--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees_Bad.thy Thu Sep 26 12:47:47 1996 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees_Bad.thy Thu Sep 26 12:50:48 1996 +0200
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
(*Initial trace is empty*)
Nil "[]: otway"
- (*The enemy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
+ (*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
- Fake "[| evs: otway; B ~= Enemy; X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs)) |]
- ==> Says Enemy B X # evs : otway"
+ Fake "[| evs: otway; B ~= Spy; X: synth (analz (sees Spy evs)) |]
+ ==> Says Spy B X # evs : otway"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
OR1 "[| evs: otway; A ~= B; B ~= Server |]
@@ -68,12 +68,12 @@
(*This message models possible leaks of session keys. Alice's Nonce
identifies the protocol run.*)
- Reveal "[| evs: otway; A ~= Enemy;
+ Reveal "[| evs: otway; A ~= Spy;
Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Crypt {|Nonce NA, Key K|} (shrK A)|}
: set_of_list evs;
Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK A)|}
: set_of_list evs |]
- ==> Says A Enemy {|Nonce NA, Key K|} # evs : otway"
+ ==> Says A Spy {|Nonce NA, Key K|} # evs : otway"
end