--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.thy Tue Feb 27 12:28:42 2001 +0100
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.thy Tue Feb 27 16:13:23 2001 +0100
@@ -16,65 +16,65 @@
inductive "yahalom"
intrs
(*Initial trace is empty*)
- Nil "[]: yahalom"
+ Nil "[] \\<in> yahalom"
(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
- Fake "[| evs: yahalom; X: synth (analz (knows Spy evs)) |]
- ==> Says Spy B X # evs : yahalom"
+ Fake "[| evsf \\<in> yahalom; X \\<in> synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) |]
+ ==> Says Spy B X # evsf \\<in> yahalom"
(*A message that has been sent can be received by the
intended recipient.*)
- Reception "[| evsr: yahalom; Says A B X : set evsr |]
- ==> Gets B X # evsr : yahalom"
+ Reception "[| evsr \\<in> yahalom; Says A B X \\<in> set evsr |]
+ ==> Gets B X # evsr \\<in> yahalom"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
- YM1 "[| evs1: yahalom; Nonce NA ~: used evs1 |]
- ==> Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} # evs1 : yahalom"
+ YM1 "[| evs1 \\<in> yahalom; Nonce NA \\<notin> used evs1 |]
+ ==> Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} # evs1 \\<in> yahalom"
(*Bob's response to Alice's message.*)
- YM2 "[| evs2: yahalom; Nonce NB ~: used evs2;
- Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} : set evs2 |]
+ YM2 "[| evs2 \\<in> yahalom; Nonce NB \\<notin> used evs2;
+ Gets B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} \\<in> set evs2 |]
==> Says B Server
{|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
- # evs2 : yahalom"
+ # evs2 \\<in> yahalom"
(*The Server receives Bob's message. He responds by sending a
new session key to Alice, with a packet for forwarding to Bob.*)
- YM3 "[| evs3: yahalom; Key KAB ~: used evs3;
+ YM3 "[| evs3 \\<in> yahalom; Key KAB \\<notin> used evs3;
Gets Server
{|Agent B, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
- : set evs3 |]
+ \\<in> set evs3 |]
==> Says Server A
{|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key KAB, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key KAB|}|}
- # evs3 : yahalom"
+ # evs3 \\<in> yahalom"
(*Alice receives the Server's (?) message, checks her Nonce, and
uses the new session key to send Bob his Nonce. The premise
- A ~= Server is needed to prove Says_Server_not_range.*)
- YM4 "[| evs4: yahalom; A ~= Server;
+ A \\<noteq> Server is needed to prove Says_Server_not_range.*)
+ YM4 "[| evs4 \\<in> yahalom; A \\<noteq> Server;
Gets A {|Crypt(shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, X|}
- : set evs4;
- Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} : set evs4 |]
- ==> Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs4 : yahalom"
+ \\<in> set evs4;
+ Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} \\<in> set evs4 |]
+ ==> Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs4 \\<in> yahalom"
(*This message models possible leaks of session keys. The Nonces
identify the protocol run. Quoting Server here ensures they are
correct.*)
- Oops "[| evso: yahalom;
+ Oops "[| evso \\<in> yahalom;
Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A)
{|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
- X|} : set evso |]
- ==> Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso : yahalom"
+ X|} \\<in> set evso |]
+ ==> Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso \\<in> yahalom"
constdefs
KeyWithNonce :: [key, nat, event list] => bool
"KeyWithNonce K NB evs ==
- EX A B na X.
+ \\<exists>A B na X.
Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, Nonce NB|}, X|}
- : set evs"
+ \\<in> set evs"
end