src/HOL/Auth/TLS.ML
author paulson
Wed, 01 Oct 1997 12:07:24 +0200
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child 3760 77f71f650433
permissions -rw-r--r--
Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs; deleted unused theorems
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/TLS
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1997  University of Cambridge
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Protocol goals: 
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* M, serverK(NA,NB,M) and clientK(NA,NB,M) will be known only to the two
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     parties (though A is not necessarily authenticated).
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* B upon receiving CertVerify knows that A is present (But this
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    message is optional!)
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* A upon receiving ServerFinished knows that B is present
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* Each party who has received a FINISHED message can trust that the other
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  party agrees on all message components, including PA and PB (thus foiling
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  rollback attacks).
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*)
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open TLS;
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proof_timing:=true;
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HOL_quantifiers := false;
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(** We mostly DO NOT unfold the definition of "certificate".  The attached
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    lemmas unfold it lazily, when "certificate B KB" occurs in appropriate
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    contexts.
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**)
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goalw thy [certificate_def] 
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    "parts (insert (certificate B KB) H) =  \
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\    parts (insert (Crypt (priK Server) {|Agent B, Key KB|}) H)";
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by (rtac refl 1);
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qed "parts_insert_certificate";
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goalw thy [certificate_def] 
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    "analz (insert (certificate B KB) H) =  \
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\    analz (insert (Crypt (priK Server) {|Agent B, Key KB|}) H)";
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by (rtac refl 1);
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qed "analz_insert_certificate";
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Addsimps [parts_insert_certificate, analz_insert_certificate];
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goalw thy [certificate_def] 
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    "(X = certificate B KB) = (Crypt (priK Server) {|Agent B, Key KB|} = X)";
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by (Blast_tac 1);
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qed "eq_certificate_iff";
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AddIffs [eq_certificate_iff];
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(*Injectiveness of key-generating functions*)
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AddIffs [inj_PRF RS inj_eq, inj_sessionK RS inj_eq];
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(* invKey(sessionK x) = sessionK x*)
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Addsimps [isSym_sessionK, rewrite_rule [isSymKey_def] isSym_sessionK];
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(*** clientK and serverK make symmetric keys; no clashes with pubK or priK ***)
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goal thy "pubK A ~= sessionK arg";
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br notI 1;
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1);
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by (Full_simp_tac 1);
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qed "pubK_neq_sessionK";
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goal thy "priK A ~= sessionK arg";
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br notI 1;
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1);
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by (Full_simp_tac 1);
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qed "priK_neq_sessionK";
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val keys_distinct = [pubK_neq_sessionK, priK_neq_sessionK];
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AddIffs (keys_distinct @ (keys_distinct RL [not_sym]));
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(**** Protocol Proofs ****)
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(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end.
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  This protocol has three end points and six messages to consider.*)
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(** These proofs make the further assumption that the Nonce_supply nonces 
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	(which have the form  @ N. Nonce N ~: used evs)
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    lie outside the range of PRF.  This assumption seems reasonable, but
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    as it is needed only for the possibility theorems, it is not taken
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    as an axiom.
