(* Title: HOL/Auth/WooLam.thy
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
*)
header{*The Woo-Lam Protocol*}
theory WooLam imports Public begin
text{*Simplified version from page 11 of
Abadi and Needham (1996).
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols.
IEEE Trans. S.E. 22(1), pages 6-15.
Note: this differs from the Woo-Lam protocol discussed by Lowe (1996):
Some New Attacks upon Security Protocols.
Computer Security Foundations Workshop
*}
inductive_set woolam :: "event list set"
where
(*Initial trace is empty*)
Nil: "[] \<in> woolam"
(** These rules allow agents to send messages to themselves **)
(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
| Fake: "[| evsf \<in> woolam; X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf)) |]
==> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> woolam"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
| WL1: "evs1 \<in> woolam ==> Says A B (Agent A) # evs1 \<in> woolam"
(*Bob responds to Alice's message with a challenge.*)
| WL2: "[| evs2 \<in> woolam; Says A' B (Agent A) \<in> set evs2 |]
==> Says B A (Nonce NB) # evs2 \<in> woolam"
(*Alice responds to Bob's challenge by encrypting NB with her key.
B is *not* properly determined -- Alice essentially broadcasts
her reply.*)
| WL3: "[| evs3 \<in> woolam;
Says A B (Agent A) \<in> set evs3;
Says B' A (Nonce NB) \<in> set evs3 |]
==> Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 \<in> woolam"
(*Bob forwards Alice's response to the Server. NOTE: usually
the messages are shown in chronological order, for clarity.
But here, exchanging the two events would cause the lemma
WL4_analz_spies to pick up the wrong assumption!*)
| WL4: "[| evs4 \<in> woolam;
Says A' B X \<in> set evs4;
Says A'' B (Agent A) \<in> set evs4 |]
==> Says B Server {|Agent A, Agent B, X|} # evs4 \<in> woolam"
(*Server decrypts Alice's response for Bob.*)
| WL5: "[| evs5 \<in> woolam;
Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)|}
\<in> set evs5 |]
==> Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|})
# evs5 \<in> woolam"
declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*)
lemma "\<exists>NB. \<exists>evs \<in> woolam.
Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|}) \<in> set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] woolam.Nil
[THEN woolam.WL1, THEN woolam.WL2, THEN woolam.WL3,
THEN woolam.WL4, THEN woolam.WL5], possibility)
done
(*Could prove forwarding lemmas for WL4, but we do not need them!*)
(**** Inductive proofs about woolam ****)
(** Theorems of the form X \<notin> parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY
sends messages containing X! **)
(*Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!*)
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
"evs \<in> woolam ==> (Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by (erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
"evs \<in> woolam ==> (Key (shrK A) \<in> analz (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by auto
lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
"[|Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (knows Spy evs); evs \<in> woolam|] ==> A \<in> bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
(**** Autheticity properties for Woo-Lam ****)
(*** WL4 ***)
(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice*)
lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Alice_msg:
"[| Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs);
A \<notin> bad; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> \<exists>B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
(*Guarantee for Server: if it gets a message containing a certificate from
Alice, then she originated that certificate. But we DO NOT know that B
ever saw it: the Spy may have rerouted the message to the Server.*)
lemma Server_trusts_WL4 [dest]:
"[| Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)|}
\<in> set evs;
A \<notin> bad; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> \<exists>B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
by (blast intro!: NB_Crypt_imp_Alice_msg)
(*** WL5 ***)
(*Server sent WL5 only if it received the right sort of message*)
lemma Server_sent_WL5 [dest]:
"[| Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|}) \<in> set evs;
evs \<in> woolam |]
==> \<exists>B'. Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) NB|}
\<in> set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server!*)
lemma NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg [rule_format]:
"[| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|} \<in> parts (spies evs);
B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, NB|}) \<in> set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
(*Guarantee for B. If B gets the Server's certificate then A has encrypted
the nonce using her key. This event can be no older than the nonce itself.
But A may have sent the nonce to some other agent and it could have reached
the Server via the Spy.*)
lemma B_trusts_WL5:
"[| Says S B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|}): set evs;
A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> \<exists>B. Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
by (blast dest!: NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg)
(*B only issues challenges in response to WL1. Not used.*)
lemma B_said_WL2:
"[| Says B A (Nonce NB) \<in> set evs; B \<noteq> Spy; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> \<exists>A'. Says A' B (Agent A) \<in> set evs"
by (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast+)
(**CANNOT be proved because A doesn't know where challenges come from...*)
lemma "[| A \<notin> bad; B \<noteq> Spy; evs \<in> woolam |]
==> Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs) &
Says B A (Nonce NB) \<in> set evs
--> Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp, erule woolam.induct, force, simp_all, blast, auto)
oops
end