src/HOL/Auth/ZhouGollmann.thy
author paulson
Tue May 11 10:49:58 2004 +0200 (2004-05-11)
changeset 14736 7104394df99a
parent 14207 f20fbb141673
child 14741 36582c356db7
permissions -rw-r--r--
broken no longer includes TTP, and other minor changes
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/ZhouGollmann
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Giampaolo Bella and L C Paulson, Cambridge Univ Computer Lab
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    Copyright   2003  University of Cambridge
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The protocol of
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  Jianying Zhou and Dieter Gollmann,
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  A Fair Non-Repudiation Protocol,
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  Security and Privacy 1996 (Oakland)
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  55-61
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*)
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theory ZhouGollmann = Public:
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syntax
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  TTP :: agent
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translations
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  "TTP" == "Server "
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syntax
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  f_sub :: nat
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  f_nro :: nat
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  f_nrr :: nat
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  f_con :: nat
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translations
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  "f_sub" == "5"
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  "f_nro" == "2"
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  "f_nrr" == "3"
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  "f_con" == "4"
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constdefs
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  broken :: "agent set"    
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    --{*the compromised honest agents; TTP is included as it's not allowed to
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        use the protocol*}
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   "broken == bad - {Spy}"
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declare broken_def [simp]
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consts  zg  :: "event list set"
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inductive zg
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  intros
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  Nil:  "[] \<in> zg"
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  Fake: "[| evsf \<in> zg;  X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf)) |]
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	 ==> Says Spy B X  # evsf \<in> zg"
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Reception:  "[| evsr \<in> zg; Says A B X \<in> set evsr |] ==> Gets B X # evsr \<in> zg"
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  (*L is fresh for honest agents.
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    We don't require K to be fresh because we don't bother to prove secrecy!
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    We just assume that the protocol's objective is to deliver K fairly,
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    rather than to keep M secret.*)
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  ZG1: "[| evs1 \<in> zg;  Nonce L \<notin> used evs1; C = Crypt K (Number m);
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	   K \<in> symKeys;
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	   NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|}|]
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       ==> Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} # evs1 \<in> zg"
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  (*B must check that NRO is A's signature to learn the sender's name*)
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  ZG2: "[| evs2 \<in> zg;
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	   Gets B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} \<in> set evs2;
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	   NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
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	   NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|}|]
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       ==> Says B A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} # evs2  \<in>  zg"
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  (*A must check that NRR is B's signature to learn the sender's name;
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    without spy, the matching label would be enough*)
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  ZG3: "[| evs3 \<in> zg; C = Crypt K M; K \<in> symKeys;
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	   Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} \<in> set evs3;
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	   Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} \<in> set evs3;
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	   NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
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	   sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|}|]
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       ==> Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|}
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	     # evs3 \<in> zg"
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 (*TTP checks that sub_K is A's signature to learn who issued K, then
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   gives credentials to A and B.  The Notes event models the availability of
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   the credentials, but the act of fetching them is not modelled.  We also
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   give con_K to the Spy. This makes the threat model more dangerous, while 
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   also allowing lemma @{text Crypt_used_imp_spies} to omit the condition
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   @{term "K \<noteq> priK TTP"}. *)
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  ZG4: "[| evs4 \<in> zg; K \<in> symKeys;
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	   Gets TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|}
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	     \<in> set evs4;
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	   sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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	   con_K = Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B,
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				      Nonce L, Key K|}|]
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       ==> Says TTP Spy con_K
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           #
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	   Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
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	   # evs4 \<in> zg"
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declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
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declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un  [dest]
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declare analz_into_parts [dest]
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declare symKey_neq_priEK [simp]
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declare symKey_neq_priEK [THEN not_sym, simp]
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text{*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*}
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lemma "[|A \<noteq> B; TTP \<noteq> A; TTP \<noteq> B; K \<in> symKeys|] ==>
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     \<exists>L. \<exists>evs \<in> zg.
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           Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K,
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               Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|} |}
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               \<in> set evs"
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apply (intro exI bexI)
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apply (rule_tac [2] zg.Nil
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                    [THEN zg.ZG1, THEN zg.Reception [of _ A B],
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                     THEN zg.ZG2, THEN zg.Reception [of _ B A],
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                     THEN zg.ZG3, THEN zg.Reception [of _ A TTP], 
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                     THEN zg.ZG4])
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apply (possibility, auto)
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done
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subsection {*Basic Lemmas*}
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lemma Gets_imp_Says:
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     "[| Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> zg |] ==> \<exists>A. Says A B X \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
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done
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lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy:
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     "[| Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> zg |]  ==> X \<in> spies evs"
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by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy)
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text{*Lets us replace proofs about @{term "used evs"} by simpler proofs 
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about @{term "parts (spies evs)"}.*}
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lemma Crypt_used_imp_spies:
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     "[| Crypt K X \<in> used evs; evs \<in> zg |]
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      ==> Crypt K X \<in> parts (spies evs)"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (simp_all add: parts_insert_knows_A) 
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done
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lemma Notes_TTP_imp_Gets:
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     "[|Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K |}
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           \<in> set evs;
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        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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        evs \<in> zg|]
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    ==> Gets TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
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done
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text{*For reasoning about C, which is encrypted in message ZG2*}
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lemma ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies:
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     "[|Gets B {|F, B', L, C, X|} \<in> set evs; evs \<in> zg|]
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      ==> C \<in> parts (spies evs)"
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by (blast dest: Gets_imp_Says)
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(*classical regularity lemma on priK*)
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lemma Spy_see_priK [simp]:
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     "evs \<in> zg ==> (Key (priK A) \<in> parts (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)
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done
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text{*So that blast can use it too*}
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declare  Spy_see_priK [THEN [2] rev_iffD1, dest!]
