src/HOL/Auth/TLS.thy
author paulson
Wed Sep 17 16:37:21 1997 +0200 (1997-09-17)
changeset 3677 f2569416d18b
parent 3676 cbaec955056b
child 3683 aafe719dff14
permissions -rw-r--r--
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/TLS
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1997  University of Cambridge
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Inductive relation "tls" for the baby TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol.
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This protocol is essentially the same as SSL 3.0.
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Abstracted from "The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0" by Tim Dierks and Christopher
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Allen, Transport Layer Security Working Group, 21 May 1997,
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INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-tls-protocol-03.txt.  Section numbers below refer
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to that memo.
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An RSA cryptosystem is assumed, and X.509v3 certificates are abstracted down
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to the trivial form {A, publicKey(A)}privateKey(Server), where Server is a
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global signing authority.
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A is the client and B is the server, not to be confused with the constant
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Server, who is in charge of all public keys.
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The model assumes that no fraudulent certificates are present, but it does
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assume that some private keys are to the spy.
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REMARK.  The event "Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|}" appears in ClientCertKeyEx,
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CertVerify, ClientFinished to record that A knows M.  It is a note from A to
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herself.  Nobody else can see it.  In ClientCertKeyEx, the Spy can substitute
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his own certificate for A's, but he cannot replace A's note by one for himself.
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The Note event avoids a weakness in the public-key model.  Each
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agent's state is recorded as the trace of messages.  When the true client (A)
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invents PMS, he encrypts PMS with B's public key before sending it.  The model
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does not distinguish the original occurrence of such a message from a replay.
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In the shared-key model, the ability to encrypt implies the ability to
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decrypt, so the problem does not arise.
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*)
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TLS = Public + 
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consts
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  (*Pseudo-random function of Section 5*)
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  PRF  :: "nat*nat*nat => nat"
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  (*Client, server write keys generated uniformly by function sessionK
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    to avoid duplicating their properties.
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    Theyimplicitly include the MAC secrets.*)
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  sessionK :: "bool*nat*nat*nat => key"
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  certificate      :: "[agent,key] => msg"
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defs
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  certificate_def
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    "certificate A KA == Crypt (priK Server) {|Agent A, Key KA|}"
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syntax
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    clientK, serverK :: "nat*nat*nat => key"
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translations
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  "clientK x"	== "sessionK(True,x)"
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  "serverK x"	== "sessionK(False,x)"
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rules
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  inj_PRF       "inj PRF"	
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  (*sessionK is collision-free and makes symmetric keys*)
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  inj_sessionK  "inj sessionK"	
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  isSym_sessionK "isSymKey (sessionK x)"
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  (*serverK is similar*)
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  inj_serverK   "inj serverK"	
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  isSym_serverK "isSymKey (serverK x)"
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  (*Clashes with pubK and priK are impossible, but this axiom is needed.*)
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  clientK_range "range clientK <= Compl (range serverK)"
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consts    tls :: event list set
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inductive tls
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  intrs 
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    Nil  (*Initial trace is empty*)
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         "[]: tls"
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    Fake (*The spy, an active attacker, MAY say anything he CAN say.*)
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         "[| evs: tls;  B ~= Spy;  
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             X: synth (analz (sees Spy evs)) |]
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          ==> Says Spy B X # evs : tls"
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    SpyKeys (*The spy may apply PRF, clientK & serverK to available nonces*)
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         "[| evsSK: tls;
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	     Says Spy B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M|} : set evsSK |]
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          ==> Says Spy B {| Nonce (PRF(M,NA,NB)),
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			    Key (clientK(NA,NB,M)),
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			    Key (serverK(NA,NB,M)) |} # evsSK : tls"
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    ClientHello
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	 (*(7.4.1.2)
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	   XA represents CLIENT_VERSION, CIPHER_SUITES and COMPRESSION_METHODS.
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	   It is uninterpreted but will be confirmed in the FINISHED messages.
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	   NA is CLIENT RANDOM, while SID is SESSION_ID.
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           UNIX TIME is omitted because the protocol doesn't use it.
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           May assume NA ~: range PRF because CLIENT RANDOM is 28 bytes
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	   while MASTER SECRET is 48 byptes*)
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         "[| evsCH: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce NA ~: used evsCH;  NA ~: range PRF |]
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          ==> Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number XA|}
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	        # evsCH  :  tls"
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    ServerHello
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         (*7.4.1.3 of the TLS Internet-Draft
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	   XB represents CLIENT_VERSION, CIPHER_SUITE and COMPRESSION_METHOD.
