src/HOL/Auth/TLS.ML
author paulson
Wed, 24 Dec 1997 10:02:30 +0100
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permissions -rw-r--r--
New Auto_tac (by Oheimb), and new syntax (without parens), and expandshort
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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/TLS
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1997  University of Cambridge
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Protocol goals: 
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* M, serverK(NA,NB,M) and clientK(NA,NB,M) will be known only to the two
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     parties (though A is not necessarily authenticated).
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* B upon receiving CertVerify knows that A is present (But this
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    message is optional!)
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* A upon receiving ServerFinished knows that B is present
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* Each party who has received a FINISHED message can trust that the other
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  party agrees on all message components, including PA and PB (thus foiling
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  rollback attacks).
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*)
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open TLS;
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set proof_timing;
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HOL_quantifiers := false;
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(*Automatically unfold the definition of "certificate"*)
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Addsimps [certificate_def];
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(*Injectiveness of key-generating functions*)
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AddIffs [inj_PRF RS inj_eq, inj_sessionK RS inj_eq];
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(* invKey(sessionK x) = sessionK x*)
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Addsimps [isSym_sessionK, rewrite_rule [isSymKey_def] isSym_sessionK];
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(*** clientK and serverK make symmetric keys; no clashes with pubK or priK ***)
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goal thy "pubK A ~= sessionK arg";
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by (rtac notI 1);
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1);
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by (Full_simp_tac 1);
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qed "pubK_neq_sessionK";
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goal thy "priK A ~= sessionK arg";
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by (rtac notI 1);
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1);
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by (Full_simp_tac 1);
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qed "priK_neq_sessionK";
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val keys_distinct = [pubK_neq_sessionK, priK_neq_sessionK];
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AddIffs (keys_distinct @ (keys_distinct RL [not_sym]));
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(**** Protocol Proofs ****)
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(*Possibility properties state that some traces run the protocol to the end.
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  Four paths and 12 rules are considered.*)
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(** These proofs assume that the Nonce_supply nonces 
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	(which have the form  @ N. Nonce N ~: used evs)
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    lie outside the range of PRF.  It seems reasonable, but as it is needed
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    only for the possibility theorems, it is not taken as an axiom.
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**)
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(*Possibility property ending with ClientAccepts.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |]            \
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\  ==> EX SID M. EX evs: tls.    \
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\        Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ClientFinished RS tls.ServerFinished RS
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	  tls.ClientAccepts) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*And one for ServerAccepts.  Either FINISHED message may come first.*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |]                        \
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\  ==> EX SID NA PA NB PB M. EX evs: tls.    \
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\        Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ServerFinished RS tls.ClientFinished RS
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	  tls.ServerAccepts) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*Another one, for CertVerify (which is optional)*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |]                       \
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\  ==> EX NB PMS. EX evs: tls.   \
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\  Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})) : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS
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	  tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.CertVerify) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(*Another one, for session resumption (both ServerResume and ClientResume) *)
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goal thy 
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 "!!A B. [| evs0 : tls;     \
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\           Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \
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\           Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \
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\           ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF;  \
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\           A ~= B |] ==> EX NA PA NB PB X. EX evs: tls.    \
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\      X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
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\                       Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,      \
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\                       Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}  &  \
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\      Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs  &  \
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\      Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs";
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
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by (etac (tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.ServerResume RS 
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	  tls.ClientResume) 2);
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by possibility_tac;
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1));
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result();
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(**** Inductive proofs about tls ****)
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(*Nobody sends themselves messages*)
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> ALL A X. Says A A X ~: set evs";
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by (etac tls.induct 1);
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by Auto_tac;
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qed_spec_mp "not_Says_to_self";
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Addsimps [not_Says_to_self];
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AddSEs   [not_Says_to_self RSN (2, rev_notE)];
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(*Induction for regularity theorems.  If induction formula has the form
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   X ~: analz (spies evs) --> ... then it shortens the proof by discarding
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   needless information about analz (insert X (spies evs))  *)
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fun parts_induct_tac i = 
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    etac tls.induct i
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    THEN 
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    REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL analz_mono_contra_tac)
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    THEN 
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    fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) i THEN
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsplits [expand_if]));
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(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
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    sends messages containing X! **)
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(*Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)*)
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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qed "Spy_see_priK";
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Addsimps [Spy_see_priK];
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goal thy 
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 "!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)";
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by (auto_tac(claset() addDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts], simpset()));
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qed "Spy_analz_priK";
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Addsimps [Spy_analz_priK];
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AddSDs [Spy_see_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1), 
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	Spy_analz_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1)];
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(*This lemma says that no false certificates exist.  One might extend the
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  model to include bogus certificates for the agents, but there seems
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  little point in doing so: the loss of their private keys is a worse
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  breach of security.*)
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goalw thy [certificate_def]
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 "!!evs. [| certificate B KB : parts (spies evs);  evs : tls |]  \
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\        ==> pubK B = KB";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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qed "certificate_valid";
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(*Replace key KB in ClientKeyExch by (pubK B) *)
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val ClientKeyExch_tac = 
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    forward_tac [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS certificate_valid]
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    THEN' assume_tac
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    THEN' hyp_subst_tac;
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fun analz_induct_tac i = 
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    etac tls.induct i   THEN
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    ClientKeyExch_tac  (i+6)  THEN	(*ClientKeyExch*)
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac 
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              (simpset() addcongs [if_weak_cong]
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                         addsimps (expand_ifs@pushes)
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                         addsplits [expand_if]))  THEN
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    (*Remove instances of pubK B:  the Spy already knows all public keys.