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lemma Spy_analz_priK [simp]:
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     "evs \<in> zg ==> (Key (priK A) \<in> analz (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
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by auto 
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subsection{*About NRO*}
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text{*Below we prove that if @{term NRO} exists then @{term A} definitely
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sent it, provided @{term A} is not broken.  *}
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text{*Strong conclusion for a good agent*}
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lemma NRO_authenticity_good:
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     "[| NRO \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
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         A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)  
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done
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text{*A compromised agent: we can't be sure whether A or the Spy sends the
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message or of the precise form of the message*}
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lemma NRO_authenticity_bad:
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     "[| NRO \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
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         A \<in> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>A' \<in> {A,Spy}. \<exists>C Y. Says A' C Y \<in> set evs & NRO \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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txt{*ZG3*}
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   prefer 4 apply blast
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txt{*ZG2*}
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   prefer 3 apply blast
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A, blast) 
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txt{*ZG1*}
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apply (force intro!: exI)
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txt{*ZG4*}
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apply (auto ); 
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done
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theorem NRO_authenticity:
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     "[| NRO \<in> used evs;
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         NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
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         A \<notin> broken; evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>C Y. Says A C Y \<in> set evs & NRO \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply auto
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 apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies NRO_authenticity_good)
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apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies NRO_authenticity_bad)
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done
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subsection{*About NRR*}
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text{*Below we prove that if @{term NRR} exists then @{term B} definitely
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sent it, provided @{term B} is not broken.*}
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text{*Strong conclusion for a good agent*}
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lemma NRR_authenticity_good:
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     "[| NRR \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
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         B \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> Says B A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto)  
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done
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lemma NRR_authenticity_bad:
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     "[| NRR \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
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         B \<in> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>B' \<in> {B,Spy}. \<exists>C Y. Says B' C Y \<in> set evs & NRR \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply (simp_all del: bex_simps)
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txt{*ZG3*}
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   prefer 4 apply blast
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A, blast)
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txt{*ZG1*}
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apply (auto simp del: bex_simps)
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txt{*ZG2*}
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apply (force intro!: exI)
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done
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theorem NRR_authenticity:
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     "[| NRR \<in> used evs;
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         NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
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         B \<notin> broken;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>C Y. Says B C Y \<in> set evs & NRR \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply auto
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 apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies NRR_authenticity_good)
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apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies NRR_authenticity_bad)
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done
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subsection{*Proofs About @{term sub_K}*}
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text{*Below we prove that if @{term sub_K} exists then @{term A} definitely
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sent it, provided @{term A} is not broken.  *}
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text{*Strong conclusion for a good agent*}
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lemma sub_K_authenticity_good:
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     "[| sub_K \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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         A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> Says A TTP {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, sub_K|} \<in> set evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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txt{*Fake*} 
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apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
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done
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text{*A compromised agent: we can't be sure whether A or the Spy sends the
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message or of the precise form of the message*}
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lemma sub_K_authenticity_bad:
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     "[| sub_K \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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         A \<in> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>A' \<in> {A,Spy}. \<exists>C Y. Says A' C Y \<in> set evs & sub_K \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies)
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apply (simp_all del: bex_simps)
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A, blast)
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txt{*ZG1*}
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apply (auto simp del: bex_simps)
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txt{*ZG3*}
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apply (force intro!: exI)
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done
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theorem sub_K_authenticity:
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     "[| sub_K \<in> used evs;
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         sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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         A \<notin> broken;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> \<exists>C Y. Says A C Y \<in> set evs & sub_K \<in> parts {Y}"
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apply auto
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 apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies sub_K_authenticity_good)
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apply (force dest!: Crypt_used_imp_spies sub_K_authenticity_bad)
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done
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subsection{*Proofs About @{term con_K}*}
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text{*Below we prove that if @{term con_K} exists, then @{term TTP} has it,
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and therefore @{term A} and @{term B}) can get it too.  Moreover, we know
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that @{term A} sent @{term sub_K}*}
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lemma con_K_authenticity:
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     "[|con_K \<in> used evs;
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        con_K = Crypt (priK TTP)
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                  {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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        evs \<in> zg |]
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    ==> Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
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          \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
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txt{*ZG2*}
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apply (blast dest: parts_cut)
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done
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text{*If @{term TTP} holds @{term con_K} then @{term A} sent
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 @{term sub_K}.  We assume that @{term A} is not broken.  Importantly, nothing
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  needs to be assumed about the form of @{term con_K}!*}
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lemma Notes_TTP_imp_Says_A:
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     "[|Notes TTP {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K, con_K|}
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           \<in> set evs;
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        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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        A \<notin> broken; evs \<in> zg|]
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    ==> \<exists>C Y. Says A C Y \<in> set evs & sub_K \<in> parts {Y}"
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by (blast dest!: Notes_TTP_imp_Gets [THEN Gets_imp_knows_Spy, THEN parts.Inj] intro: sub_K_authenticity)
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text{*If @{term con_K} exists, then @{term A} sent @{term sub_K}.  We again
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   assume that @{term A} is not broken. *}
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theorem B_sub_K_authenticity:
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     "[|con_K \<in> used evs;
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        con_K = Crypt (priK TTP) {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B,
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                                   Nonce L, Key K|};
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        sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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        A \<notin> broken; B \<noteq> TTP; evs \<in> zg|]
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    ==> \<exists>C Y. Says A C Y \<in> set evs & sub_K \<in> parts {Y}"
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by (blast dest: con_K_authenticity Notes_TTP_imp_Says_A)
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subsection{*Proving fairness*}
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text{*Cannot prove that, if @{term B} has NRO, then  @{term A} has her NRR.
