author | paulson |
Tue, 13 Feb 2001 13:16:27 +0100 | |
changeset 11104 | f2024fed9f0c |
parent 10833 | c0844a30ea4e |
child 11150 | 67387142225e |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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(* Title: HOL/Auth/TLS |
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ID: $Id$ |
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Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory |
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Copyright 1997 University of Cambridge |
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Protocol goals: |
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* M, serverK(NA,NB,M) and clientK(NA,NB,M) will be known only to the two |
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parties (though A is not necessarily authenticated). |
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* B upon receiving CertVerify knows that A is present (But this |
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message is optional!) |
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* A upon receiving ServerFinished knows that B is present |
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* Each party who has received a FINISHED message can trust that the other |
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party agrees on all message components, including PA and PB (thus foiling |
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rollback attacks). |
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*) |
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||
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AddEs spies_partsEs; |
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AddDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts]; |
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AddDs [impOfSubs Fake_parts_insert]; |
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(*Automatically unfold the definition of "certificate"*) |
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Addsimps [certificate_def]; |
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(*Injectiveness of key-generating functions*) |
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AddIffs [inj_PRF RS inj_eq, inj_sessionK RS inj_eq]; |
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(* invKey(sessionK x) = sessionK x*) |
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Addsimps [isSym_sessionK, rewrite_rule [isSymKey_def] isSym_sessionK]; |
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(*** clientK and serverK make symmetric keys; no clashes with pubK or priK ***) |
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Goal "pubK A ~= sessionK arg"; |
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by (rtac notI 1); |
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1); |
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by (Full_simp_tac 1); |
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qed "pubK_neq_sessionK"; |
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Goal "priK A ~= sessionK arg"; |
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by (rtac notI 1); |
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1); |
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by (Full_simp_tac 1); |
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qed "priK_neq_sessionK"; |
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val keys_distinct = [pubK_neq_sessionK, priK_neq_sessionK]; |
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AddIffs (keys_distinct @ (keys_distinct RL [not_sym])); |
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(**** Protocol Proofs ****) |
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(*Possibility properties state that some traces run the protocol to the end. |
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Four paths and 12 rules are considered.*) |
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(** These proofs assume that the Nonce_supply nonces |
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(which have the form @ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) |
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lie outside the range of PRF. It seems reasonable, but as it is needed |
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only for the possibility theorems, it is not taken as an axiom. |
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**) |
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(*Possibility property ending with ClientAccepts.*) |
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Goal "[| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX SID M. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ClientFinished RS tls.ServerFinished RS |
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tls.ClientAccepts) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
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(*And one for ServerAccepts. Either FINISHED message may come first.*) |
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Goal "[| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX SID NA PA NB PB M. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ServerFinished RS tls.ClientFinished RS |
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tls.ServerAccepts) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
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(*Another one, for CertVerify (which is optional)*) |
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Goal "[| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX NB PMS. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})) : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.CertVerify) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
102 |
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(*Another one, for session resumption (both ServerResume and ClientResume) *) |
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Goal "[| evs0 : tls; \ |
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\ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \ |
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\ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \ |
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\ ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX NA PA NB PB X. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M, \ |
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\ Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A, \ |
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\ Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|} & \ |
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\ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs & \ |
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\ Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (etac (tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.ServerResume RS |
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tls.ClientResume) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
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(**** Inductive proofs about tls ****) |
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(*Induction for regularity theorems. If induction formula has the form |
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X ~: analz (spies evs) --> ... then it shortens the proof by discarding |
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needless information about analz (insert X (spies evs)) *) |
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fun parts_induct_tac i = |
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etac tls.induct i |
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THEN |
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REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL analz_mono_contra_tac) |
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THEN |
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fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) i THEN |
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ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac; |
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(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY |
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sends messages containing X! **) |
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(*Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)*) |
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Goal "evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
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by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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by (Blast_tac 1); |
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qed "Spy_see_priK"; |