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      Combining the two simplifier calls makes them run extremely slowly.*)
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    ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac 
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              (simpset() addcongs [if_weak_cong]
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			 addsimps [insert_absorb]
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                         addsplits [expand_if]));
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(*** Properties of items found in Notes ***)
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goal thy "!!evs. [| Notes A {|Agent B, X|} : set evs;  evs : tls |]  \
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\                ==> Crypt (pubK B) X : parts (spies evs)";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (analz_induct_tac 1);
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by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1);
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qed "Notes_Crypt_parts_spies";
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(*C may be either A or B*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Notes C {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs; \
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\           evs : tls     \
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\        |] ==> Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs)";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
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(*Fake*)
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by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1);
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(*Client, Server Accept*)
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by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs
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                                addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 1));
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qed "Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS";
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(*Compared with the theorem above, both premise and conclusion are stronger*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Notes A {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs;\
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\           evs : tls     \
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\        |] ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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(*ServerAccepts*)
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by (Fast_tac 1);	(*Blast_tac's very slow here*)
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qed "Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS";
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(*** Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it ***)
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(*B can check A's signature if he has received A's certificate.*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs);                          \
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\           X = Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|});  \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                         \
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\    ==> Says A B X : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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val lemma = result();
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(*Final version: B checks X using the distributed KA instead of priK A*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs);                            \
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\           X = Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); \
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\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);             \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                           \
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\    ==> Says A B X : set evs";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1);
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qed "TrustCertVerify";
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(*If CertVerify is present then A has chosen PMS.*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \
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\             : parts (spies evs);                          \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                         \
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\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
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by (etac rev_mp 1);
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by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
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val lemma = result();
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(*Final version using the distributed KA instead of priK A*)
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goal thy
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 "!!evs. [| Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \
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\             : parts (spies evs);                             \
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\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);              \
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\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad |]                            \
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\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs";
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by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1);
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qed "UseCertVerify";
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44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
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parents:
diff changeset
   287
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
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parents: 3474
diff changeset
   288
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce (PRF x)|} ~: set evs";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   290
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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   291
(*ClientKeyExch: PMS is assumed to differ from any PRF.*)
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   292
by (Blast_tac 1);
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   293
qed "no_Notes_A_PRF";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   294
Addsimps [no_Notes_A_PRF];
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   295
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   296
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aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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   297
goal thy "!!evs. [| Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) : parts (spies evs);  \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   298
\                   evs : tls |]  \
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aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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parents: 3677
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   299
\                ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)";
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   300
by (etac rev_mp 1);
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents: 3519
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   301
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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parents: 4006
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   302
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [parts_insert_spies])));
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents: 3519
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   303
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
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parents: 3676
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   304
(*Six others, all trivial or by freshness*)
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771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
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parents: 4006
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   305
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
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parents: 4091
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   306
                                addSEs spies_partsEs) 1));
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   307
qed "MS_imp_PMS";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   308
AddSDs [MS_imp_PMS];
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents: 3519
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   309
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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   310
3474
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parents:
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   311
3672
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(*** Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret ***)
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   313
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents: 3519
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   314
(*PMS determines B.  Proof borrowed from NS_Public/unique_NA and from Yahalom*)
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d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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   315
goal thy 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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parents: 3677
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   316
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs);  evs : tls |]   \
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d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents: 3506
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   317
\        ==> EX B'. ALL B.   \
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parents: 3677
diff changeset
   318
\              Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs) --> B=B'";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents: 3506
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   319
by (etac rev_mp 1);
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   320
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   321
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   322
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents: 3729
diff changeset
   323
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 1);
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wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   324
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   325
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   326
    blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   327
val lemma = result();
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   328
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   329
goal thy 
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   330
 "!!evs. [| Crypt(pubK B)  (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   331
\           Crypt(pubK B') (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
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parents: 3677
diff changeset
   332
\           Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs);                 \
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   333
\           evs : tls |]                                          \
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   334
\        ==> B=B'";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   335
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   336
qed "Crypt_unique_PMS";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   337
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents: 3506
diff changeset
   338
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   339
(** It is frustrating that we need two versions of the unicity results.
