

theory *EX-SmartCardPurse-deep* = *VCOpt* + *AuxBox*:

1 Smart Card Purse

This program adds a credit C to a balance B if the new balance $B + C$ does not exceed an upper bound MAX (the highest number the safety policy accepts). To check this condition a procedure is called which sets a flag F to $NAT\ 0$ if this condition is violated

— program variables

constdefs

$b :: nat$ — balance

$b \equiv 0$

$c :: nat$ — credit

$c \equiv 1$

$m :: nat$ — maximum

$m \equiv 2$

$p :: nat$ — return address storage

$p \equiv 3$

— initial values

constdefs

$b0 :: nat$

$b0 \equiv 4$ — maximal initial balance

$c0 :: nat$

$c0 \equiv 2$ — initial credit

$x :: nat$

$x \equiv 5$

constdefs *prog::SALprogram*

prog \equiv

$[(0, [(SET\ b\ b0, None),$
 $(SET\ c\ c0, None),$
 $(CALL\ p\ 1, Some\ (\Lambda\ [V\ b\ \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ b0), V\ c\ \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ c0)])),$
 $(ADD\ b\ c, Some\ (\Lambda\ [V\ b\ \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ b0), Ty\ (V\ c)\ Nat,$
 $(C\ (NAT\ 0) \prec V\ c) \supset$
 $\Lambda\ [(V\ b \oplus V\ c) \preceq C\ (NAT\ MAX), V\ c\ \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ c0)]))],$
 $(HALT, None)]),$
 $(1, [(SET\ m\ MAX, Some\ (\Lambda\ [V\ p\ \doteq\ Rp, Ty\ (V\ b)\ Nat, Ty\ (V\ c)\ Nat,$
 $\prod x. Neg\ (Eq\ (Lv\ x)\ (C\ (NAT\ p))) \supset (Deref\ (Lv\ x) \doteq\ Old$
 $(Deref\ (Lv\ x)))]),$
 $(SUB\ m\ c, None),$
 $(JMPL\ b\ m\ 2, None),$
 $(SET\ c\ 0, None),$
 $(RET\ p, Some\ (\Lambda\ [(\prod x. (\Lambda\ [Neg\ ((Lv\ x) \doteq\ (C\ (NAT\ c))], Neg\ ((Lv\ x) \doteq\ (C$
 $(NAT\ m))),$
 $Neg\ ((Lv\ x) \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ p)]) \supset$
 $(Deref\ (Lv\ x) \doteq\ Old\ (Deref\ (Lv\ x)))]),$
 $(Neg\ (V\ c \doteq\ C\ (NAT\ 0)) \supset (\Lambda\ [V\ c \doteq\ Old\ (V\ c),$

$$(V b \oplus V c) \preceq C (NAT MAX)])))]]$$

1.1 The Verification Condition

generate-code [*term-of*]

vcg = *vcgSALDeep*

vcopt = *vcopt*

prg = *prg*

ML {** set show-brackets; **}

ML {** val vc = vcg prg; **}

ML {** File.write (Path.unpack pvc.txt) (Pretty.str-of (Sign.pretty-term (sign-of (the-context ()))) (term-of-form vc))); **}

ML {** val vco = vcopt [] vc; **}

ML {** File.write (Path.unpack opvc.txt) (Pretty.str-of (Sign.pretty-term (sign-of (the-context ()))) (term-of-form vco))); **}

ML {** val pvc = (Pretty.str-of (Sign.pretty-term (sign-of (the-context ()))) (term-of-form vco))); **}

ML {** reset show-brackets **}

1.2 Program Verification

First we ensure that the program is wellformed.

lemma *wf-prog*:

wf prg

apply (*simp add: wf-def checkPos.simps prog-def Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv cmd.simps domC.simps ret-succs.simps callpoints-def isCall-def anF.simps*)

done

Then, we prove the verification condition

1.2.1 Automated Proof

lemma *vc-prog-holds*:

provable prog vc

apply (*simp only: provable-def valid-def split-paired-all | rule HOLprf | rule ballI | rule allI | rule impI*)+

apply (*rename-tac pn i m e I*)

apply (*cut-tac wf-prog, drule vc-proof-startup,assumption, (erule conjE | erule exE)*+, (*simp only: fst-conv snd-conv*))

— Now, the prelude is finished. The main proof starts . . .

