diff -r e9ab4ad7bd15 -r 23307fd33906 src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy
--- a/src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy	Thu Jan 11 13:48:17 2018 +0100
+++ b/src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy	Fri Jan 12 14:08:53 2018 +0100
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 Inductive relations "parts", "analz" and "synth"
 *)(*<*)
 
-section{*Theory of Agents and Messages for Security Protocols*}
+section\<open>Theory of Agents and Messages for Security Protocols\<close>
 
 theory Message imports Main begin
 ML_file "../../antiquote_setup.ML"
@@ -15,27 +15,27 @@
 by blast
 (*>*)
 
-section{* Agents and Messages *}
+section\<open>Agents and Messages\<close>
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 All protocol specifications refer to a syntactic theory of messages. 
 Datatype
 @{text agent} introduces the constant @{text Server} (a trusted central
 machine, needed for some protocols), an infinite population of
 friendly agents, and the~@{text Spy}:
-*}
+\<close>
 
 datatype agent = Server | Friend nat | Spy
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 Keys are just natural numbers.  Function @{text invKey} maps a public key to
 the matching private key, and vice versa:
-*}
+\<close>
 
 type_synonym key = nat
 consts invKey :: "key \<Rightarrow> key"
 (*<*)
-consts all_symmetric :: bool        --{*true if all keys are symmetric*}
+consts all_symmetric :: bool        \<comment>\<open>true if all keys are symmetric\<close>
 
 specification (invKey)
   invKey [simp]: "invKey (invKey K) = K"
@@ -43,18 +43,18 @@
     by (rule exI [of _ id], auto)
 
 
-text{*The inverse of a symmetric key is itself; that of a public key
-      is the private key and vice versa*}
+text\<open>The inverse of a symmetric key is itself; that of a public key
+      is the private key and vice versa\<close>
 
 definition symKeys :: "key set" where
   "symKeys == {K. invKey K = K}"
 (*>*)
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 Datatype
 @{text msg} introduces the message forms, which include agent names, nonces,
 keys, compound messages, and encryptions.  
-*}
+\<close>
 
 datatype
      msg = Agent  agent
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
          | MPair  msg msg
          | Crypt  key msg
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 \noindent
 The notation $\comp{X\sb 1,\ldots X\sb{n-1},X\sb n}$
 abbreviates
@@ -76,10 +76,10 @@
 wrong key succeeds but yields garbage.  Our model of encryption is
 realistic if encryption adds some redundancy to the plaintext, such as a
 checksum, so that garbage can be detected.
-*}
+\<close>
 
 (*<*)
-text{*Concrete syntax: messages appear as \<open>\<lbrace>A,B,NA\<rbrace>\<close>, etc...*}
+text\<open>Concrete syntax: messages appear as \<open>\<lbrace>A,B,NA\<rbrace>\<close>, etc...\<close>
 syntax
   "_MTuple"      :: "['a, args] => 'a * 'b"       ("(2\<lbrace>_,/ _\<rbrace>)")
 translations
@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@
 
 
 definition keysFor :: "msg set => key set" where
-    --{*Keys useful to decrypt elements of a message set*}
+    \<comment>\<open>Keys useful to decrypt elements of a message set\<close>
   "keysFor H == invKey ` {K. \<exists>X. Crypt K X \<in> H}"
 
 
-subsubsection{*Inductive Definition of All Parts" of a Message*}
+subsubsection\<open>Inductive Definition of All Parts" of a Message\<close>
 
 inductive_set
   parts :: "msg set => msg set"
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
   | Body:        "Crypt K X \<in> parts H ==> X \<in> parts H"
 
 
-text{*Monotonicity*}
+text\<open>Monotonicity\<close>
 lemma parts_mono: "G \<subseteq> H ==> parts(G) \<subseteq> parts(H)"
 apply auto
 apply (erule parts.induct) 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
 done
 
 
-text{*Equations hold because constructors are injective.*}
+text\<open>Equations hold because constructors are injective.\<close>
 lemma Friend_image_eq [simp]: "(Friend x \<in> Friend`A) = (x:A)"
 by auto
 