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   340
    But Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} determines both A and B.  Sometimes
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   341
    we have only the weaker assertion Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS), which 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   342
    determines B alone, and only if PMS is secret.
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   343
**)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   344
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   345
(*In A's internal Note, PMS determines A and B.*)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   346
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls               \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   347
\                ==> EX A' B'. ALL A B.  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   348
\                    Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> A=A' & B=B'";
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   349
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
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771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   350
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   351
(*ClientKeyExch: if PMS is fresh, then it can't appear in Notes A X.*)
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   352
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   353
    blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies] addSEs partsEs) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   354
val lemma = result();
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   355
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   356
goal thy 
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   357
 "!!evs. [| Notes A  {|Agent B,  Nonce PMS|} : set evs;  \
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   358
\           Notes A' {|Agent B', Nonce PMS|} : set evs;  \
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   359
\           evs : tls |]                               \
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   360
\        ==> A=A' & B=B'";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   361
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   362
qed "Notes_unique_PMS";
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   363
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   364
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   365
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   366
(**** Secrecy Theorems ****)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   367
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   368
(*Key compromise lemma needed to prove analz_image_keys.
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   369
  No collection of keys can help the spy get new private keys.*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   370
goal thy  
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   371
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>                                      \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   372
\  ALL KK. (Key(priK B) : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   373
\          (priK B : KK | B : bad)";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   374
by (etac tls.induct 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   375
by (ALLGOALS
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   376
    (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   377
		   addsimps (certificate_def::keys_distinct))));
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   378
(*Fake*) 
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   379
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   380
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_priK";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   381
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   382
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   383
(*slightly speeds up the big simplification below*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   384
goal thy "!!evs. KK <= range sessionK ==> priK B ~: KK";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   385
by (Blast_tac 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   386
val range_sessionkeys_not_priK = result();
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   387
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   388
(*Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   389
goal thy  
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   390
 "!!evs. (X : analz (G Un H)) --> (X : analz H)  ==> \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   391
\        (X : analz (G Un H))  =  (X : analz H)";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   392
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [impOfSubs analz_mono]) 1);
3961
6a8996fb7d99 Many minor speedups:
paulson
parents: 3919
diff changeset
   393
val analz_image_keys_lemma = result();
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   394
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   395
(** Strangely, the following version doesn't work:
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   396
\    ALL Z. (Nonce N : analz (Key``(sessionK``Z) Un (spies evs))) = \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   397
\           (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   398
**)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   399
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   400
goal thy  
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   401
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>                                    \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   402
\    ALL KK. KK <= range sessionK -->                     \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   403
\            (Nonce N : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   404
\            (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   405
by (etac tls.induct 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   406
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 7);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   407
by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI]));
3961
6a8996fb7d99 Many minor speedups:
paulson
parents: 3919
diff changeset
   408
by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac analz_image_keys_lemma));
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   409
by (ALLGOALS    (*18 seconds*)
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   410
    (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss 
3961
6a8996fb7d99 Many minor speedups:
paulson
parents: 3919
diff changeset
   411
		   addsimps (expand_ifs@pushes)
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   412
		   addsimps [range_sessionkeys_not_priK, 
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   413
                             analz_image_priK, certificate_def])));
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   414
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [insert_absorb])));
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   415
(*Fake*) 
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   416
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   417
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_keys";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   418
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   419
(*Knowing some session keys is no help in getting new nonces*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   420
goal thy
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   421
 "!!evs. evs : tls ==>          \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   422
\        Nonce N : analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs)) =  \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   423
\        (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   424
by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss addsimps [analz_image_keys]) 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   425
qed "analz_insert_key";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   426
Addsimps [analz_insert_key];
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   427
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   428
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   429
(*** Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure ***)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   430
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   431
(** Some lemmas about session keys, comprising clientK and serverK **)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   432
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   433
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   434
(*Lemma: session keys are never used if PMS is fresh.  
