

theory *EX-Sum* = *SALTypeSafetyFWInst*:

1 Example: Type Safety

We analyse a program that adds all numbers from 0 to N.

1.1 Variables

constdefs

N::*nat*

N≡0

I::*nat*

I≡1

S::*nat*

S≡2

— initial values

constdefs

N0::*nat*

N0≡4

I0::*nat*

I0≡0

S0::*nat*

S0≡0

1.2 Annotated program

constdefs

prog::*SALprogram*

prog ≡ [

(*SET N N0*,*None*),

(*SET I I0*,*None*),

(*SET S S0*,*None*),

(*JMPEQ I N 4*, *Some* ($\lambda(pc, m). m I \neq \text{ILLEGAL} \wedge m N \neq \text{ILLEGAL} \wedge m$

S $\neq \text{ILLEGAL}$)),

(*ADD S I*, *None*),

(*INC I*, *None*),

(*JMPB 3*, *None*),

(*JMPB 0*, *Some TrueF*)

]

lemma [*code*]:

prog = [

(*SET N N0*,*None*),

(*SET I I0*,*None*),

(*SET S S0*,*None*),

```

    (JMPEQ I N 4, Some (term (λ(pc, m). m (to-term I) ≠ ILLEGAL ∧ m
(to-term N) ≠ ILLEGAL ∧ m (to-term S) ≠ ILLEGAL))),
    (ADD S I, None),
    (INC I, None),
    (JMPB 3, None),
    (JMPB 0, Some TrueF)
  ]
apply (simp add: term-def to-term-def prog-def)
done

```

1.3 The verification condition

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generate-code (vcgTSAL.ML) [term-of]
  prg = prog
  vcg = vcgTSAL

```

constdefs *vc::SALform*

```

vc ≡ %s. (%s. (%s. (p, m). p = 0 & (ALL X. m X = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL))
s --> (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%s. True) s --> (%(pc, m). (%s. (%s.
True) s & (%s. (%s. (%s. True) s --> (%(pc, m). (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s.
(%s. (%s. True) s --> (%(pc, m). (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%(pc, m). m (Suc
0) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL & m 0 ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL &
m (Suc (Suc 0)) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL) s & (%s. True) s) s) (Suc
(Suc (Suc 0)), SALSemantics.update m (Suc (Suc 0)) (SALSemantics.tval.NAT
0))) s) s & (%s. True) s) s) (Suc (Suc 0), SALSemantics.update m (Suc 0)
(SALSemantics.tval.NAT 0))) s) s & (%s. True) s) s) (Suc 0, SALSemantics.update
m 0 (SALSemantics.tval.NAT (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0)))))) s) s & (%s. True) s)
s) s & (%s. (%s. (%s. (%s. (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%(pc, m). m (Suc 0) ~ =
SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL & m 0 ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL & m (Suc
(Suc 0)) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL) s & (%s. True) s) s) s & (%s. (%(pc,
m). m (Suc 0) = m 0) s & (%s. True) s) s) s --> (%(pc, m). (%s. (%s. True)
s & (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))))),
m)) s) s & (%s. (%s. (%s. (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%(pc, m). m (Suc
0) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL & m 0 ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL &
m (Suc (Suc 0)) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL) s & (%s. True) s) s) s & (%s.
(%(pc, m). m (Suc 0) ~ = m 0) s & (%s. True) s) s) s --> (%(pc, m). (%s.
(%(p, m). m (Suc 0) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL) s & (%s. (%s. (%s. True)
s --> (%(pc, m). (%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%s. (%s. True) s --> (%(pc, m).
(%s. (%s. True) s & (%s. (%(pc, m). m (Suc 0) ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL
& m 0 ~ = SALSemantics.tval.ILLEGAL & m (Suc (Suc 0)) ~ = SALSemantics.
tval.ILLEGAL) s & (%s. True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc 0)), m)) s) s & (%s.
True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))))), SALSemantics.update m (Suc
0) (SALSemantics.lift op + (m (Suc 0)) (SALSemantics.tval.NAT 1))) s) s &
(%s. True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))))), SALSemantics.update m (Suc
(Suc 0)) (SALSemantics.lift op + (m (Suc (Suc 0))) (m (Suc 0)))) s) s & (%s.

```

$True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))), m)) s) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) s \& (\%s. (\%s. (\%s. (\%s. (\%s. True) s \& (\%s. (\%s. True) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) s \& (\%s. (\%s. True) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) s) s \dashrightarrow (\% (pc, m). (\%s. (\%s. True) s \& (\%s. (\%s. True) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc (Suc 0))))))), m)) s) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) s \& (\%s. True) s) s) s$

lemma *all-ex-tval*: $(\forall x. m x \sim = ILLEGAL) \implies \forall x. \exists k. m x = NAT k \mathbf{done}$

lemma *ex-tval*: $(m x \sim = ILLEGAL) \implies \exists k. m x = NAT k \mathbf{done}$

1.4 Program Verification

First, we check the program's wellformedness.

lemma *wf-prog*:

wf prog

apply (*simp add: wf-def checkPos.simps prog-def Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv cmd-def domC-def anF-def*)

done

Then we prove the verification condition. One simplifier call suffices.

lemmas *vc-simps* [*simp*] = *vc-def provable-def valid-def initF-def valid-def Let-def split-def fst-conv snd-conv update-def fun-upd-apply S-def I-def N-def S0-def I0-def N0-def lift-def all-ex-tval ex-tval*

lemma *vc-prog-holds*: $prog \vdash vc$

apply (*auto simp add: vc-def tval.cases split add: tval.split tval.split-asm*)

done

Next, we check that the generated vc is correct

lemma *vc-correct*: $vcgTSAL prog = vc$

apply (*simp add: nat-number vcgTSAL-def prog-def vcG-def ipc-def wpF-def succsF-def safeF-def anF-def domC-def domA-def isafe.simps cmd-def Conj-def Impl-def TrueF-def FalseF-def*)

done

theorem *prog-isSafe*:

isSafe prog

apply (*rule platform-soundness*)

apply (*rule wf-prog*)

apply (*simp only: vc-correct*)

apply (*rule vc-prog-holds*)

done

end