB uniquely identifies B's message. ***)
paulson@3444
   418
paulson@3444
   419
goal thy 
paulson@5065
   420
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom ==>                                         \
paulson@5065
   421
\   EX NA' A' B'. ALL NA A B.                                      \
paulson@3683
   422
\      Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} : parts(spies evs) \
paulson@3683
   423
\      --> B ~: bad --> NA = NA' & A = A' & B = B'";
paulson@3519
   424
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
paulson@3121
   425
(*Fake*)
paulson@3121
   426
by (REPEAT (etac (exI RSN (2,exE)) 1)   (*stripping EXs makes proof faster*)
paulson@3121
   427
    THEN Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
wenzelm@4091
   428
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1); 
paulson@2133
   429
(*YM2: creation of new Nonce.  Move assertion into global context*)
paulson@3501
   430
by (expand_case_tac "nb = ?y" 1);
paulson@2516
   431
by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI, conjI, impI, refl] 1));
wenzelm@4091
   432
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs) 1);
paulson@2133
   433
val lemma = result();
paulson@2133
   434
paulson@2110
   435
goal thy 
paulson@5065
   436
 "!!evs.[| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} : parts (spies evs);    \
paulson@3683
   437
\          Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|} : parts (spies evs); \
paulson@3683
   438
\          evs : yahalom;  B ~: bad;  B' ~: bad |]  \
paulson@2133
   439
\        ==> NA' = NA & A' = A & B' = B";
paulson@2451
   440
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
paulson@2133
   441
qed "unique_NB";
paulson@2133
   442
paulson@2133
   443
paulson@3444
   444
(*Variant useful for proving secrecy of NB: the Says... form allows 
paulson@3683
   445
  not_bad_tac to remove the assumption B' ~: bad.*)
paulson@2133
   446
goal thy 
paulson@3501
   447
 "!!evs.[| Says C D   {|X,  Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}    \
paulson@5065
   448
\            : set evs;          B ~: bad;                                \
paulson@3501
   449
\          Says C' D' {|X', Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|}|} \
paulson@3466
   450
\            : set evs;                                                   \
paulson@5065
   451
\          nb ~: analz (spies evs);  evs : yahalom |]                     \
paulson@2133
   452
\        ==> NA' = NA & A' = A & B' = B";
paulson@3683
   453
by (not_bad_tac "B'" 1);
wenzelm@4091
   454
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
paulson@4238
   455
                        addSEs [MPair_parts]
paulson@4238
   456
                        addDs  [unique_NB]) 1);
paulson@2133
   457
qed "Says_unique_NB";
paulson@2133
   458
paulson@3444
   459
paulson@3444
   460
(** A nonce value is never used both as NA and as NB **)
paulson@3121
   461
paulson@2133
   462
goal thy 
paulson@5073
   463
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom                     \
paulson@5073
   464
\ ==> Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs) -->    \
paulson@3683
   465
\     Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NB, nb'|} : parts(spies evs) --> \
paulson@5065
   466
\     Crypt (shrK B)  {|Agent A, na, Nonce NB|} ~: parts(spies evs)";
paulson@3519
   467
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
paulson@3121
   468
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
wenzelm@4091
   469
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]
paulson@4238
   470
                        addSIs [parts_insertI]
paulson@4238
   471
                        addSEs partsEs) 1);
paulson@3464
   472
bind_thm ("no_nonce_YM1_YM2", result() RS mp RSN (2,rev_mp) RSN (2,rev_notE));
paulson@2133
   473
paulson@5065
   474
(*more readable version cited in Yahalom paper*)
paulson@5065
   475
standard (result() RS mp RSN (2,rev_mp));
paulson@5065
   476
paulson@3464
   477
(*The Server sends YM3 only in response to YM2.*)
paulson@2133
   478
goal thy 
paulson@3466
   479
 "!!evs. [| Says Server A                                                \
paulson@3466
   480
\            {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, k, na, nb|}, X|} : set evs;     \
paulson@3519
   481
\           evs : yahalom |]                                             \
paulson@2133
   482
\        ==> EX B'. Says B' Server                                       \
paulson@2284
   483
\                      {| Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, na, nb|} |} \
nipkow@3465
   484