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It would appear that @{term B} has a small advantage, though it is
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useless to win disputes: @{term B} needs to present @{term con_K} as well.*}
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text{*Strange: unicity of the label protects @{term A}?*}
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lemma A_unicity: 
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     "[|NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
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        NRO \<in> parts (spies evs);
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        Says A B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M', NRO'|}
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          \<in> set evs;
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        A \<notin> bad; evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> M'=M"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, auto) 
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txt{*ZG1: freshness*}
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apply (blast dest: parts.Body) 
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done
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text{*Fairness lemma: if @{term sub_K} exists, then @{term A} holds 
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NRR.  Relies on unicity of labels.*}
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lemma sub_K_implies_NRR:
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     "[| sub_K \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         NRO \<in> parts (spies evs);
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         sub_K = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_sub, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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         NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
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         NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
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         A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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     ==> Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply blast 
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txt{*ZG1: freshness*}
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apply (blast dest: parts.Body) 
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txt{*ZG3*}
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apply (blast dest: A_unicity [OF refl]) 
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done
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lemma Crypt_used_imp_L_used:
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     "[| Crypt (priK TTP) {|F, A, B, L, K|} \<in> used evs; evs \<in> zg |]
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      ==> L \<in> used evs"
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct, auto)
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
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txt{*ZG2: freshness*}
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apply (blast dest: parts.Body) 
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done
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text{*Fairness for @{term A}: if @{term con_K} and @{term NRO} exist, 
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then @{term A} holds NRR.  @{term A} must be uncompromised, but there is no
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assumption about @{term B}.*}
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theorem A_fairness_NRO:
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     "[|con_K \<in> used evs;
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        NRO \<in> parts (spies evs);
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        con_K = Crypt (priK TTP)
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                      {|Number f_con, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce L, Key K|};
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        NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
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        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, Crypt K M|};
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        A \<notin> bad;  evs \<in> zg |]
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    ==> Gets A {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, NRR|} \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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   txt{*Fake*}
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   apply (simp add: parts_insert_knows_A) 
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   apply (blast dest: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un) 
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  txt{*ZG1*}
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  apply (blast dest: Crypt_used_imp_L_used) 
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 txt{*ZG2*}
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 apply (blast dest: parts_cut)
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   453
txt{*ZG4*}
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apply (blast intro: sub_K_implies_NRR [OF _ _ refl] 
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             dest: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj])
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   456
done
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text{*Fairness for @{term B}: NRR exists at all, then @{term B} holds NRO.
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@{term B} must be uncompromised, but there is no assumption about @{term
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A}. *}
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theorem B_fairness_NRR:
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     "[|NRR \<in> used evs;
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        NRR = Crypt (priK B) {|Number f_nrr, Agent A, Nonce L, C|};
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        NRO = Crypt (priK A) {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C|};
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        B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> zg |]
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    ==> Gets B {|Number f_nro, Agent B, Nonce L, C, NRO|} \<in> set evs"
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apply clarify
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apply (erule rev_mp)
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apply (erule zg.induct)
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apply (frule_tac [5] ZG2_msg_in_parts_spies, simp_all)
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txt{*Fake*}
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apply (blast dest!: Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un)
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txt{*ZG2*}
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apply (blast dest: parts_cut)
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   475
done
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   477
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text{*If @{term con_K} exists at all, then @{term B} can get it, by @{text
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con_K_authenticity}.  Cannot conclude that also NRO is available to @{term B},
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because if @{term A} were unfair, @{term A} could build message 3 without
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building message 1, which contains NRO. *}
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end