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**)
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(*Possibility property ending with ClientAccepts.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |] ==> EX SID M. EX evs: tls.    \
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\  Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ClientFinished RS tls.ServerFinished RS
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	  tls.ClientAccepts) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*And one for ServerAccepts.  Either FINISHED message may come first.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |] ==> EX SID NA PA NB PB M. EX evs: tls.    \
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\  Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ServerFinished RS tls.ClientFinished RS
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	  tls.ServerAccepts) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*Another one, for CertVerify (which is optional)*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |] ==> EX NB PMS. EX evs: tls.   \
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\  Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})) : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.CertVerify) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*Another one, for session resumption (both ServerResume and ClientResume) *)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| evs0 : tls;     \
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\           Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \
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\           Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \
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\           ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |] ==> EX NA PA NB PB. EX evs: tls.    \
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\  Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))                           \
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\            (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
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\                   Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,      \
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\                   Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|})) : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (etac (tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.ServerResume RS 
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	  tls.ClientResume) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(**** Inductive proofs about tls ****)
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(*Nobody sends themselves messages*)
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> ALL A X. Says A A X ~: set evs";
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by (etac tls.induct 1);
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by (Auto_tac());
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qed_spec_mp "not_Says_to_self";
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Addsimps [not_Says_to_self];
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AddSEs   [not_Says_to_self RSN (2, rev_notE)];
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(*Induction for regularity theorems.  If induction formula has the form
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   X ~: analz (spies evs) --> ... then it shortens the proof by discarding
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   needless information about analz (insert X (spies evs))  *)
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fun parts_induct_tac i = 
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    etac tls.induct i
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    THEN 
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    REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL analz_mono_contra_tac)
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    THEN 
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    fast_tac (!claset addss (!simpset)) i THEN
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
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(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
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    sends messages containing X! **)
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(*Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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qed "Spy_see_priK";
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Addsimps [Spy_see_priK];
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (auto_tac(!claset addDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts], !simpset));
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qed "Spy_analz_priK";
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Addsimps [Spy_analz_priK];
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goal thy  "!!A. [| Key (priK A) : parts (spies evs);  evs : tls |] ==> A:bad";
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by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Spy_see_priK]) 1);
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qed "Spy_see_priK_D";
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bind_thm ("Spy_analz_priK_D", analz_subset_parts RS subsetD RS Spy_see_priK_D);
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AddSDs [Spy_see_priK_D, Spy_analz_priK_D];
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(*This lemma says that no false certificates exist.  One might extend the
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  model to include bogus certificates for the agents, but there seems
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  little point in doing so: the loss of their private keys is a worse
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  breach of security.*)
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goalw thy [certificate_def]
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 "!!evs. evs : tls ==> certificate B KB : parts (spies evs) --> KB = pubK B";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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bind_thm ("Server_cert_pubB", result() RSN (2, rev_mp));
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(*Replace key KB in ClientKeyExch by (pubK B) *)
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val ClientKeyExch_tac = 
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    forward_tac [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS Server_cert_pubB]
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    THEN' assume_tac
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    THEN' hyp_subst_tac;
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fun analz_induct_tac i = 
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    etac tls.induct i   THEN
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    ClientKeyExch_tac  (i+6)  THEN	(*ClientKeyExch*)
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac 
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              (!simpset addcongs [if_weak_cong]
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                        setloop split_tac [expand_if]))  THEN
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    (*Remove instances of pubK B:  the Spy already knows all public keys.
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      Combining the two simplifier calls makes them run extremely slowly.*)
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac 
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              (!simpset addcongs [if_weak_cong]
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			addsimps [insert_absorb]
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                        setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
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(*** Properties of items found in Notes ***)
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goal thy "!!evs. [| Notes A {|Agent B, X|} : set evs;  evs : tls |]  \
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\                ==> Crypt (pubK B) X : parts (spies evs)";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (analz_induct_tac 1);
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by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [parts_insertI]) 1);
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qed "Notes_Crypt_parts_spies";
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(*C may be either A or B*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Notes C {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs; \
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\           evs : tls     \
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\        |] ==> Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs)";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
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(*Fake*)
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by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [parts_insertI]) 1);
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(*Client, Server Accept*)
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by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addSEs spies_partsEs
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                               addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 1));
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qed "Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS";
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(*Compared with the theorem above, both premise and conclusion are stronger*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Notes A {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs;\
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\           evs : tls     \
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\        |] ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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(*ServerAccepts*)
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by (Fast_tac 1);	(*Blast_tac's very slow here*)
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qed "Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS";
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(*** Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it ***)
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(*B can check A's signature if he has received A's certificate.*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs);          \
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\           X = Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|});      \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                       \
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\    ==> Says A B X : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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val lemma = result();
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(*Final version: B checks X using the distributed KA instead of priK A*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs);          \
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\           X = Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|});      \
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\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);       \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                       \
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   283
\    ==> Says A B X : set evs";
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
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   284
by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Server_cert_pubB] addSIs [lemma]) 1);
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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   285
qed "TrustCertVerify";
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44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   286
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   287
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5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
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parents: 3683
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   288
(*If CertVerify is present then A has chosen PMS.*)
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parents: 3500
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   289
goal thy
3745
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   290
 "!!evs. [| Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})  \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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parents: 3677
diff changeset
   291
\             : parts (spies evs);                                \
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parents: 3677
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   292
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                                      \
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56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents: 3519
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   293
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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   294
be rev_mp 1;
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   295
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   296
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   297
val lemma = result();
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   298
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   299
(*Final version using the distributed KA instead of priK A*)
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
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   300
goal thy
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   301
 "!!evs. [| Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})  \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   302
\             : parts (spies evs);                                \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   303
\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);       \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   304
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                                      \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   305
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   306
by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Server_cert_pubB] addSIs [lemma]) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   307
qed "UseCertVerify";
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   308
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   309
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
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parents: 3686
diff changeset
   310
(*Key compromise lemma needed to prove analz_image_keys.