\                   : set evs";
paulson@2133
   485
by (etac rev_mp 1);
paulson@2133
   486
by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
paulson@2133
   487
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
paulson@3121
   488
by (ALLGOALS Blast_tac);
paulson@2133
   489
qed "Says_Server_imp_YM2";
paulson@2133
   490
paulson@2133
   491
paulson@3519
   492
(*A vital theorem for B, that nonce NB remains secure from the Spy.*)
paulson@2133
   493
goal thy 
paulson@3683
   494
 "!!evs. [| A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]  \
paulson@2133
   495
\ ==> Says B Server                                                    \
paulson@2284
   496
\          {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|} \
paulson@3466
   497
\     : set evs -->                                                    \
paulson@4537
   498
\     (ALL k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ~: set evs) -->      \
paulson@3683
   499
\     Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs)";
paulson@2133
   500
by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
paulson@3683
   501
by analz_spies_tac;
paulson@2133
   502
by (ALLGOALS
paulson@2133
   503
    (asm_simp_tac 
nipkow@4831
   504
     (simpset() addsimps (split_ifs@pushes)
paulson@4238
   505
	        addsimps [analz_insert_eq, analz_insert_freshK])));
paulson@3450
   506
(*Prove YM3 by showing that no NB can also be an NA*)
wenzelm@4091
   507
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
paulson@4238
   508
	                addSEs [MPair_parts]
paulson@4238
   509
		        addDs  [no_nonce_YM1_YM2, Says_unique_NB]) 4
paulson@3450
   510
    THEN flexflex_tac);
paulson@3444
   511
(*YM2: similar freshness reasoning*) 
wenzelm@4091
   512
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs
paulson@4238
   513
		        addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj,
paulson@4238
   514
				impOfSubs analz_subset_parts]) 3);
paulson@3450
   515
(*YM1: NB=NA is impossible anyway, but NA is secret because it is fresh!*)
wenzelm@4091
   516
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [parts_insertI]
paulson@4238
   517
                        addSEs spies_partsEs) 2);
paulson@2377
   518
(*Fake*)
paulson@2377
   519
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   520
(** LEVEL 7: YM4 and Oops remain **)
paulson@3708
   521
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
paulson@3444
   522
(*YM4: key K is visible to Spy, contradicting session key secrecy theorem*) 
paulson@3683
   523
by (not_bad_tac "Aa" 1);
paulson@3683
   524
by (dtac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS parts.Fst RS A_trusts_YM3) 1);
paulson@5073
   525
by (forward_tac [Says_Server_imp_YM2] 3);
paulson@3121
   526
by (REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac [asm_rl, bexE, exE, disjE]));
paulson@3519
   527
(*  use Says_unique_NB to identify message components: Aa=A, Ba=B, NAa=NA *)
wenzelm@4091
   528
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_unique_NB, Spy_not_see_encrypted_key,
paulson@4238
   529
			       impOfSubs Fake_analz_insert]) 1);
paulson@5073
   530
(** LEVEL 13 **)
paulson@3444
   531
(*Oops case: if the nonce is betrayed now, show that the Oops event is 
paulson@3444
   532
  covered by the quantified Oops assumption.*)
wenzelm@4091
   533
by (full_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
paulson@2133
   534
by (forward_tac [Says_Server_imp_YM2] 1 THEN assume_tac 1 THEN etac exE 1);
paulson@2133
   535
by (expand_case_tac "NB = NBa" 1);
paulson@3444
   536
(*If NB=NBa then all other components of the Oops message agree*)
wenzelm@4091
   537
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_unique_NB]) 1 THEN flexflex_tac);
paulson@3444
   538
(*case NB ~= NBa*)
wenzelm@4091
   539
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [single_Nonce_secrecy]) 1);
paulson@4471
   540
by (Clarify_tac 1);
wenzelm@4091
   541
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
paulson@4238
   542
		        addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj, 
paulson@4238
   543
			        no_nonce_YM1_YM2 (*to prove NB~=NAa*) ]) 1);
paulson@3444
   544
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_NB", result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp));
paulson@2133
   545
paulson@2001
   546
paulson@3464
   547
(*B's session key guarantee from YM4.  The two certificates contribute to a
paulson@4537
   548
  single conclusion about the Server's message.  Note that the "Notes Spy"
paulson@3464
   549
  assumption must quantify over ALL POSSIBLE keys instead of our particular K.
