src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.thy
author paulson
Thu May 03 10:27:37 2001 +0200 (2001-05-03)
changeset 11280 6fdc4c4ccec1
parent 11251 a6816d47f41d
child 11465 45d156ede468
permissions -rw-r--r--
minor tweaks
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/NS_Shared
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge
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Inductive relation "ns_shared" for Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key protocol.
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From page 247 of
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  Burrows, Abadi and Needham.  A Logic of Authentication.
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  Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989)
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*)
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theory NS_Shared = Shared:
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consts  ns_shared   :: "event list set"
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inductive "ns_shared"
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 intros
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	(*Initial trace is empty*)
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  Nil:  "[] \<in> ns_shared"
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	(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
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	  invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
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	  all similar protocols.*)
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  Fake: "\<lbrakk>evsf \<in> ns_shared;  X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf))\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> ns_shared"
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	(*Alice initiates a protocol run, requesting to talk to any B*)
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  NS1:  "\<lbrakk>evs1 \<in> ns_shared;  Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says A Server \<lbrace>Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA\<rbrace> # evs1  \<in>  ns_shared"
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	(*Server's response to Alice's message.
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	  !! It may respond more than once to A's request !!
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	  Server doesn't know who the true sender is, hence the A' in
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	      the sender field.*)
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  NS2:  "\<lbrakk>evs2 \<in> ns_shared;  Key KAB \<notin> used evs2;
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	  Says A' Server \<lbrace>Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA\<rbrace> \<in> set evs2\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says Server A
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	       (Crypt (shrK A)
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		  \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key KAB,
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		    (Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key KAB, Agent A\<rbrace>)\<rbrace>)
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	       # evs2 \<in> ns_shared"
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	 (*We can't assume S=Server.  Agent A "remembers" her nonce.
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	   Need A \<noteq> Server because we allow messages to self.*)
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  NS3:  "\<lbrakk>evs3 \<in> ns_shared;  A \<noteq> Server;
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	  Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs3;
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	  Says A Server \<lbrace>Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA\<rbrace> \<in> set evs3\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says A B X # evs3 \<in> ns_shared"
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	(*Bob's nonce exchange.  He does not know who the message came
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	  from, but responds to A because she is mentioned inside.*)
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  NS4:  "\<lbrakk>evs4 \<in> ns_shared;  Nonce NB \<notin> used evs4;
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	  Says A' B (Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs4\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) # evs4 \<in> ns_shared"
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	(*Alice responds with Nonce NB if she has seen the key before.
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	  Maybe should somehow check Nonce NA again.
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	  We do NOT send NB-1 or similar as the Spy cannot spoof such things.
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	  Letting the Spy add or subtract 1 lets him send \<forall>nonces.
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	  Instead we distinguish the messages by sending the nonce twice.*)
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  NS5:  "\<lbrakk>evs5 \<in> ns_shared;
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	  Says B' A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs5;
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	  Says S  A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>)
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	    \<in> set evs5\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce NB\<rbrace>) # evs5 \<in> ns_shared"
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	(*This message models possible leaks of session keys.
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	  The two Nonces identify the protocol run: the rule insists upon
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	  the true senders in order to make them accurate.*)
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  Oops: "\<lbrakk>evso \<in> ns_shared;  Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evso;
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	  Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>)
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	      \<in> set evso\<rbrakk>
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	 \<Longrightarrow> Notes Spy \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace> # evso \<in> ns_shared"
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declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest]
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declare parts.Body  [dest]
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declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
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declare analz_into_parts [dest]
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declare image_eq_UN [simp]  (*accelerates proofs involving nested images*)
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(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*)
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lemma "A \<noteq> Server \<Longrightarrow> \<exists>N K. \<exists>evs \<in> ns_shared.
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                              Says A B (Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce N, Nonce N\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs"
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apply (intro exI bexI)
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apply (rule_tac [2] ns_shared.Nil
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       [THEN ns_shared.NS1, THEN ns_shared.NS2, THEN ns_shared.NS3,
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	THEN ns_shared.NS4, THEN ns_shared.NS5])
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apply possibility
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done
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(*This version is similar, while instantiating ?K and ?N to epsilon-terms
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lemma "A \<noteq> Server \<Longrightarrow> \<exists>evs \<in> ns_shared.
