src/HOL/Auth/TLS.thy
author paulson
Mon Jul 07 10:49:14 1997 +0200 (1997-07-07)
changeset 3506 a36e0a49d2cd
parent 3500 0d8ad2f192d8
child 3515 d8a71f6eaf40
permissions -rw-r--r--
New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/TLS
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1997  University of Cambridge
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Inductive relation "tls" for the baby TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol.
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An RSA cryptosystem is assumed, and X.509v3 certificates are abstracted down
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to the trivial form {A, publicKey(A)}privateKey(Server), where Server is a
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global signing authority.
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A is the client and B is the server, not to be confused with the constant
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Server, who is in charge of all public keys.
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The model assumes that no fraudulent certificates are present, but it does
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assume that some private keys are lost to the spy.
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Abstracted from "The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0" by Tim Dierks and Christopher
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Allen, Transport Layer Security Working Group, 21 May 1997,
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INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-tls-protocol-03.txt
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*)
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TLS = Public + 
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consts
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  (*Client, server write keys.  They implicitly include the MAC secrets.*)
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  clientK, serverK :: "nat*nat*nat => key"
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  certificate      :: "[agent,key] => msg"
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defs
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  certificate_def
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    "certificate A KA == Crypt (priK Server) {|Agent A, Key KA|}"
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rules
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  (*clientK is collision-free and makes symmetric keys*)
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  inj_clientK   "inj clientK"	
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  isSym_clientK "isSymKey (clientK x)"	(*client write keys are symmetric*)
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  (*serverK is similar*)
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  inj_serverK   "inj serverK"	
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  isSym_serverK "isSymKey (serverK x)"	(*server write keys are symmetric*)
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  (*Clashes with pubK and priK are impossible, but this axiom is needed.*)
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  clientK_range "range clientK <= Compl (range serverK)"
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  (*Spy has access to his own key for spoof messages, but Server is secure*)
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  Spy_in_lost     "Spy: lost"
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  Server_not_lost "Server ~: lost"
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consts  lost :: agent set        (*No need for it to be a variable*)
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	tls  :: event list set
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inductive tls
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  intrs 
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    Nil  (*Initial trace is empty*)
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         "[]: tls"
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    Fake (*The spy, an active attacker, MAY say anything he CAN say.*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  B ~= Spy;  
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             X: synth (analz (sees lost Spy evs)) |]
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          ==> Says Spy B X # evs : tls"
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    SpyKeys (*The spy may apply clientK & serverK to nonces he's found*)
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         "[| evs: tls;
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	     Says Spy B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M|} : set evs |]
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          ==> Says Spy B {| Key (clientK(NA,NB,M)),
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			    Key (serverK(NA,NB,M)) |} # evs : tls"
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    ClientHello
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	 (*XA represents CLIENT_VERSION, CIPHER_SUITES and COMPRESSION_METHODS.
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	   It is uninterpreted but will be confirmed in the FINISHED messages.
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	   As an initial simplification, SESSION_ID is identified with NA
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           and reuse of sessions is not supported.*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce NA ~: used evs |]
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          ==> Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Agent XA|} # evs  :  tls"
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    ServerHello
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         (*XB represents CLIENT_VERSION, CIPHER_SUITE and COMPRESSION_METHOD.
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	   Na is returned in its role as SESSION_ID.  A CERTIFICATE_REQUEST is
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	   implied and a SERVER CERTIFICATE is always present.*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce NB ~: used evs;
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             Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Agent XA|} : set evs |]
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          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent XB,
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			 certificate B (pubK B)|}
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                # evs  :  tls"
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    ClientCertKeyEx
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         (*CLIENT CERTIFICATE and KEY EXCHANGE.  M is the pre-master-secret.
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           Note that A encrypts using the supplied KB, not pubK B.*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce M ~: used evs;
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evs |]
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          ==> Says A B {|certificate A (pubK A), Crypt KB (Nonce M)|}
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                # evs  :  tls"
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    CertVerify
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	(*The optional CERTIFICATE VERIFY message contains the specific
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          components listed in the security analysis, Appendix F.1.1.2;
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          it also contains the pre-master-secret.  Checking the signature,
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          which is the only use of A's certificate, assures B of A's presence*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;  
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evs;
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	     Says A B {|certificate A (pubK A), Crypt KB (Nonce M)|}
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	       : set evs |]
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          ==> Says A B (Crypt (priK A)
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			(Hash{|Nonce NB, certificate B KB, Nonce M|}))
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                # evs  :  tls"
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	(*Finally come the FINISHED messages, confirming XA and XB among
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          other things.  The master-secret is the hash of NA, NB and M.
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          Either party may sent its message first.*)
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    ClientFinished
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;
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	     Says A  B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Agent XA|} : set evs;
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evs;
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             Says A  B {|certificate A (pubK A), Crypt KB (Nonce M)|}
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	       : set evs |]
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          ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
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			(Hash{|Hash{|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M|},
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			       Nonce NA, Agent XA,
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			       certificate A (pubK A), 
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			       Nonce NB, Agent XB, Agent B|}))
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                # evs  :  tls"
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	(*Keeping A' and A'' distinct means B cannot even check that the
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          two messages originate from the same source.*)
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    ServerFinished
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         "[| evs: tls;  A ~= B;
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	     Says A' B  {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Agent XA|} : set evs;
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	     Says B  A  {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent XB,
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		 	  certificate B (pubK B)|}
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	       : set evs;
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	     Says A'' B {|CERTA, Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce M)|} : set evs |]
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          ==> Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
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			(Hash{|Hash{|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M|},
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			       Nonce NA, Agent XA, Agent A, 
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			       Nonce NB, Agent XB,
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			       certificate B (pubK B)|}))
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                # evs  :  tls"
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  (**Oops message??**)
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end