paulson@3464
   550
  If this run is broken and the spy substitutes a certificate containing an
paulson@3464
   551
  old key, B has no means of telling.*)
paulson@2001
   552
goal thy 
paulson@4598
   553
 "!!evs. [| Says A' B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},                  \
paulson@4598
   554
\                       Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs;                     \
paulson@4598
   555
\           Says B Server                                                   \
paulson@3444
   556
\             {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}   \
paulson@3466
   557
\             : set evs;                                                    \
paulson@4537
   558
\           ALL k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ~: set evs;          \
paulson@3683
   559
\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]       \
paulson@3444
   560
\         ==> Says Server A                                                 \
paulson@3444
   561
\                     {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K,                    \
paulson@3444
   562
\                               Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},                       \
paulson@3444
   563
\                       Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|}                 \
nipkow@3465
   564
\               : set evs";
paulson@2133
   565
by (forward_tac [Spy_not_see_NB] 1 THEN REPEAT (assume_tac 1));
paulson@3683
   566
by (etac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1 THEN
paulson@2133
   567
    dtac B_trusts_YM4_shrK 1);
paulson@2170
   568
by (dtac B_trusts_YM4_newK 3);
paulson@2110
   569
by (REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac [asm_rl, exE]));
paulson@2133
   570
by (forward_tac [Says_Server_imp_YM2] 1 THEN assume_tac 1);
paulson@2170
   571
by (dtac unique_session_keys 1 THEN REPEAT (assume_tac 1));
wenzelm@4091
   572
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_unique_NB]) 1);
paulson@2322
   573
qed "B_trusts_YM4";
paulson@3444
   574
paulson@3444
   575
paulson@4598
   576
(*The obvious combination of B_trusts_YM4 with Spy_not_see_encrypted_key*)
paulson@4598
   577
goal thy 
paulson@4598
   578
 "!!evs. [| Says A' B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},                  \
paulson@4598
   579
\                       Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs;                     \
paulson@4598
   580
\           Says B Server                                                   \
paulson@4598
   581
\             {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}   \
paulson@4598
   582
\             : set evs;                                                    \
paulson@4598
   583
\           ALL k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ~: set evs;          \
paulson@4598
   584
\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                \
paulson@4598
   585
\        ==> Key K ~: analz (spies evs)";
paulson@4598
   586
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [B_trusts_YM4, Spy_not_see_encrypted_key]) 1);
paulson@4598
   587
qed "B_gets_good_key";
paulson@4598
   588
paulson@3444
   589
paulson@3444
   590
(*** Authenticating B to A ***)
paulson@3444
   591
paulson@3444
   592
(*The encryption in message YM2 tells us it cannot be faked.*)
paulson@3444
   593
goal thy 
paulson@3519
   594
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom                                            \
paulson@3683
   595
\  ==> Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} : parts (spies evs) --> \
paulson@3683
   596
\      B ~: bad -->                                              \
paulson@3466
   597
\      Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}  \
nipkow@3465
   598
\         : set evs";
paulson@3519
   599
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   600
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   601
bind_thm ("B_Said_YM2", result() RSN (2, rev_mp) RS mp);
paulson@3444
   602
paulson@3444
   603
(*If the server sends YM3 then B sent YM2*)
paulson@3444
   604
goal thy 
paulson@3519
   605
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom                                                      \
paulson@3444
   606
\  ==> Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, nb|}, X|} \
paulson@3466
   607
\         : set evs -->                                                     \
paulson@3683
   608
\      B ~: bad -->                                                        \
paulson@3466
   609
\      Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|}  \
nipkow@3465
   610
\                 : set evs";
paulson@3444
   611
by (etac yahalom.induct 1);
paulson@3444
   612
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
paulson@3444
   613
(*YM4*)
paulson@3444