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
 by auto
 
 
-subsubsection{*Inverse of keys *}
+subsubsection\<open>Inverse of keys\<close>
 
 lemma invKey_eq [simp]: "(invKey K = invKey K') = (K=K')"
 apply safe
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
 done
 
 
-subsection{*keysFor operator*}
+subsection\<open>keysFor operator\<close>
 
 lemma keysFor_empty [simp]: "keysFor {} = {}"
 by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
 lemma keysFor_UN [simp]: "keysFor (\<Union>i\<in>A. H i) = (\<Union>i\<in>A. keysFor (H i))"
 by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
 
-text{*Monotonicity*}
+text\<open>Monotonicity\<close>
 lemma keysFor_mono: "G \<subseteq> H ==> keysFor(G) \<subseteq> keysFor(H)"
 by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
 
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
 by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
 
 
-subsection{*Inductive relation "parts"*}
+subsection\<open>Inductive relation "parts"\<close>
 
 lemma MPair_parts:
      "[| \<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<in> parts H;        
@@ -177,10 +177,10 @@
 by (blast dest: parts.Fst parts.Snd) 
 
 declare MPair_parts [elim!]  parts.Body [dest!]
-text{*NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the
+text\<open>NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the
      compound message.  They work well on THIS FILE.  
   @{text MPair_parts} is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs.
-  The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.*}
+  The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.\<close>
 
 lemma parts_increasing: "H \<subseteq> parts(H)"
 by blast
@@ -195,12 +195,12 @@
 lemma parts_emptyE [elim!]: "X\<in> parts{} ==> P"
 by simp
 
-text{*WARNING: loops if H = {Y}, therefore must not be repeated!*}
+text\<open>WARNING: loops if H = {Y}, therefore must not be repeated!\<close>
 lemma parts_singleton: "X\<in> parts H ==> \<exists>Y\<in>H. X\<in> parts {Y}"
 by (erule parts.induct, fast+)
 
 
-subsubsection{*Unions *}
+subsubsection\<open>Unions\<close>
 
 lemma parts_Un_subset1: "parts(G) \<union> parts(H) \<subseteq> parts(G \<union> H)"
 by (intro Un_least parts_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
@@ -218,8 +218,8 @@
 apply (simp only: parts_Un)
 done
 
-text{*TWO inserts to avoid looping.  This rewrite is better than nothing.
-  Not suitable for Addsimps: its behaviour can be strange.*}
+text\<open>TWO inserts to avoid looping.  This rewrite is better than nothing.
+  Not suitable for Addsimps: its behaviour can be strange.\<close>
 lemma parts_insert2:
      "parts (insert X (insert Y H)) = parts {X} \<union> parts {Y} \<union> parts H"
 apply (simp add: Un_assoc)
@@ -237,12 +237,12 @@
 lemma parts_UN [simp]: "parts(\<Union>x\<in>A. H x) = (\<Union>x\<in>A. parts(H x))"
 by (intro equalityI parts_UN_subset1 parts_UN_subset2)
 
-text{*Added to simplify arguments to parts, analz and synth.
-  NOTE: the UN versions are no longer used!*}
+text\<open>Added to simplify arguments to parts, analz and synth.
+  NOTE: the UN versions are no longer used!\<close>
 
 
-text{*This allows @{text blast} to simplify occurrences of 
-  @{term "parts(G\<union>H)"} in the assumption.*}
+text\<open>This allows @{text blast} to simplify occurrences of 
+  @{term "parts(G\<union>H)"} in the assumption.\<close>
 lemmas in_parts_UnE = parts_Un [THEN equalityD1, THEN subsetD, THEN UnE] 
 declare in_parts_UnE [elim!]
 