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   435
  Nonces don't have to agree, allowing session resumption.
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   436
  Converse doesn't hold; revealing PMS doesn't force the keys to be sent.
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   437
  THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE AS SAFE ELIM RULES.*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   438
goal thy 
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   439
 "!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs);  \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   440
\           K = sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b);  \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   441
\           evs : tls |]             \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   442
\  ==> Key K ~: parts (spies evs) & (ALL Y. Crypt K Y ~: parts (spies evs))";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   443
by (etac rev_mp 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   444
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   445
by (analz_induct_tac 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   446
(*SpyKeys*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   447
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs) 3);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   448
(*Fake*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   449
by (simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [parts_insert_spies]) 2);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   450
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 2);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   451
(** LEVEL 6 **)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   452
(*Oops*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   453
by (fast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   454
		       addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   455
		       addss (simpset())) 6);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   456
by (REPEAT 
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   457
    (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, 
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   458
				 Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS]
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   459
                         addSEs spies_partsEs) 1));
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   460
val lemma = result();
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   461
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   462
goal thy 
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   463
 "!!evs. [| Key (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) : parts (spies evs); \
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   464
\           evs : tls |]             \
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   465
\        ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   466
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   467
qed "PMS_sessionK_not_spied";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   468
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   469
goal thy 
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   470
 "!!evs. [| Crypt (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) Y  \
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   471
\             : parts (spies evs);  evs : tls |]             \
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   472
\        ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   473
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   474
qed "PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   475
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   476
(*Lemma: write keys are never sent if M (MASTER SECRET) is secure.  
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   477
  Converse doesn't hold; betraying M doesn't force the keys to be sent!
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   478
  The strong Oops condition can be weakened later by unicity reasoning, 
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   479
	with some effort.*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   480
goal thy 
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   481
 "!!evs. [| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b))) ~: set evs; \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   482
\           Nonce M ~: analz (spies evs);  evs : tls |]   \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   483
\        ==> Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b)) ~: parts (spies evs)";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   484
by (etac rev_mp 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   485
by (etac rev_mp 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   486
by (analz_induct_tac 1);        (*17 seconds*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   487
(*Oops*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   488
by (Blast_tac 4);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   489
(*SpyKeys*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   490
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   491
(*Fake*) 
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   492
by (spy_analz_tac 2);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   493
(*Base*)
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   494
by (Blast_tac 1);
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   495
qed "sessionK_not_spied";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   496
Addsimps [sessionK_not_spied];
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   497
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   498
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   499
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the PMS will stay secret.*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   500
goal thy
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   501
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]           \
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   502
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs  -->   \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   503
\            Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs)";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   504
by (analz_induct_tac 1);   (*11 seconds*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   505
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS ~: range PRF*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   506
by (REPEAT (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 6));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   507
(*ClientHello, ServerHello, ClientKeyExch, ServerResume: 
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   508
  mostly freshness reasoning*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   509
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   510
				addDs  [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   511
					impOfSubs analz_subset_parts,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   512
					Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   513
(*SpyKeys*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   514
by (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 2);
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   515
(*Fake*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   516
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   517
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_PMS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp));
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   518
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   519
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   520
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the MASTER SECRET
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   521
  will stay secret.*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   522
goal thy
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   523
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]           \
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   524
\        ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs  -->   \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   525
\            Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ~: analz (spies evs)";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   526
by (analz_induct_tac 1);   (*13 seconds*)
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   527
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS was already visible*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   528
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   529
				       Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   530
				       Notes_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 6));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   531
(*ClientHello*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   532
by (Blast_tac 3);
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   533
(*SpyKeys: by secrecy of the PMS, Spy cannot make the MS*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   534
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   535
				Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 2);
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   536
(*Fake*)
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   537
by (spy_analz_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   538
(*ServerHello and ClientKeyExch: mostly freshness reasoning*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   539
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   540
				addDs  [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   541
					impOfSubs analz_subset_parts,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   542
					Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 1));
3677
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   543
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_MS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp));
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   544
f2569416d18b Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents: 3676
diff changeset
   545
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   546
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK ***)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   547
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   548
(*If A created PMS then nobody other than the Spy would send a message
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   549
  using a clientK generated from that PMS.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   550
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   551
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A' ~= Spy |]                \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   552
\  ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   553
\      Says A' B' (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs -->  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   554
\      A = A'";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   555
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*8 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   556
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   557
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   558
by (REPEAT 
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   559
    (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   560
     	 	         addIs  [Notes_unique_PMS RS conjunct1]) 2));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   561
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   562
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied,
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   563
				Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   564
bind_thm ("Says_clientK_unique",
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   565
	  result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp));
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   566
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   567
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   568
(*If A created PMS and has not leaked her clientK to the Spy, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   569
  then nobody has.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   570
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   571
 "!!evs. evs : tls                         \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   572
\  ==> Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   573
\      Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                   \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   574
\      (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) ";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   575
by (etac tls.induct 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   576
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   577
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac);
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   578
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   579
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   580
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   581
(*Oops*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   582
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_clientK_unique]) 2);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   583
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   584
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied]