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
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parents: 3686
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   311
  No collection of keys can help the spy get new private keys.*)
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
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parents: 3474
diff changeset
   312
goal thy  
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   313
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>                                    \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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parents: 3677
diff changeset
   314
\  ALL KK. (Key(priK B) : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) =  \
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   315
\          (priK B : KK | B : bad)";
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   316
by (etac tls.induct 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   317
by (ALLGOALS
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   318
    (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   319
		   addsimps (analz_insert_certificate::keys_distinct))));
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   320
(*Fake*) 
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   321
by (spy_analz_tac 2);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   322
(*Base*)
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   323
by (Blast_tac 1);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   324
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_priK";
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   325
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   326
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   327
(*slightly speeds up the big simplification below*)
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   328
goal thy "!!evs. KK <= range sessionK ==> priK B ~: KK";
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   329
by (Blast_tac 1);
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   330
val range_sessionkeys_not_priK = result();
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   331
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   332
(*Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if*)
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   333
goal thy  
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   334
 "!!evs. (X : analz (G Un H)) --> (X : analz H)  ==> \
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   335
\        (X : analz (G Un H))  =  (X : analz H)";
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   336
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [impOfSubs analz_mono]) 1);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   337
val lemma = result();
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   338
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   339
(** It is a mystery to me why the following formulation is actually slower
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   340
    in simplification:
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   341
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   342
\    ALL Z. (Nonce N : analz (Key``(sessionK``Z) Un (spies evs))) = \
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   343
\           (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   344
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   345
More so as it can take advantage of unconditional rewrites such as 
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   346
     priK B ~: sessionK``Z
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   347
**)
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   348
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
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parents: 3474
diff changeset
   349
goal thy  
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   350
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>                                 \
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   351
\    ALL KK. KK <= range sessionK -->           \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   352
\            (Nonce N : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   353
\            (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   354
by (etac tls.induct 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   355
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 7);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   356
by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI]));
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   357
by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac lemma));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   358
by (ALLGOALS    (*23 seconds*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   359
    (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss 
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   360
		   addsimps [range_sessionkeys_not_priK, 
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   361
			     analz_image_priK, analz_insert_certificate])));
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   362
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [insert_absorb])));
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   363
(*Fake*) 
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   364
by (spy_analz_tac 2);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   365
(*Base*)
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   366
by (Blast_tac 1);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   367
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_keys";
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   368
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   369
(*Knowing some session keys is no help in getting new nonces*)
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   370
goal thy
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   371
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>          \
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   372
\        Nonce N : analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs)) =  \
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   373
\        (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   374
by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss addsimps [analz_image_keys]) 1);
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   375
qed "analz_insert_key";
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   376
Addsimps [analz_insert_key];
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   377
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   378
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce (PRF x)|} ~: set evs";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   379
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   380
(*ClientKeyExch: PMS is assumed to differ from any PRF.*)
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   381
by (Blast_tac 1);
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   382
qed "no_Notes_A_PRF";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   383
Addsimps [no_Notes_A_PRF];
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   384
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   385
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   386
goal thy "!!evs. [| Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) : parts (spies evs);  \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   387
\                   evs : tls |]  \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   388
\                ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)";
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   389
by (etac rev_mp 1);
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   390
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   391
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [parts_insert_spies])));
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   392
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   393
(*Six others, all trivial or by freshness*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   394
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   395
                               addSEs spies_partsEs) 1));
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   396
qed "MS_imp_PMS";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   397
AddSDs [MS_imp_PMS];
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   398
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   399
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   400
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   401
(*** Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure ***)
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   402
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   403
(** Some lemmas about session keys, comprising clientK and serverK **)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   404
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   405
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   406
(*Lemma: session keys are never used if PMS is fresh.  
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   407
  Nonces don't have to agree, allowing session resumption.
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   408
  Converse doesn't hold; revealing PMS doesn't force the keys to be sent.