apply (*simp only: vc-def*)
apply (*auto simp add: vc-simps*)
apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: tval.split tval.split-asm*)

apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: nat.split*)

apply (*fastsimp simp add: vc-simps*)

apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: tval.split tval.split-asm*)
apply *arith*

apply (*simp split add: nat.split*)
 — nprfsize = 51.204
done

1.2.2 Manual Proof

— Lemmas about validity of formulae

lemma *validF-True: validF I s T = True*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-False: validF I s F = False*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-And-Nil: validF I s (Λ []) = True*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-And-Cons: validF I s (Λ (f # fs)) = ((validF I s f) ∧ (validF I s (Λ fs)))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-And-Cons-Nil: valid' (?s, (Λ [f])) = (valid' (?s, ?f))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-Imp: validF I s (f1 ⊃ f2) = ((validF I s f1) → (validF I s f2))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-Neg: validF I s (Neg f) = (¬ (validF I s f))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-Eq: validF I s (e1 ≐ e2) = ((eval I s e1) = (eval I s e2))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-Leq: validF I s (e1 ≲ e2) = ((nv (eval I s e1)) ≤ (nv (eval I s e2)))*
by *simp*

lemma *validF-Less: validF I s (e1 ≺ e2) = ((nv (eval I s e1)) < (nv (eval I s e2)))*

by *simp*

lemma *validF-Forall*: $\text{validF } I \ s \ (\prod v. f) = (\forall tv. (\text{validF } (I[v::=tv]) \ s \ f))$
by (*simp add: Let-def*)

lemma *length-cons*:
 $\text{length } (a\#as) = \text{Suc } (\text{length } as)$
by *simp*

lemma *vc-prog-holds2*:
provable prog vc
apply (*simp only: provable-def valid-def split-paired-all | rule HOLprf | rule ballI | rule allI | rule impI*)
apply (*rename-tac pn i m e I*)
apply (*cut-tac wf-prog, drule vc-proof-startup,assumption, (erule conjE | erule exE)*)
apply (*simp only: fst-conv snd-conv*)
apply (*simp add: vc-def validF-validFs.simps del: sysinv.simps sysinv2.simps*)

— Now, the prelude is finished. The main proof starts . . .

apply (*case-tac prog, ((pn,i),m,e) \models (initF prog)*)
— (initF prg) implies (isafeF prg (ipc prg))
apply (*simp add: initF-def valid-def b-def MAX-def b0-def c-def c0-def update-def fun-upd-apply nv-def*)
— case not (initF prg)
apply (*erule isafeP-elim*)
apply (*simp only: simp-thms*)
apply (*drule-tac t=s'' in sym*)
apply (*simp only: fst-conv snd-conv*)
— now we know that ((pn,i),m,e) is inductively safe

apply (*rule conjI*)
— initF impliziert isafeF (0,0)
apply (*simp add: validF-validFs.simps Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv nv-def*)

apply (*simp only: Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv*)

apply (*rule conjI*)
— (1,0) nach (1,4), prozedurbody, zwei wege
apply (*case-tac css*)
apply (*simp only:*)
apply (*drule-tac P= λ s. s in subst[OF sysinv.simps]*)
apply (*simp add: validF-validFs.simps Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv nv-def lift-def*)

— case "css = a list"

apply (*simp add: validF-validFs.simps Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv nv-def*)

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lift-def tval.cases id-lookup-def)
apply (rule impI)
apply (simp add: validF-validFs.simps Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv nv-def
lift-def tval.cases id-lookup-def update-def split add: tval.split tval.split-asm)
apply (rule conjI | rule impI)+

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apply (erule-tac x=NAT (Suc 0) in allE)
apply (erule conjE)+
apply (erule-tac x=Suc 0 in allE)
apply simp

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apply arith

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— Sprungbedingung gilt nicht

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apply (rule impI | rule allI | erule conjE)+
apply (rule conjI)
apply (simp add: lift-def nv-def update-def)
apply (erule-tac x=NAT 0 in allE)
apply simp
apply (case-tac m (Suc 0))
apply (simp add: MAX-def)
apply simp
apply (case-tac 0 < nat)
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp

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apply (rule conjI)
apply (erule-tac x=NAT 0 in allE)
apply (simp add: update-def)

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apply (rule conjI)
apply simp
apply (case-tac m (Suc 0))
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp

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apply (rule impI)
apply (simp add: nv-def lift-def)
apply (erule-tac x=NAT 0 in allE)
apply (simp add: update-def)

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apply (case-tac m (Suc 0))
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp

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exE)+, (*simp only: fst-conv snd-conv*)

— Now, the prelude is finished. The main proof starts . . .

apply (*simp only: vco-def*)

apply (*auto simp add: vc-simps*)

apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: tval.split tval.split-asm*)

apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: nat.split*)

apply (*fastsimp simp add: vc-simps*)

apply (*simp add: vc-simps split add: tval.split tval.split-asm*)

apply *arith*

apply (*simp split add: nat.split*)

done

end