   614
by (Blast_tac 2);
paulson@4509
   615
(*YM3 [blast_tac is 50% slower] *)
wenzelm@4091
   616
by (best_tac (claset() addSDs [B_Said_YM2, Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
paulson@4238
   617
		       addSEs [MPair_parts]) 1);
paulson@3444
   618
val lemma = result() RSN (2, rev_mp) RS mp |> standard;
paulson@3444
   619
paulson@3444
   620
(*If A receives YM3 then B has used nonce NA (and therefore is alive)*)
paulson@3444
   621
goal thy
paulson@3444
   622
 "!!evs. [| Says S A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, nb|}, X|} \
paulson@3466
   623
\             : set evs;                                                    \
paulson@3683
   624
\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]                        \
paulson@3444
   625
\   ==> Says B Server {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|} \
nipkow@3465
   626
\         : set evs";
wenzelm@4091
   627
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [A_trusts_YM3, lemma]
paulson@4238
   628
		        addEs spies_partsEs) 1);
paulson@3444
   629
qed "YM3_auth_B_to_A";
paulson@3444
   630
paulson@3444
   631
paulson@3444
   632
(*** Authenticating A to B using the certificate Crypt K (Nonce NB) ***)
paulson@3444
   633
paulson@3444
   634
(*Assuming the session key is secure, if both certificates are present then
paulson@3444
   635
  A has said NB.  We can't be sure about the rest of A's message, but only
paulson@3444
   636
  NB matters for freshness.*)  
paulson@3444
   637
goal thy 
paulson@3519
   638
 "!!evs. evs : yahalom                                             \
paulson@3683
   639
\        ==> Key K ~: analz (spies evs) -->                     \
paulson@3683
   640
\            Crypt K (Nonce NB) : parts (spies evs) -->         \
paulson@3683
   641
\            Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} : parts (spies evs) --> \
paulson@3683
   642
\            B ~: bad -->                                         \
paulson@3683
   643
\            (EX X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs)";
paulson@3519
   644
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   645
(*Fake*)
paulson@3444
   646
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
paulson@3444
   647
(*YM3: by new_keys_not_used we note that Crypt K (Nonce NB) could not exist*)
paulson@4238
   648
by (fast_tac (claset() addSDs [Crypt_imp_keysFor] addss (simpset())) 1); 
paulson@3444
   649
(*YM4: was Crypt K (Nonce NB) the very last message?  If not, use ind. hyp.*)
wenzelm@4091
   650
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]) 1);
paulson@3444
   651
(*yes: apply unicity of session keys*)
paulson@3683
   652
by (not_bad_tac "Aa" 1);
wenzelm@4091
   653
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
paulson@4238
   654
                        addSDs [A_trusts_YM3, B_trusts_YM4_shrK]
paulson@4238
   655
		        addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj,
paulson@4238
   656
				unique_session_keys]) 1);
paulson@3444
   657
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSspec, RSmp] (result()) |> standard;
paulson@3444
   658
paulson@3444
   659
(*If B receives YM4 then A has used nonce NB (and therefore is alive).
paulson@3444
   660
  Moreover, A associates K with NB (thus is talking about the same run).
paulson@3444
   661
  Other premises guarantee secrecy of K.*)
paulson@3444
   662
goal thy 
paulson@4598
   663
 "!!evs. [| Says A' B {|Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|},                  \
paulson@4598
   664
\                       Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs;                     \
paulson@4598
   665
\           Says B Server                                                   \
paulson@3444
   666
\             {|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}   \
paulson@3466
   667
\             : set evs;                                                    \
paulson@4537
   668
\           (ALL NA k. Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, k|} ~: set evs);     \
paulson@3683
   669
\           A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  evs : yahalom |]       \
nipkow@3465
   670
\        ==> EX X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs";
paulson@4598
   671
by (forward_tac [B_trusts_YM4] 1);
paulson@3444
   672
by (REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac [asm_rl, spec]));
paulson@3683
   673
by (etac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1);
paulson@3444
   674
by (rtac lemma 1);
paulson@3444
   675
by (rtac Spy_not_see_encrypted_key 2);
paulson@3444
   676
by (REPEAT_FIRST assume_tac);
wenzelm@4091
   677
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
paulson@4238
   678
	       	        addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
paulson@3444
   679
qed_spec_mp "YM4_imp_A_Said_YM3";