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   409
  THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE AS SAFE ELIM RULES.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   410
goal thy 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   411
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs);  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   412
\           K = sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b);  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   413
\           evs : tls |]             \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   414
\  ==> Key K ~: parts (spies evs) & (ALL Y. Crypt K Y ~: parts (spies evs))";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   415
by (etac rev_mp 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   416
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   417
by (analz_induct_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   418
(*SpyKeys*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   419
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs spies_partsEs) 3);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   420
(*Fake*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   421
by (simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [parts_insert_spies]) 2);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   422
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 2);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   423
(** LEVEL 6 **)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   424
(*Oops*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   425
by (fast_tac (!claset addSEs [MPair_parts]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   426
		       addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   427
		       addss (!simpset)) 6);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   428
by (REPEAT 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   429
    (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   430
				Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   431
                        addSEs spies_partsEs) 1));
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   432
val lemma = result();
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   433
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   434
goal thy 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   435
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs);  evs : tls |]             \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   436
\  ==> Key (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) ~: parts (spies evs)";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   437
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [lemma]) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   438
qed "PMS_sessionK_not_spied";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   439
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   440
goal thy 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   441
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs);  evs : tls |]             \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   442
\  ==> Crypt (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) Y ~: parts (spies evs)";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   443
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [lemma]) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   444
qed "PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   445
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   446
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   447
(*Lemma: write keys are never sent if M (MASTER SECRET) is secure.  
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   448
  Converse doesn't hold; betraying M doesn't force the keys to be sent!
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   449
  The strong Oops condition can be weakened later by unicity reasoning, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   450
	with some effort.*)
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   451
goal thy 
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   452
 "!!evs. [| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b))) ~: set evs; \
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   453
\           Nonce M ~: analz (spies evs);  evs : tls |]   \
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   454
\        ==> Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b)) ~: parts (spies evs)";
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   455
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   456
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   457
by (analz_induct_tac 1);        (*17 seconds*)
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   458
(*Oops*)
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   459
by (Blast_tac 4);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   460
(*SpyKeys*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   461
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   462
(*Fake*) 
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   463
by (spy_analz_tac 2);
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   464
(*Base*)
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   465
by (Blast_tac 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   466
qed "sessionK_not_spied";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   467
Addsimps [sessionK_not_spied];
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   468
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   469
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   470
(*** Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret ***)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   471
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   472
(*PMS determines B.  Proof borrowed from NS_Public/unique_NA and from Yahalom*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   473
goal thy 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   474
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs);  evs : tls |]   \
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   475
\        ==> EX B'. ALL B.   \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   476
\              Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs) --> B=B'";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   477
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   478
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   479
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   480
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   481
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 1);
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   482
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   483
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   484
    blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   485
val lemma = result();
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   486
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   487
goal thy 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   488
 "!!evs. [| Crypt(pubK B)  (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   489
\           Crypt(pubK B') (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   490
\           Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs);                 \
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   491
\           evs : tls |]                                          \
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   492
\        ==> B=B'";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   493
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   494
qed "Crypt_unique_PMS";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   495
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   496
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   497
(** It is frustrating that we need two versions of the unicity results.
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   498
    But Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} determines both A and B.  Sometimes
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   499
    we have only the weaker assertion Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS), which 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   500
    determines B alone, and only if PMS is secret.