147 |
Addsimps [Spy_see_priK]; |
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Goal "evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
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by Auto_tac; |
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qed "Spy_analz_priK"; |
152 |
Addsimps [Spy_analz_priK]; |
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153 |
||
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AddSDs [Spy_see_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1), |
155 |
Spy_analz_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1)]; |
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||
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(*This lemma says that no false certificates exist. One might extend the |
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model to include bogus certificates for the agents, but there seems |
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little point in doing so: the loss of their private keys is a worse |
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161 |
breach of security.*) |
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Goalw [certificate_def] |
5359 | 163 |
"[| certificate B KB : parts (spies evs); evs : tls |] ==> pubK B = KB"; |
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by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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165 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
5433 | 166 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
3772 | 167 |
qed "certificate_valid"; |
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|
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(*Replace key KB in ClientKeyExch by (pubK B) *) |
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171 |
val ClientKeyExch_tac = |
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forward_tac [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS certificate_valid] |
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173 |
THEN' assume_tac |
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THEN' hyp_subst_tac; |
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175 |
|
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fun analz_induct_tac i = |
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177 |
etac tls.induct i THEN |
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178 |
ClientKeyExch_tac (i+6) THEN (*ClientKeyExch*) |
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ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps split_ifs @ pushes)) THEN |
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180 |
(*Remove instances of pubK B: the Spy already knows all public keys. |
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181 |
Combining the two simplifier calls makes them run extremely slowly.*) |
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182 |
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [image_eq_UN, insert_absorb])); |
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183 |
|
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184 |
|
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185 |
(*** Properties of items found in Notes ***) |
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186 |
|
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187 |
Goal "[| Notes A {|Agent B, X|} : set evs; evs : tls |] \ |
5359 | 188 |
\ ==> Crypt (pubK B) X : parts (spies evs)"; |
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189 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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190 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
4091 | 191 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
3683 | 192 |
qed "Notes_Crypt_parts_spies"; |
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193 |
|
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194 |
(*C may be either A or B*) |
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195 |
Goal "[| Notes C {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs; \ |
5359 | 196 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
197 |
\ ==> Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs)"; |
|
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198 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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199 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
3711 | 200 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
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201 |
(*Fake*) |
4091 | 202 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
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203 |
(*Client, Server Accept*) |
5433 | 204 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 1)); |
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205 |
qed "Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS"; |
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206 |
|
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207 |
(*Compared with the theorem above, both premise and conclusion are stronger*) |
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208 |
Goal "[| Notes A {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs;\ |
5359 | 209 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
210 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
|
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211 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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212 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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213 |
(*ServerAccepts*) |
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214 |
by (Fast_tac 1); |
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215 |
qed "Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS"; |
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216 |
|
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217 |
|
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218 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it ***) |
3474 | 219 |
|
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220 |
(*B can check A's signature if he has received A's certificate.*) |
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221 |
Goal "[| X : parts (spies evs); \ |
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222 |
\ X = Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); \ |
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223 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
5359 | 224 |
\ ==> Says A B X : set evs"; |
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225 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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226 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
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227 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
5433 | 228 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
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229 |
val lemma = result(); |
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230 |
|
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231 |
(*Final version: B checks X using the distributed KA instead of priK A*) |
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232 |
Goal "[| X : parts (spies evs); \ |
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233 |
\ X = Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); \ |
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234 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
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235 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
5359 | 236 |
\ ==> Says A B X : set evs"; |
4091 | 237 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1); |
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238 |
qed "TrustCertVerify"; |
3474 | 239 |
|
240 |
||
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241 |
(*If CertVerify is present then A has chosen PMS.*) |
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242 |
Goal "[| Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \ |
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243 |
\ : parts (spies evs); \ |
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244 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
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245 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
4423 | 246 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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247 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
5433 | 248 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
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249 |