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           SERVER CERTIFICATE (7.4.2) is always present.
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           CERTIFICATE_REQUEST (7.4.4) is implied.*)
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         "[| evsSH: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce NB ~: used evsSH;  NB ~: range PRF;
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             Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number XA|}
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	       : set evsSH |]
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          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number XB,
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			 certificate B (pubK B)|}
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                # evsSH  :  tls"
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    ClientCertKeyEx
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         (*CLIENT CERTIFICATE (7.4.6) and KEY EXCHANGE (7.4.7).
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           The client, A, chooses PMS, the PREMASTER SECRET.
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           She encrypts PMS using the supplied KB, which ought to be pubK B.
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           We assume PMS ~: range PRF because a clash betweem the PMS
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           and another MASTER SECRET is highly unlikely (even though
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	   both items have the same length, 48 bytes).
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           The Note event records in the trace that she knows PMS
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               (see REMARK at top).*)
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         "[| evsCX: tls;  A ~= B;  Nonce PMS ~: used evsCX;  PMS ~: range PRF;
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evsCX |]
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          ==> Says A B {|certificate A (pubK A), Crypt KB (Nonce PMS)|}
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	      # Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|}
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	      # evsCX  :  tls"
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    CertVerify
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	(*The optional CERTIFICATE VERIFY (7.4.8) message contains the
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          specific components listed in the security analysis, F.1.1.2.
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          It adds the pre-master-secret, which is also essential!
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          Checking the signature, which is the only use of A's certificate,
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          assures B of A's presence*)
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         "[| evsCV: tls;  A ~= B;  
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evsCV;
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	     Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCV |]
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          ==> Says A B (Crypt (priK A)
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			(Hash{|Nonce NB, certificate B KB, Nonce PMS|}))
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              # evsCV  :  tls"
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	(*Finally come the FINISHED messages (7.4.8), confirming XA and XB
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          among other things.  The master-secret is PRF(PMS,NA,NB).
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          Either party may sent its message first.*)
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        (*The occurrence of Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} stops the 
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          rule's applying when the Spy has satisfied the "Says A B" by
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          repaying messages sent by the true client; in that case, the
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          Spy does not know PMS and could not sent CLIENT FINISHED.  One
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          could simply put A~=Spy into the rule, but one should not
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          expect the spy to be well-behaved.*)
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    ClientFinished
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         "[| evsCF: tls;  
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	     Says A  B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number XA|}
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	       : set evsCF;
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             Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number XB, certificate B KB|}
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	       : set evsCF;
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             Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCF;
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	     M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB) |]
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          ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
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			(Hash{|Nonce M, Number SID,
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			       Nonce NA, Number XA, Agent A, 
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			       Nonce NB, Number XB, Agent B|}))
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              # evsCF  :  tls"
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	(*Keeping A' and A'' distinct means B cannot even check that the
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          two messages originate from the same source. *)
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    ServerFinished
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         "[| evsSF: tls;
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	     Says A' B  {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number XA|}
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	       : set evsSF;
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	     Says B  A  {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number XB,
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		 	  certificate B (pubK B)|}
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	       : set evsSF;
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	     Says A'' B {|certificate A KA, Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)|}
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	       : set evsSF;
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	     M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB) |]
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          ==> Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
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			(Hash{|Nonce M, Number SID,
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			       Nonce NA, Number XA, Agent A, 
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			       Nonce NB, Number XB, Agent B|}))
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              # evsSF  :  tls"
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	(*Having transmitted CLIENT FINISHED and received an identical
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          message encrypted with serverK, the client stores the parameters
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          needed to resume this session.*)
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    ClientAccepts
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         "[| evsCA: tls;
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             Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCA;
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	     M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  
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	     X = Hash{|Nonce M, Number SID,
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	               Nonce NA, Number XA, Agent A, 
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		       Nonce NB, Number XB, Agent B|};
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             Says A  B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsCA;
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             Says B' A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsCA |]
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          ==> 
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             Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsCA  :  tls"
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	(*Having transmitted SERVER FINISHED and received an identical
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          message encrypted with clientK, the server stores the parameters
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          needed to resume this session.*)
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    ServerAccepts
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         "[| evsSA: tls;
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             Says A'' B {|certificate A KA, Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)|}
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	       : set evsSA;
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	     M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  
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	     X = Hash{|Nonce M, Number SID,
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	               Nonce NA, Number XA, Agent A, 
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		       Nonce NB, Number XB, Agent B|};
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             Says B  A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsSA;
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             Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsSA |]
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          ==> 
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             Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsSA  :  tls"
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  (**Oops message??**)
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end