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                Says A B (Crypt ?K \<lbrace>Nonce ?N, Nonce ?N\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs"
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*)
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(**** Inductive proofs about ns_shared ****)
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(** Forwarding lemmas, to aid simplification **)
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(*For reasoning about the encrypted portion of message NS3*)
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lemma NS3_msg_in_parts_spies:
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     "Says S A (Crypt KA \<lbrace>N, B, K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<Longrightarrow> X \<in> parts (spies evs)"
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by blast
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(*For reasoning about the Oops message*)
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lemma Oops_parts_spies:
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     "Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, B, K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs
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            \<Longrightarrow> K \<in> parts (spies evs)"
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by blast
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(** Theorems of the form X \<notin> parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
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    sends messages containing X! **)
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(*Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)*)
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lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
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     "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow> (Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply simp_all
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apply blast+;
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done
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lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
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     "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow> (Key (shrK A) \<in> analz (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
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by auto
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(*Nobody can have used non-existent keys!*)
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lemma new_keys_not_used [rule_format, simp]:
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    "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow> Key K \<notin> used evs \<longrightarrow> K \<notin> keysFor (parts (spies evs))"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply simp_all
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(*Fake, NS2, NS4, NS5*)
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apply (blast dest!: keysFor_parts_insert)+
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done
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(** Lemmas concerning the form of items passed in messages **)
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(*Describes the form of K, X and K' when the Server sends this message.*)
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lemma Says_Server_message_form:
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     "\<lbrakk>Says Server A (Crypt K' \<lbrace>N, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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       evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> K \<notin> range shrK \<and>
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          X = (Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<and>
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          K' = shrK A"
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by (erule rev_mp, erule ns_shared.induct, auto)
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(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server*)
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lemma A_trusts_NS2:
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     "\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply auto
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done
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lemma cert_A_form:
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     "\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> K \<notin> range shrK \<and>  X = (Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>)"
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by (blast dest!: A_trusts_NS2 Says_Server_message_form)
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(*EITHER describes the form of X when the following message is sent,
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  OR     reduces it to the Fake case.
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  Use Says_Server_message_form if applicable.*)
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lemma Says_S_message_form:
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     "\<lbrakk>Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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       evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> (K \<notin> range shrK \<and> X = (Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>))
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          \<or> X \<in> analz (spies evs)"
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by (blast dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy cert_A_form analz.Inj)
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(*Alternative version also provable
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lemma Says_S_message_form2:
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  "\<lbrakk>Says S A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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    evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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   \<Longrightarrow> Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs
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       \<or> X \<in> analz (spies evs)"
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apply (case_tac "A \<in> bad")
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apply (force dest!: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]);
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by (blast dest!: A_trusts_NS2 Says_Server_message_form)
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*)
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(****
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 SESSION KEY COMPROMISE THEOREM.  To prove theorems of the form
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  Key K \<in> analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) \<Longrightarrow>
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  Key K \<in> analz (spies evs)
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 A more general formula must be proved inductively.
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****)
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(*NOT useful in this form, but it says that session keys are not used
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  to encrypt messages containing other keys, in the actual protocol.
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  We require that agents should behave like this subsequently also.*)
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lemma  "\<lbrakk>evs \<in> ns_shared;  Kab \<notin> range shrK\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow>
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         (Crypt KAB X) \<in> parts (spies evs) \<and>
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         Key K \<in> parts {X} \<longrightarrow> Key K \<in> parts (spies evs)"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply simp_all
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(*Fake*)
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apply (blast dest: parts_insert_subset_Un)
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(*Base, NS4 and NS5*)
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apply auto
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done
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(** Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys **)
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(*The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply*)
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lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
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 "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow>
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   \<forall>K KK. KK \<subseteq> - (range shrK) \<longrightarrow>
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             (Key K \<in> analz (Key`KK \<union> (spies evs))) =
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             (K \<in> KK \<or> Key K \<in> analz (spies evs))"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force)
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apply (drule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
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apply (erule_tac [4] Says_S_message_form [THEN disjE])
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apply analz_freshK
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apply spy_analz
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done
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lemma analz_insert_freshK:
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     "\<lbrakk>evs \<in> ns_shared;  KAB \<notin> range shrK\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow>
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       Key K \<in> analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) =
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       (K = KAB \<or> Key K \<in> analz (spies evs))"
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by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
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(** The session key K uniquely identifies the message **)
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(*In messages of this form, the session key uniquely identifies the rest*)
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lemma unique_session_keys:
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     "\<lbrakk>Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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       Says Server A' (Crypt (shrK A') \<lbrace>NA', Agent B', Key K, X'\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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       evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> A=A' \<and> NA=NA' \<and> B=B' \<and> X = X'"
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule ns_shared.induct)
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apply simp_all
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apply blast+
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done