val lemma = result(); |
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250 |
|
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251 |
(*Final version using the distributed KA instead of priK A*) |
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252 |
Goal "[| Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \ |
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253 |
\ : parts (spies evs); \ |
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|
254 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
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255 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
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|
256 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
4091 | 257 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1); |
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|
258 |
qed "UseCertVerify"; |
3474 | 259 |
|
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260 |
|
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261 |
Goal "evs : tls ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce (PRF x)|} ~: set evs"; |
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262 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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|
263 |
(*ClientKeyExch: PMS is assumed to differ from any PRF.*) |
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264 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
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|
265 |
qed "no_Notes_A_PRF"; |
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266 |
Addsimps [no_Notes_A_PRF]; |
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|
267 |
|
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268 |
|
5359 | 269 |
Goal "[| Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) : parts (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
270 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
|
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271 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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|
272 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
5433 | 273 |
(*Easy, e.g. by freshness*) |
274 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 2)); |
|
275 |
(*Fake*) |
|
276 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
|
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277 |
qed "MS_imp_PMS"; |
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|
278 |
AddSDs [MS_imp_PMS]; |
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|
279 |
|
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280 |
|
3474 | 281 |
|
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|
282 |
(*** Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret ***) |
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|
283 |
|
11104 | 284 |
(*PMS determines B.*) |
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|
285 |
Goal "[| Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \ |
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|
286 |
\ Crypt(pubK B') (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \ |
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|
287 |
\ Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs); \ |
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|
288 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
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|
289 |
\ ==> B=B'"; |
11104 | 290 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
291 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
292 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
293 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
|
294 |
(*Fake, ClientKeyExch*) |
|
295 |
by (ALLGOALS Blast_tac); |
|
3704 | 296 |
qed "Crypt_unique_PMS"; |
297 |
||
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|
298 |
|
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|
299 |
(** It is frustrating that we need two versions of the unicity results. |
3704 | 300 |
But Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} determines both A and B. Sometimes |
301 |
we have only the weaker assertion Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS), which |
|
302 |
determines B alone, and only if PMS is secret. |
|
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303 |
**) |
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|
304 |
|
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|
305 |
(*In A's internal Note, PMS determines A and B.*) |
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|
306 |
Goal "[| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
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|
307 |
\ Notes A' {|Agent B', Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
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|
308 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
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|
309 |
\ ==> A=A' & B=B'"; |
11104 | 310 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
311 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
312 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
|
313 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
|
314 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 1); |
|
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|
315 |
qed "Notes_unique_PMS"; |
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|
316 |
|
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|
317 |
|
3772 | 318 |
(**** Secrecy Theorems ****) |
319 |
||
320 |
(*Key compromise lemma needed to prove analz_image_keys. |
|
321 |
No collection of keys can help the spy get new private keys.*) |
|
5359 | 322 |
Goal "evs : tls \ |
10833 | 323 |
\ ==> ALL KK. (Key(priK B) : analz (Key`KK Un (spies evs))) = \ |
5359 | 324 |
\ (priK B : KK | B : bad)"; |
3772 | 325 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
326 |
by (ALLGOALS |
|
327 |
(asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss |
|
5535 | 328 |
addsimps certificate_def::keys_distinct))); |
3772 | 329 |
(*Fake*) |
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|
330 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3772 | 331 |
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_priK"; |
332 |
||
333 |
||
334 |
(*slightly speeds up the big simplification below*) |
|
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|
335 |
Goal "KK <= range sessionK ==> priK B ~: KK"; |
3772 | 336 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
337 |
val range_sessionkeys_not_priK = result(); |
|
338 |
||
339 |
(*Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if*) |
|
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|
340 |
Goal "(X : analz (G Un H)) --> (X : analz H) ==> \ |
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|
341 |
\ (X : analz (G Un H)) = (X : analz H)"; |
4091 | 342 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [impOfSubs analz_mono]) 1); |
3961 | 343 |
val analz_image_keys_lemma = result(); |
3772 | 344 |
|
345 |
(** Strangely, the following version doesn't work: |
|
10833 | 346 |
\ ALL Z. (Nonce N : analz (Key`(sessionK`Z) Un (spies evs))) = \ |
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|
347 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
3772 | 348 |
**) |
349 |
||
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|
350 |
Goal "evs : tls ==> \ |
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|
351 |
\ ALL KK. KK <= range sessionK --> \ |
10833 | 352 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (Key`KK Un (spies evs))) = \ |
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|
353 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
3772 | 354 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
355 |
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 7); |
|
356 |
by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI])); |
|
3961 | 357 |
by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac analz_image_keys_lemma)); |
5076 | 358 |
by (ALLGOALS (*4.5 seconds*) |
3772 | 359 |
(asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss |
5535 | 360 |
addsimps split_ifs @ pushes @ |
361 |
[range_sessionkeys_not_priK, |
|
362 |
analz_image_priK, certificate_def]))); |
|
4091 | 363 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [insert_absorb]))); |
3772 | 364 |
(*Fake*) |
4422
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Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
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parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
365 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3772 | 366 |
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_keys"; |
367 |
||
368 |
(*Knowing some session keys is no help in getting new nonces*) |