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@
 lemma parts_insert_subset: "insert X (parts H) \<subseteq> parts(insert X H)"
 by (blast intro: parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 
-subsubsection{*Idempotence and transitivity *}
+subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
 
 lemma parts_partsD [dest!]: "X\<in> parts (parts H) ==> X\<in> parts H"
 by (erule parts.induct, blast+)
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
 lemma parts_trans: "[| X\<in> parts G;  G \<subseteq> parts H |] ==> X\<in> parts H"
 by (drule parts_mono, blast)
 
-text{*Cut*}
+text\<open>Cut\<close>
 lemma parts_cut:
      "[| Y\<in> parts (insert X G);  X\<in> parts H |] ==> Y\<in> parts (G \<union> H)" 
 by (blast intro: parts_trans) 
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@
 by (force dest!: parts_cut intro: parts_insertI)
 
 
-subsubsection{*Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages *}
+subsubsection\<open>Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages\<close>
 
 lemmas parts_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI parts_insert_subset]
 
@@ -323,21 +323,21 @@
 done
 
 
-text{*In any message, there is an upper bound N on its greatest nonce.*}
+text\<open>In any message, there is an upper bound N on its greatest nonce.\<close>
 lemma msg_Nonce_supply: "\<exists>N. \<forall>n. N\<le>n --> Nonce n \<notin> parts {msg}"
 apply (induct_tac "msg")
 apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: exI parts_insert2)
- txt{*MPair case: blast works out the necessary sum itself!*}
+ txt\<open>MPair case: blast works out the necessary sum itself!\<close>
  prefer 2 apply auto apply (blast elim!: add_leE)
-txt{*Nonce case*}
+txt\<open>Nonce case\<close>
 apply (rename_tac nat)
 apply (rule_tac x = "N + Suc nat" in exI, auto) 
 done
 (*>*)
 
-section{* Modelling the Adversary *}
+section\<open>Modelling the Adversary\<close>
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 The spy is part of the system and must be built into the model.  He is
 a malicious user who does not have to follow the protocol.  He
 watches the network and uses any keys he knows to decrypt messages.
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@
 messages. The set @{text "analz H"} formalizes what the adversary can learn
 from the set of messages~$H$.  The closure properties of this set are
 defined inductively.
-*}
+\<close>
 
 inductive_set
   analz :: "msg set \<Rightarrow> msg set"
@@ -362,14 +362,14 @@
              "\<lbrakk>Crypt K X \<in> analz H; Key(invKey K) \<in> analz H\<rbrakk>
               \<Longrightarrow> X \<in> analz H"
 (*<*)
-text{*Monotonicity; Lemma 1 of Lowe's paper*}
+text\<open>Monotonicity; Lemma 1 of Lowe's paper\<close>
 lemma analz_mono: "G\<subseteq>H ==> analz(G) \<subseteq> analz(H)"
 apply auto
 apply (erule analz.induct) 
 apply (auto dest: analz.Fst analz.Snd) 
 done
 
-text{*Making it safe speeds up proofs*}
+text\<open>Making it safe speeds up proofs\<close>
 lemma MPair_analz [elim!]:
      "[| \<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<in> analz H;        
              [| X \<in> analz H; Y \<in> analz H |] ==> P   
@@ -402,22 +402,22 @@
 
 lemmas analz_insertI = subset_insertI [THEN analz_mono, THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
 
-subsubsection{*General equational properties *}
+subsubsection\<open>General equational properties\<close>
 
 lemma analz_empty [simp]: "analz{} = {}"
 apply safe
 apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
 done
 
-text{*Converse fails: we can analz more from the union than from the 
-  separate parts, as a key in one might decrypt a message in the other*}
+text\<open>Converse fails: we can analz more from the union than from the 
+  separate parts, as a key in one might decrypt a message in the other\<close>
 lemma analz_Un: "analz(G) \<union> analz(H) \<subseteq> analz(G \<union> H)"
 by (intro Un_least analz_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
 
 lemma analz_insert: "insert X (analz H) \<subseteq> analz(insert X H)"
 by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 
-subsubsection{*Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages *}
+subsubsection\<open>Rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages\<close>
 
 lemmas analz_insert_eq_I = equalityI [OF subsetI analz_insert]
 
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@
 apply (erule analz.induct, auto) 
 done
 
-text{*Can only pull out Keys if they are not needed to decrypt the rest*}
+text\<open>Can only pull out Keys if they are not needed to decrypt the rest\<close>
 lemma analz_insert_Key [simp]: 
     "K \<notin> keysFor (analz H) ==>   
           analz (insert (Key K) H) = insert (Key K) (analz H)"
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@
 apply (blast intro: analz.Fst analz.Snd)+
 done
 
