

```
theory EX-Mult = SALTimeFWInst:
```

1 Time Bounded Multiplication

We show that a machine program that multiplies two numbers A and B is type safe, contains no overflows and does not require more than MAXTIME computation steps provided the input for A and B is less than MXA or MXB respectively.

1.1 Variables

We use A and B to store the input values

```
constdefs
  A :: nat — Faktor1
  A ≡ 0
  B :: nat — Faktor2
  B ≡ 1
```

We use C as counter and R as result variable

```
constdefs
  C::nat — Counter
  C ≡ 2
  R :: nat — Result
  R ≡ 3
```

Both inputs should not be greater than 3.

```
constdefs
  MXA::nat
  MXA ≡ 3
  MXB::nat
  MXB ≡ 3
```

We start the program with these values. They could be changed to other values within [0,MXA] or [0,MXB] without affecting the safety proof

```
constdefs
  a0::nat
  a0 ≡ 3
  b0::nat
  b0 ≡ 3

constdefs
  prog :: SALprogram
  prog ≡
  [
    (0,[(SET R 0, None),
         (SET C 0, None),
```

```


$$\begin{aligned}
& (SET A a0, None), \\
& (SET B b0, None), \\
& (JMPEQ C A 4, Some (\lambda (p,m,e). \exists a b r c. (m A) = NAT a \wedge (m B) = NAT b \wedge (m C) = NAT c \wedge (m R) = NAT r \\
& \quad \quad \quad \wedge a <= MXA \wedge b <= MXB \wedge c <= a \wedge (r \\
& = c * b) \wedge (tim e) = 4 + c * 4)), \\
& (INC C, None), \\
& (ADD R B, None), \\
& (JMPB 3, None), \\
& (HALT, None)
\end{aligned}
]$$


```

lemma [*code*]:

prog =

[

```
(0,[(SET R 0, None),
      (SET C 0, None),
      (SET A a0, None),
      (SET B b0, None),
      (JMPEQ C A 4, S)
= NAT b ∧ (m C)=NA
```

$\wedge a <= MXA \wedge b <= MXB \wedge c <= a \wedge (r = c * b) \wedge (tim\ e) = 4 + c * 4))$,

(INC C, None),

$(ADD R B, None)$,
 $(JMPB \beta, None)$.

(HALT, None),

1

)

]

a

d

1.2

1.2 Verification Condition

generate-code (*vcgSALT.ML*) [*term-of*]

$$vcg = vcgSALT$$

prg = *prog*

This is the verification condition the ML program we generated for the VCG above yields.

constdefs

vc::SALform

```


$$vc \equiv (\%s. (((\%s. (((\%(pc, m, e). ((pc = ((0::nat), (0::nat))) \& ((cs e) = [(0::nat), m])) \& (((h e) = [])) \& (ALL X. ((m X) = ILLEGAL)))))) s) --> ((\%s. (((\%s. (((\%(pc, m, e). ((0::nat) <= MAX)) s) \& ((\%s. (((\%(pc, m, e). ((tim e) < MAXTIME)) s) \& ((\%s. True) s)))) s))) s) \& ((\%s. (((\%(pc,$$