|
5114
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|
369 |
Goal "evs : tls ==> \ |
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|
370 |
\ Nonce N : analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs)) = \ |
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|
371 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
3772 | 372 |
by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss addsimps [analz_image_keys]) 1); |
373 |
qed "analz_insert_key"; |
|
374 |
Addsimps [analz_insert_key]; |
|
375 |
||
376 |
||
377 |
(*** Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure ***) |
|
378 |
||
379 |
(** Some lemmas about session keys, comprising clientK and serverK **) |
|
380 |
||
381 |
||
382 |
(*Lemma: session keys are never used if PMS is fresh. |
|
383 |
Nonces don't have to agree, allowing session resumption. |
|
384 |
Converse doesn't hold; revealing PMS doesn't force the keys to be sent. |
|
385 |
THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE AS SAFE ELIM RULES.*) |
|
5114
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diff
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|
386 |
Goal "[| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs); \ |
6284
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tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
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changeset
|
387 |
\ K = sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role); \ |
5114
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|
388 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
3772 | 389 |
\ ==> Key K ~: parts (spies evs) & (ALL Y. Crypt K Y ~: parts (spies evs))"; |
390 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
391 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
|
392 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
|
393 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
|
8054
2ce57ef2a4aa
used image_eq_UN to speed up slow proofs of base cases
paulson
parents:
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diff
changeset
|
394 |
by (Blast_tac 2); |
3772 | 395 |
(*Fake*) |
8054
2ce57ef2a4aa
used image_eq_UN to speed up slow proofs of base cases
paulson
parents:
7057
diff
changeset
|
396 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
3772 | 397 |
(** LEVEL 6 **) |
398 |
(*Oops*) |
|
399 |
by (REPEAT |
|
7057
b9ddbb925939
tweaked proofs to handle new freeness reasoning for data c onstructors
paulson
parents:
6915
diff
changeset
|
400 |
(force_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
b9ddbb925939
tweaked proofs to handle new freeness reasoning for data c onstructors
paulson
parents:
6915
diff
changeset
|
401 |
Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS], |
b9ddbb925939
tweaked proofs to handle new freeness reasoning for data c onstructors
paulson
parents:
6915
diff
changeset
|
402 |
simpset()) 1)); |
3772 | 403 |
val lemma = result(); |
404 |
||
6284
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tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
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changeset
|
405 |
Goal "[| Key (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role)) : parts (spies evs); \ |
5114
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|
406 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
c729d4c299c1
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parents:
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diff
changeset
|
407 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
4091 | 408 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1); |
3772 | 409 |
qed "PMS_sessionK_not_spied"; |
410 |
||
6284
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tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
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changeset
|
411 |
Goal "[| Crypt (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), role)) Y \ |
5114
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changeset
|
412 |
\ : parts (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
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5076
diff
changeset
|
413 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
4091 | 414 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1); |
3772 | 415 |
qed "PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied"; |
416 |
||
5433 | 417 |
(*Write keys are never sent if M (MASTER SECRET) is secure. |
418 |
Converse fails; betraying M doesn't force the keys to be sent! |
|
3772 | 419 |
The strong Oops condition can be weakened later by unicity reasoning, |
5433 | 420 |
with some effort. |
421 |
NO LONGER USED: see clientK_not_spied and serverK_not_spied*) |
|
6284
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tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
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changeset
|
422 |
Goal "[| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role))) ~: set evs; \ |
5114
c729d4c299c1
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parents:
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diff
changeset
|
423 |
\ Nonce M ~: analz (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
6284
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tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
424 |
\ ==> Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) ~: parts (spies evs)"; |
3772 | 425 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
426 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
427 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*5 seconds*) |
3772 | 428 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
8054
2ce57ef2a4aa
used image_eq_UN to speed up slow proofs of base cases
paulson
parents:
7057
diff
changeset
|
429 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 2); |
3772 | 430 |
(*Fake*) |
8054
2ce57ef2a4aa
used image_eq_UN to speed up slow proofs of base cases
paulson
parents:
7057
diff
changeset
|
431 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3772 | 432 |
qed "sessionK_not_spied"; |
433 |
||
434 |
||
3745
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paulson
parents:
3729
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changeset
|
435 |
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the PMS will stay secret.*) |
5114
c729d4c299c1
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paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
436 |
Goal "[| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
437 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
438 |
\ Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
439 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*4 seconds*) |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
440 |
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS ~: range PRF*) |
4091 | 441 |
by (REPEAT (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 6)); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
442 |
(*ClientHello, ServerHello, ClientKeyExch, ServerResume: |
3687
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
443 |
mostly freshness reasoning*) |
4091 | 444 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs |
4201 | 445 |
addDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
446 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3)); |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
447 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
4091 | 448 |
by (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 2); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
449 |
(*Fake*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
450 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
451 |
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_PMS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp)); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
452 |
|
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
453 |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
454 |
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the MASTER SECRET |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
455 |
will stay secret.*) |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
456 |
Goal "[| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
457 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
458 |
\ Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
459 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*4 seconds*) |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
460 |
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS was already visible*) |
4091 | 461 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
4201 | 462 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj, |
6308
76f3865a2b1d
Added Bella's "Gets" model for Otway_Rees. Also affects some other theories.