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(** Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg NS2 **)
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(*Beware of [rule_format] and the universal quantifier!*)
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lemma secrecy_lemma:
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     "\<lbrakk>Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K,
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                                      Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>\<rbrace>)
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              \<in> set evs;
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         A \<notin> bad;  B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> (\<forall>NB. Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs) \<longrightarrow>
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         Key K \<notin> analz (spies evs)"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force)
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apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
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apply (frule_tac [4] Says_S_message_form)
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apply (erule_tac [5] disjE)
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apply (simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes split_ifs)
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apply spy_analz  (*Fake*)
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apply blast      (*NS2*)
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(*NS3, Server sub-case*) (**LEVEL 8 **)
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apply (blast dest!: Crypt_Spy_analz_bad A_trusts_NS2
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	     dest:  Says_imp_knows_Spy analz.Inj unique_session_keys)
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(*NS3, Spy sub-case; also Oops*)
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apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)+
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done
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(*Final version: Server's message in the most abstract form*)
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lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
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     "\<lbrakk>Says Server A (Crypt K' \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs;
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       \<forall>NB. Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs;
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       A \<notin> bad;  B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> Key K \<notin> analz (spies evs)"
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by (blast dest: Says_Server_message_form secrecy_lemma)
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(**** Guarantees available at various stages of protocol ***)
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(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server*)
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lemma B_trusts_NS3:
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     "\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> \<exists>NA. Says Server A
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               (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K,
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                                 Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>\<rbrace>)
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              \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply auto
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done
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lemma A_trusts_NS4_lemma [rule_format]:
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   "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow>
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      Key K \<notin> analz (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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      Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow>
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      Crypt K (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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      Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply (analz_mono_contra, simp_all)
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apply blast     (*Fake*)
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(*NS2: contradiction from the assumptions
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  Key K \<notin> used evs2  and Crypt K (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs2) *)
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apply (force dest!: Crypt_imp_keysFor)
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apply blast     (*NS3*)
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(*NS4*)
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apply (blast dest!: B_trusts_NS3
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	     dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
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                   Crypt_Spy_analz_bad unique_session_keys)
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done
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(*This version no longer assumes that K is secure*)
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lemma A_trusts_NS4:
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     "\<lbrakk>Crypt K (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       \<forall>NB. Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs;
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       A \<notin> bad;  B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> Says B A (Crypt K (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
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by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS4_lemma
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          dest: A_trusts_NS2 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
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(*If the session key has been used in NS4 then somebody has forwarded
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  component X in some instance of NS4.  Perhaps an interesting property,
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  but not needed (after all) for the proofs below.*)
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theorem NS4_implies_NS3 [rule_format]:
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  "evs \<in> ns_shared \<Longrightarrow>
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     Key K \<notin> analz (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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     Says Server A (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K, X\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow>
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     Crypt K (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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     (\<exists>A'. Says A' B X \<in> set evs)"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply analz_mono_contra
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apply (simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib)
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apply blast  (*Fake*)
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apply (blast dest!: new_keys_not_used Crypt_imp_keysFor)  (*NS2*)
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apply blast  (*NS3*)
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(*NS4*)
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apply (blast dest!: B_trusts_NS3
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	     dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
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                   unique_session_keys Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)
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done
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lemma B_trusts_NS5_lemma [rule_format]:
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  "\<lbrakk>B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow>
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     Key K \<notin> analz (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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     Says Server A
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	  (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent B, Key K,
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			    Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace>\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow>
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     Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce NB\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow>
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     Says A B (Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce NB\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule ns_shared.induct, force, drule_tac [4] NS3_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply analz_mono_contra
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apply simp_all
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apply blast  (*Fake*)
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apply (blast dest!: new_keys_not_used Crypt_imp_keysFor)  (*NS2*)
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apply (blast dest!: cert_A_form) (*NS3*)
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(*NS5*)
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apply (blast dest!: A_trusts_NS2
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	     dest: Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
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                   unique_session_keys Crypt_Spy_analz_bad)
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done
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(*Very strong Oops condition reveals protocol's weakness*)
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lemma B_trusts_NS5:
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     "\<lbrakk>Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce NB\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Key K, Agent A\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs);
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       \<forall>NA NB. Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs;
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       A \<notin> bad;  B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> ns_shared\<rbrakk>
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      \<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt K \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce NB\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs"
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by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS5_lemma
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          dest: B_trusts_NS3 Spy_not_see_encrypted_key)
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   385
end