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   501
**)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   502
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   503
(*In A's internal Note, PMS determines A and B.*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   504
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls               \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   505
\                ==> EX A' B'. ALL A B.  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   506
\                    Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> A=A' & B=B'";
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   507
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   508
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   509
(*ClientKeyExch: if PMS is fresh, then it can't appear in Notes A X.*)
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   510
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   511
    blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies] addSEs partsEs) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   512
val lemma = result();
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   513
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   514
goal thy 
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   515
 "!!evs. [| Notes A  {|Agent B,  Nonce PMS|} : set evs;  \
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   516
\           Notes A' {|Agent B', Nonce PMS|} : set evs;  \
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   517
\           evs : tls |]                               \
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   518
\        ==> A=A' & B=B'";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   519
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   520
qed "Notes_unique_PMS";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   521
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   522
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   523
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   524
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the PMS will stay secret.*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   525
goal thy
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   526
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]           \
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   527
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs  -->   \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   528
\            Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs)";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   529
by (analz_induct_tac 1);   (*11 seconds*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   530
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS ~: range PRF*)
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   531
by (REPEAT (fast_tac (!claset addss (!simpset)) 6));
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   532
(*ClientHello, ServerHello, ClientKeyExch, ServerResume: 
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   533
  mostly freshness reasoning*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   534
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   535
			       addDs  [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   536
				       impOfSubs analz_subset_parts,
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   537
				       Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   538
(*SpyKeys*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   539
by (fast_tac (!claset addss (!simpset)) 2);
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   540
(*Fake*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   541
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   542
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_PMS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp));
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   543
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   544
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   545
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the MASTER SECRET
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   546
  will stay secret.*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   547
goal thy
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   548
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]           \
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   549
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs  -->   \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   550
\            Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ~: analz (spies evs)";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   551
by (analz_induct_tac 1);   (*13 seconds*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   552
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS was already visible*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   553
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   554
				      Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj,
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   555
				      Notes_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 6));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   556
(*ClientHello*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   557
by (Blast_tac 3);
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   558
(*SpyKeys: by secrecy of the PMS, Spy cannot make the MS*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   559
by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   560
			       Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 2);
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   561
(*Fake*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   562
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   563
(*ServerHello and ClientKeyExch: mostly freshness reasoning*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   564
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   565
			       addDs  [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   566
				       impOfSubs analz_subset_parts,
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   567
				       Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 1));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   568
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_MS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp));
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   569
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   570
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   571
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK ***)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   572
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   573
(*If A created PMS then nobody other than the Spy would send a message
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   574
  using a clientK generated from that PMS.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   575
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   576
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A' ~= Spy |]                \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   577
\  ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   578
\      Says A' B' (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs -->  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   579
\      A = A'";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   580
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*8 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   581
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   582
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   583
by (REPEAT 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   584
    (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   585
     	 	        addIs  [Notes_unique_PMS RS conjunct1]) 2));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   586
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   587
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   588
	               addSDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   589
bind_thm ("Says_clientK_unique",
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   590
	  result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp));
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   591
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   592
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   593
(*If A created PMS and has not leaked her clientK to the Spy, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   594
  then nobody has.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   595
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   596
 "!!evs. evs : tls                         \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   597
\  ==> Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   598
\      Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                   \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   599
\      (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) ";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   600
by (etac tls.induct 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   601
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   602
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac);
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   603
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   604
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   605
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   606
(*Oops*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   607
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [Says_clientK_unique]) 2);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   608
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   609
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs ((PMS_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)) ::
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   610
			       spies_partsEs)) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   611
qed_spec_mp "clientK_Oops_ALL";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   612
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   613
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   614
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   615
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK ***)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   616
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   617
(*If A created PMS for B, then nobody other than B or the Spy would
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   618
  send a message using a serverK generated from that PMS.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   619
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   620
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  B' ~= Spy |]                \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   621
\  ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   622
\      Says B' A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs -->  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   623
\      B = B'";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   624
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*9 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   625
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   626
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   627
by (REPEAT
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   628
    (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [MPair_parts]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   629
		        addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   630
				Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   631
                        addDs  [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   632
				Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   633
				Crypt_unique_PMS]) 2));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   634
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   635
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   636
	               addSDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   637
bind_thm ("Says_serverK_unique",
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   638
	  result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp));
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   639
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   640
(*If A created PMS for B, and B has not leaked his serverK to the Spy, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   641
  then nobody has.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   642
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   643
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                        \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   644
\  ==> Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   645
\      Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                   \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   646
\      (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) ";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   647
by (etac tls.induct 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   648
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   649
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac);
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   650
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   651
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   652
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   653
(*Oops*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   654
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [Says_serverK_unique]) 2);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   655
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   656
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs ((PMS_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)) ::
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   657
			       spies_partsEs)) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   658
qed_spec_mp "serverK_Oops_ALL";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   659
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   660
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   661
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   662
(*** Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present 
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   663
     and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc.  Note that it is up to A
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   664
     to compare PA with what she originally sent.