```


$$\begin{aligned}
& s) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) s)) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). (\text{pc} = ((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) s) \rightarrow ((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\text{EX} n. ((m (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) = (\text{NAT} n)))) \& ((\text{EX} n. ((m (\text{Suc}(0::nat))) = (\text{NAT} n)))) \& \\
& ((\text{EX} n. (((\text{lift op} + (m (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))) (m (\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) = (\text{NAT} n)) \& (n <= \text{MAX}))))) s) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\text{tim} e) < \text{MAXTIME})) s) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) s)) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). (\text{pc} = ((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) s) \rightarrow ((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\text{tim} e) < \text{MAXTIME}) | ((\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat))) = (0::nat)))) s) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) s)) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). (\text{pc} = ((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) s) \rightarrow ((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\text{EX} n. ((m (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) = (\text{NAT} n)))) \& ((\text{EX} n. ((m (0::nat)) = (\text{NAT} n)))) s) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). ((\text{tim} e) < \text{MAXTIME})) s) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) s)) \& ((\%s. (((\%s. \text{pc}, m, e). (\text{EX} a b r c. (((m A) = (\text{NAT} a)) \& (((m B) = (\text{NAT} b)) \& (((m C) = (\text{NAT} c)) \& (((m R) = (\text{NAT} r)) \& ((a <= MXA) \& ((b <= MXB) \& ((c <= a) \& ((r = (c * b)) \& ((\text{tim} e) = ((4::nat) + (c * (4::nat))))))))))) s) \& \\
& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) (((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat))))), m, (\text{h-update}((h e) @ [((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) e)))) s)) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) (((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))), (\text{update} m (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) (\text{lift op} + (m (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) (m (\text{Suc}(0::nat)))), (\text{h-update}((h e) @ [((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) e)))) s)) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) (((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))), (\text{update} m (\text{Suc}(0::nat))) (\text{lift op} + (m (\text{Suc}(0::nat)))) (\text{NAT}(1::nat))), (\text{h-update}((h e) @ [((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) e)))) s)) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) (((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))), m, (\text{h-update}((h e) @ [((0::nat), (\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(\text{Suc}(0::nat)))))))) e)))) s)) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s))) \& ((\%s. \text{True}) s)))
\end{aligned}$$

1.3 Program Verification

First, we check that the program is wellformed

```

lemma wf-prog:
wf prog
apply (simp add: wf-def domC.simps checkPos.simps prog-def Let-def split-def
fst-conv snd-conv cmd.simps ret-succs.simps callpoints-def isCall-def anF.simps)
done

lemmas prog-constants = MAX-def MAXTIME-def a0-def b0-def MXA-def MXB-def
A-def B-def C-def R-def
lemmas prog-simps = prog-constants tim-def update-def fun-upd-apply Let-def split-def
fst-conv snd-conv initF-def valid-def

```

Then we proof the vc. Note that the firt part of the proof is a standard prelude, which is the same for every program. In this prelude we instantiate two system invariants sysinv1 and sysinv2. They give us valuable properties that hold for any wellformed program.

The actual proof for the vc is almost entirely by automatic simplification. They only point where human insight is needed, is where we use lemma about monotonicity of multiplication

```

lemma mult-mono:
   $\llbracket a \leq (b::nat); c \leq (d::nat) \rrbracket \implies a * c \leq b * d$ 
  apply (simp add: mult-le-mono)
  done

theorem vc-prog-holds:
  provable prog vc
  apply (simp add: provable-def valid-def)
  apply (rule allI)+
  apply (rename-tac pn i m e)
  apply (simp only: vc-def)
  apply (rule impI)
  apply (subgoal-tac sysinv (((pn,i),m,e),prog))
  prefer 2
  apply (cut-tac wf-prog)
  apply (cut-tac sysinv-pres)
  apply (erule-tac x=prog in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=((pn,i),m,e) in allE)
  apply (drule isafeP-mono)
  apply (drule mp, assumption)+
  apply assumption
  apply (subgoal-tac sysinv2 (((pn,i),m,e),prog))
  prefer 2
  apply (cut-tac wf-prog)
  apply (cut-tac sysinv2-pres)
  apply (erule-tac x=prog in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=((pn,i),m,e) in allE)
  apply (drule isafeP-mono)
  apply (drule mp, assumption)+
  apply assumption
  apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists c \text{ cs. } cs = c\#cs$ )
  prefer 2
  apply (rule classical)
  apply (subgoal-tac cs e = [])
  prefer 2
  apply (rule classical)
  apply (simp only: neq-Nil-conv)
  apply (simp add: sysinv.simps)
  apply (erule exE)+

— main proof
  apply (case-tac prog,((pn,i),m,e)  $\models$  (initF prog))
  apply (simp add: prog-simps)

```

```

— case not (initF prg)
apply (drule isafeP-mono)
apply (erule isafeP-elims)
apply (simp add: prog-simps)

apply (simp add: prog-simps)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule impI)+
apply (erule conjE | erule exE)+
apply arith

apply (rule impI)
apply (erule conjE | erule exE)+
apply (simp add: lift-def nat-number)
apply (subgoal-tac ca * b ≤ (Suc (Suc 0)) * (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))))
prefer 2
apply (rule mult-mono)
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp
done

end

```