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   585
			addSEs spies_partsEs) 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   586
qed_spec_mp "clientK_Oops_ALL";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   587
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   588
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   589
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   590
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK ***)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   591
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   592
(*If A created PMS for B, then nobody other than B or the Spy would
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   593
  send a message using a serverK generated from that PMS.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   594
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   595
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad;  B' ~= Spy |]                \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   596
\  ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   597
\      Says B' A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs -->  \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   598
\      B = B'";
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   599
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*9 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   600
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   601
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   602
by (REPEAT
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   603
    (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   604
			 addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, 
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   605
				 Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   606
			 addDs  [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   607
				 Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   608
				 Crypt_unique_PMS]) 2));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   609
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   610
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied,
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   611
				Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   612
bind_thm ("Says_serverK_unique",
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   613
	  result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp));
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   614
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   615
(*If A created PMS for B, and B has not leaked his serverK to the Spy, 
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   616
  then nobody has.*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   617
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   618
 "!!evs. [| evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                        \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   619
\  ==> Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   620
\      Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->                   \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   621
\      (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) ";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   622
by (etac tls.induct 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   623
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   624
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac);
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   625
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   626
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   627
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   628
(*Oops*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   629
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_serverK_unique]) 2);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   630
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   631
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied]
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   632
			addSEs spies_partsEs) 1);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   633
qed_spec_mp "serverK_Oops_ALL";
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   634
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   635
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   636
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   637
(*** Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present 
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   638
     and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc.  Note that it is up to A
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   639
     to compare PA with what she originally sent.
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   640
***)
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   641
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   642
(*The mention of her name (A) in X assures A that B knows who she is.*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   643
goal thy
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   644
 "!!evs. [| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M))                  \
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   645
\                 (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   646
\                        Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A,    \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   647
\                        Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \
3676
cbaec955056b Addition of SessionIDs to the Hello and Finished messages
paulson
parents: 3672
diff changeset
   648
\           M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   649
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]            \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   650
\        ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   651
\            Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   652
\            X : parts (spies evs) --> Says B A X : set evs";
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   653
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   654
by (analz_induct_tac 1);        (*26 seconds*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   655
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib])));
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   656
(*proves ServerResume*)
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   657
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   658
(*ClientKeyExch*)
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   659
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   660
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   661
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   662
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   663
				      not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   664
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   665
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result());
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   666
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   667
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   668
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   669
 "!!evs. [| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M))                  \
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   670
\                 (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,             \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   671
\                        Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A,    \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   672
\                        Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   673
\           M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   674
\           X : parts (spies evs);                        \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   675
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;     \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   676
\           Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   677
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]          \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   678
\        ==> Says B A X : set evs";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   679
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   680
                        addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   681
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerFinished";
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   682
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   683
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   684
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   685
(*This version refers not to ServerFinished but to any message from B.
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   686
  We don't assume B has received CertVerify, and an intruder could
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   687
  have changed A's identity in all other messages, so we can't be sure
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0 Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents: 3515
diff changeset
   688
  that B sends his message to A.  If CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE were augmented
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   689
  to bind A's identity with PMS, then we could replace A' by A below.*)
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   690
goal thy
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   691
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]     \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   692
\        ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   693
\            Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->              \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   694
\            Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs)  -->  \
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   695
\            (EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs)";
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   696
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
3686
4b484805b4c4 First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents: 3685
diff changeset
   697
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*20 seconds*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   698
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib])));
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   699
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   700
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   701
by (REPEAT
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   702
    (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   703
			 addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, 
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   704
				 Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   705
			 addDs  [Spy_not_see_PMS, 
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   706
				 Notes_Crypt_parts_spies,
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   707
				 Crypt_unique_PMS]) 3));
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   708
(*ClientKeyExch*)
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   709
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   710
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   711
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   712
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   713
				      not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   714
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   715
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result());
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   716
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   717
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   718
goal thy
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   719
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   720
\           Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs); \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   721
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;     \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   722
\           Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   723
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]          \
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   724
\        ==> EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   725
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma]
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   726
                        addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   727
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerMsg";
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   728
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   729
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   730
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   731
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK
3672
56e4365a0c99 TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents: 3519
diff changeset
   732
     then A has sent it, ASSUMING that A chose PMS.  Authentication is
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   733
     assumed here; B cannot verify it.  But if the message is
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   734
     ClientFinished, then B can then check the quoted values PA, PB, etc.