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   665
***)
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   666
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   667
(*The mention of her name (A) in X assures A that B knows who she is.*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   668
goal thy
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   669
 "!!evs. [| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   670
\           X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M))                  \
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   671
\                 (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   672
\                        Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A,    \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   673
\                        Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \
3676
cbaec955056b Addition of SessionIDs to the Hello and Finished messages
paulson
parents: 3672
diff changeset
   674
\           M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   675
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]          \
3676
cbaec955056b Addition of SessionIDs to the Hello and Finished messages
paulson
parents: 3672
diff changeset
   676
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   677
\        X : parts (spies evs) --> Says B A X : set evs";
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   678
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   679
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   680
by (analz_induct_tac 1);        (*22 seconds*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   681
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [all_conj_distrib])));
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   682
(*proves ServerResume*)
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   683
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   684
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   685
by (fast_tac  (*blast_tac gives PROOF FAILED*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   686
    (!claset addSEs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 2);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   687
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   688
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   689
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   690
				     not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   691
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   692
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSspec, RSmp] (result());
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   693
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   694
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   695
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   696
 "!!evs. [| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M))                  \
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   697
\                 (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   698
\                        Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A,    \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   699
\                        Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   700
\           M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   701
\           X : parts (spies evs);                        \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   702
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;     \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   703
\           Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   704
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]          \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   705
\        ==> Says B A X : set evs";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   706
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [lemma]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   707
                       addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   708
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerFinished";
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   709
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   710
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   711
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   712
(*This version refers not to ServerFinished but to any message from B.
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   713
  We don't assume B has received CertVerify, and an intruder could
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   714
  have changed A's identity in all other messages, so we can't be sure
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   715
  that B sends his message to A.  If CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE were augmented
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   716
  to bind A's identity with PMS, then we could replace A' by A below.*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   717
goal thy
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   718
 "!!evs. [| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   719
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;                 \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   720
\           M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB) |]            \
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   721
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->              \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   722
\            Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs)  -->  \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   723
\            (EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs)";
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   724
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   725
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   726
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*20 seconds*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   727
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [ex_disj_distrib])));
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   728
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   729
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   730
by (REPEAT
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   731
    (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [MPair_parts]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   732
		        addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   733
				Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   734
                        addDs  [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   735
				Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   736
				Crypt_unique_PMS]) 3));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   737
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   738
by (blast_tac
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   739
    (!claset addSEs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 2);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   740
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   741
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   742
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   743
				     not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   744
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   745
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSspec, RSmp] (result());
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   746
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   747
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   748
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   749
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   750
\           Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs); \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   751
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;     \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   752
\           Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   753
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]          \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   754
\        ==> EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   755
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [lemma]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   756
                       addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   757
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   758
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerMsg";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   759
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   760
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   761
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   762
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   763
     then A has sent it, ASSUMING that A chose PMS.  Authentication is
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   764
     assumed here; B cannot verify it.  But if the message is
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   765
     ClientFinished, then B can then check the quoted values PA, PB, etc.
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   766
***)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   767
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   768
goal thy
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   769
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                         \
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   770
\  ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) -->\
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   771
\      Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                  \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   772
\      Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y : parts (spies evs) -->  \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   773
\      Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   774
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*15 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   775
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   776
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   777
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset delrules [conjI]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   778
		               addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   779
	 	               addDs  [Notes_unique_PMS]) 3));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   780
(*ClientKeyExch*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   781
by (fast_tac  (*blast_tac gives PROOF FAILED*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   782
    (!claset addSEs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 2);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   783
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   784
by (subgoal_tac "Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   785
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   786
				     not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   787
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   788
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSspec, RSmp] (result());
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   789
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   790
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   791
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   792
 "!!evs. [| Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y : parts (spies evs);  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   793
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;        \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   794
\           Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs;  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   795
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                         \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   796
\  ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   797
by (blast_tac (!claset addIs [lemma]
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   798
                       addEs [clientK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   799
qed_spec_mp "TrustClientMsg";
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   800
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   801
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   802
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   803
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   804
     check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   805
     values PA, PB, etc.  Even this one requires A to be uncompromised.
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   806
 ***)
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   807
goal thy
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   808
 "!!evs. [| Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs;\
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   809
\           Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs; \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   810
\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);       \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   811
\           Says A'' B (Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))\
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   812
\             : set evs;                                                  \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   813
\        evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                             \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   814
\     ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   815
by (blast_tac (!claset addSIs [TrustClientMsg, UseCertVerify]
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   816
                       addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   817
qed "AuthClientFinished";
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   818
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   819
(*22/9/97: loads in 622s, which is 10 minutes 22 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   820
(*24/9/97: loads in 672s, which is 11 minutes 12 seconds [stronger theorems]*)
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   821
(*29/9/97: loads in 481s, after removing Certificate from ClientKeyExch*)
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   822
(*30/9/97: loads in 476s, after removing unused theorems*)