paulson
parents:
6284
diff
changeset
|
463 |
Notes_imp_knows_Spy RS analz.Inj]) 6)); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
464 |
(*ClientHello*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
465 |
by (Blast_tac 3); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
466 |
(*SpyKeys: by secrecy of the PMS, Spy cannot make the MS*) |
4091 | 467 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
468 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 2); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
469 |
(*Fake*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
470 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
471 |
(*ServerHello and ClientKeyExch: mostly freshness reasoning*) |
4091 | 472 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs |
4201 | 473 |
addDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
474 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 1)); |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
475 |
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_MS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp)); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
476 |
|
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
477 |
|
3704 | 478 |
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK ***) |
479 |
||
5433 | 480 |
(*If A created PMS then nobody else (except the Spy in replays) |
481 |
would send a message using a clientK generated from that PMS.*) |
|
482 |
Goal "[| Says A' B' (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs; \ |
|
483 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
|
484 |
\ evs : tls; A' ~= Spy |] \ |
|
485 |
\ ==> A = A'"; |
|
486 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
487 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
488 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
3711 | 489 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 490 |
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*) |
491 |
by (REPEAT |
|
4091 | 492 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS] |
4201 | 493 |
addIs [Notes_unique_PMS RS conjunct1]) 2)); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
494 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 495 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied, |
496 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
|
5433 | 497 |
qed "Says_clientK_unique"; |
3704 | 498 |
|
499 |
||
500 |
(*If A created PMS and has not leaked her clientK to the Spy, |
|
5433 | 501 |
then it is completely secure: not even in parts!*) |
502 |
Goal "[| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
|
503 |
\ Says A Spy (Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs; \ |
|
504 |
\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; \ |
|
505 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
|
506 |
\ ==> Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: parts (spies evs)"; |
|
507 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
508 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
509 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*4 seconds*) |
3704 | 510 |
(*Oops*) |
5433 | 511 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_clientK_unique]) 4); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
512 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
5433 | 513 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied]) 3); |
514 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
|
515 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [Spy_not_see_MS RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 2); |
|
516 |
(*Fake*) |
|
517 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
|
518 |
qed "clientK_not_spied"; |
|
3704 | 519 |
|
520 |
||
521 |
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK ***) |
|
522 |
||
523 |
(*If A created PMS for B, then nobody other than B or the Spy would |
|
524 |
send a message using a serverK generated from that PMS.*) |
|
5433 | 525 |
Goal "[| Says B' A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs; \ |
526 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
|
527 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad; B' ~= Spy |] \ |
|
528 |
\ ==> B = B'"; |
|
529 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
530 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
531 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
3711 | 532 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 533 |
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*) |
534 |
by (REPEAT |
|
5433 | 535 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS] |
4201 | 536 |
addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
537 |
Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
|
538 |
Crypt_unique_PMS]) 2)); |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
539 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 540 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied, |
541 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
|
5433 | 542 |
qed "Says_serverK_unique"; |
3704 | 543 |
|
544 |
(*If A created PMS for B, and B has not leaked his serverK to the Spy, |
|
5433 | 545 |
then it is completely secure: not even in parts!*) |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
546 |
Goal "[| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
5433 | 547 |
\ Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs; \ |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
548 |
\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : tls |] \ |
5433 | 549 |
\ ==> Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: parts (spies evs)"; |
550 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
551 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
552 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
3704 | 553 |
(*Oops*) |
5433 | 554 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_serverK_unique]) 4); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
555 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
5433 | 556 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied]) 3); |
557 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
|
558 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [Spy_not_see_MS RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 2); |
|
559 |
(*Fake*) |
|
560 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
|
561 |
qed "serverK_not_spied"; |
|
3704 | 562 |
|
563 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
564 |
(*** Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
565 |
and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Note that it is up to A |
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
566 |
to compare PA with what she originally sent. |
3474 | 567 |
***) |
568 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
569 |
(*The mention of her name (A) in X assures A that B knows who she is.*) |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
570 |
Goal "[| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
571 |
\ (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M, \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
572 |
\ Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A, \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
573 |
\ Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
574 |
\ M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
575 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
5433 | 576 |