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   735
***)
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   736
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   737
goal thy
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   738
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);  evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |] \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   739
\    ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   740
\        Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs -->               \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   741
\        Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs) -->         \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   742
\        Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs";
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   743
by (hyp_subst_tac 1);
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   744
by (analz_induct_tac 1);	(*15 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   745
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   746
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*)
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   747
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() delrules [conjI]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   748
		                addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS]
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   749
	 	                addDs  [Notes_unique_PMS]) 3));
4472
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   750
(*ClientKeyExch*)
cfa3bd184bc1 Tidied using rev_iffD1, etc
paulson
parents: 4449
diff changeset
   751
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2);
3480
d59bbf053258 More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3474
diff changeset
   752
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*)
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   753
by (subgoal_tac "Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1);
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   754
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, 
4422
21238c9d363e Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents: 4201
diff changeset
   755
				      not_parts_not_analz]) 2);
3474
44249bba00ec Baby TLS. Proofs work, but model seems unrealistic
paulson
parents:
diff changeset
   756
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   757
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result());
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   758
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   759
(*Final version*)
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   760
goal thy
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   761
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   762
\           Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs);  \
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   763
\           Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs;        \
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   764
\           Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs;  \
3704
2f99d7a0dccc sessionK now indexed by nat instead of bool.
paulson
parents: 3687
diff changeset
   765
\           evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                         \
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   766
\  ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   767
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   768
                        addEs [clientK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1);
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   769
qed "TrustClientMsg";
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   770
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   771
3685
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   772
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   773
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to
5b8c0c8f576e Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents: 3683
diff changeset
   774
     check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted
3729
6be7cf5086ab Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents: 3711
diff changeset
   775
     values PA, PB, etc.  Even this one requires A to be uncompromised.
3506
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   776
 ***)
a36e0a49d2cd New proofs involving CERTIFICATE VERIFY
paulson
parents: 3500
diff changeset
   777
goal thy
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   778
 "!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);                           \
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   779
\           Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs;\
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   780
\           Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs; \
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   781
\           certificate A KA : parts (spies evs);       \
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   782
\           Says A'' B (Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))\
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   783
\             : set evs;                                                  \
3683
aafe719dff14 Global change: lost->bad and sees Spy->spies
paulson
parents: 3677
diff changeset
   784
\        evs : tls;  A ~: bad;  B ~: bad |]                             \
3772
6ee707a73248 Routine tidying up
paulson
parents: 3760
diff changeset
   785
\     ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs";
4091
771b1f6422a8 isatool fixclasimp;
wenzelm
parents: 4006
diff changeset
   786
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [TrustClientMsg, UseCertVerify]
4201
858b3ec2c9db Fixed indentation
paulson
parents: 4091
diff changeset
   787
                        addDs  [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1);
3515
d8a71f6eaf40 Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents: 3506
diff changeset
   788
qed "AuthClientFinished";
3687
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   789
fb7d096d7884 Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents: 3686
diff changeset
   790
(*22/9/97: loads in 622s, which is 10 minutes 22 seconds*)
3711
2f86b403d975 Deleted an obsolete step in TrustServerFinished
paulson
parents: 3704
diff changeset
   791
(*24/9/97: loads in 672s, which is 11 minutes 12 seconds [stronger theorems]*)
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75 Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents: 3729
diff changeset
   792
(*29/9/97: loads in 481s, after removing Certificate from ClientKeyExch*)
3758
188a4fbfaf55 Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents: 3745
diff changeset
   793
(*30/9/97: loads in 476s, after removing unused theorems*)
3760
77f71f650433 Strengthened the possibility property for resumption so that it could have
paulson
parents: 3758
diff changeset
   794
(*30/9/97: loads in 448s, after fixing ServerResume*)