\ ==> Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs --> \ |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
577 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
578 |
\ X : parts (spies evs) --> Says B A X : set evs"; |
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
579 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
580 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*7 seconds*) |
4091 | 581 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]))); |
3711 | 582 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
4472 | 583 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
584 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
585 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
5433 | 586 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addEs [serverK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 1); |
3474 | 587 |
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerFinished"; |
588 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
589 |
(*This version refers not to ServerFinished but to any message from B. |
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
590 |
We don't assume B has received CertVerify, and an intruder could |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
591 |
have changed A's identity in all other messages, so we can't be sure |
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents:
3515
diff
changeset
|
592 |
that B sends his message to A. If CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE were augmented |
3704 | 593 |
to bind A's identity with PMS, then we could replace A' by A below.*) |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
594 |
Goal "[| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
5433 | 595 |
\ ==> Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs --> \ |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
596 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
597 |
\ Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs) --> \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
598 |
\ (EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs)"; |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
599 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
600 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*6 seconds*) |
4091 | 601 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]))); |
3711 | 602 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 603 |
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*) |
604 |
by (REPEAT |
|
5433 | 605 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS] |
4201 | 606 |
addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
607 |
Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
|
608 |
Crypt_unique_PMS]) 3)); |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
609 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 610 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
611 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
5433 | 612 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addEs [serverK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
613 |
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerMsg"; |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
614 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
615 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
616 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
617 |
then A has sent it, ASSUMING that A chose PMS. Authentication is |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
618 |
assumed here; B cannot verify it. But if the message is |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
619 |
ClientFinished, then B can then check the quoted values PA, PB, etc. |
3506 | 620 |
***) |
3704 | 621 |
|
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
622 |
Goal "[| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
5433 | 623 |
\ ==> Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs --> \ |
5359 | 624 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
625 |
\ Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs) --> \ |
|
626 |
\ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
|
3772 | 627 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
628 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*6 seconds*) |
3711 | 629 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 630 |
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*) |
4091 | 631 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() delrules [conjI] |
4201 | 632 |
addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS] |
633 |
addDs [Notes_unique_PMS]) 3)); |
|
4472 | 634 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
635 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
636 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
5433 | 637 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addEs [clientK_not_spied RSN (2,rev_notE)]) 1); |
638 |
qed_spec_mp "TrustClientMsg"; |
|
3506 | 639 |
|
640 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
641 |
|
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
642 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to |
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
643 |
check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
644 |
values PA, PB, etc. Even this one requires A to be uncompromised. |
3506 | 645 |
***) |
5114
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
646 |
Goal "[| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
647 |
\ Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs;\ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
648 |
\ Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs; \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
649 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
650 |
\ Says A'' B (Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))\ |
c729d4c299c1
Deleted leading parameters thanks to new Goal command
paulson
parents:
5076
diff
changeset
|
651 |
\ : set evs; \ |
5359 | 652 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
653 |
\ ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
|
4091 | 654 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [TrustClientMsg, UseCertVerify] |
4201 | 655 |
addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
656 |
qed "AuthClientFinished"; |
3687
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
657 |
|
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
658 |
(*22/9/97: loads in 622s, which is 10 minutes 22 seconds*) |
3711 | 659 |
(*24/9/97: loads in 672s, which is 11 minutes 12 seconds [stronger theorems]*) |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
660 |
(*29/9/97: loads in 481s, after removing Certificate from ClientKeyExch*) |
3758
188a4fbfaf55
Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents:
3745
diff
changeset
|
661 |
(*30/9/97: loads in 476s, after removing unused theorems*) |
3760
77f71f650433
Strengthened the possibility property for resumption so that it could have
paulson
parents:
3758
diff
changeset
|
662 |
(*30/9/97: loads in 448s, after fixing ServerResume*) |
5433 | 663 |
|
664 |
(*08/9/97: loads in 189s (pike), after much reorganization, |
|
665 |
back to 621s on albatross?*) |
|
6284
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
666 |
|
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
667 |
(*10/2/99: loads in 139s (pike) |
147db42c1009
tidying in conjuntion with the TISSEC paper; replaced (unit option)
paulson
parents:
5653
diff
changeset
|
668 |
down to 433s on albatross*) |