-text{*Can pull out enCrypted message if the Key is not known*}
+text\<open>Can pull out enCrypted message if the Key is not known\<close>
 lemma analz_insert_Crypt:
      "Key (invKey K) \<notin> analz H 
       ==> analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) = insert (Crypt K X) (analz H)"
@@ -482,10 +482,10 @@
                insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
 by (intro equalityI lemma1 lemma2)
 
-text{*Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective,
+text\<open>Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective,
 but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with @{text "if_split"}; apparently
 @{text "split_tac"} does not cope with patterns such as @{term"analz (insert
-(Crypt K X) H)"} *} 
+(Crypt K X) H)"}\<close> 
 lemma analz_Crypt_if [simp]:
      "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) =                 
           (if (Key (invKey K) \<in> analz H)                 
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@
 by (simp add: analz_insert_Crypt analz_insert_Decrypt)
 
 
-text{*This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.*}
+text\<open>This rule supposes "for the sake of argument" that we have the key.\<close>
 lemma analz_insert_Crypt_subset:
      "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) \<subseteq>   
            insert (Crypt K X) (analz (insert X H))"
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@
 done
 
 
-subsubsection{*Idempotence and transitivity *}
+subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
 
 lemma analz_analzD [dest!]: "X\<in> analz (analz H) ==> X\<in> analz H"
 by (erule analz.induct, blast+)
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@
 lemma analz_trans: "[| X\<in> analz G;  G \<subseteq> analz H |] ==> X\<in> analz H"
 by (drule analz_mono, blast)
 
-text{*Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe*}
+text\<open>Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe\<close>
 lemma analz_cut: "[| Y\<in> analz (insert X H);  X\<in> analz H |] ==> Y\<in> analz H"
 by (erule analz_trans, blast)
 
@@ -534,14 +534,14 @@
    "Y: analz (insert X H) ==> X: analz H --> Y: analz H"
 *)
 
-text{*This rewrite rule helps in the simplification of messages that involve
+text\<open>This rewrite rule helps in the simplification of messages that involve
   the forwarding of unknown components (X).  Without it, removing occurrences
-  of X can be very complicated. *}
+  of X can be very complicated.\<close>
 lemma analz_insert_eq: "X\<in> analz H ==> analz (insert X H) = analz H"
 by (blast intro: analz_cut analz_insertI)
 
 
-text{*A congruence rule for "analz" *}
+text\<open>A congruence rule for "analz"\<close>
 
 lemma analz_subset_cong:
      "[| analz G \<subseteq> analz G'; analz H \<subseteq> analz H' |] 
@@ -559,14 +559,14 @@
      "analz H = analz H' ==> analz(insert X H) = analz(insert X H')"
 by (force simp only: insert_def intro!: analz_cong)
 
-text{*If there are no pairs or encryptions then analz does nothing*}
+text\<open>If there are no pairs or encryptions then analz does nothing\<close>
 lemma analz_trivial:
      "[| \<forall>X Y. \<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<notin> H;  \<forall>X K. Crypt K X \<notin> H |] ==> analz H = H"
 apply safe
 apply (erule analz.induct, blast+)
 done
 
-text{*These two are obsolete (with a single Spy) but cost little to prove...*}
+text\<open>These two are obsolete (with a single Spy) but cost little to prove...\<close>
 lemma analz_UN_analz_lemma:
      "X\<in> analz (\<Union>i\<in>A. analz (H i)) ==> X\<in> analz (\<Union>i\<in>A. H i)"
 apply (erule analz.induct)
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@
 lemma analz_UN_analz [simp]: "analz (\<Union>i\<in>A. analz (H i)) = analz (\<Union>i\<in>A. H i)"
 by (blast intro: analz_UN_analz_lemma analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 (*>*)
-text {*
+text \<open>
 Note the @{text Decrypt} rule: the spy can decrypt a
 message encrypted with key~$K$ if he has the matching key,~$K^{-1}$. 
 Properties proved by rule induction include the following:
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@
 The set of fake messages that an intruder could invent
 starting from~@{text H} is @{text "synth(analz H)"}, where @{text "synth H"}
 formalizes what the adversary can build from the set of messages~$H$.  
-*}
+\<close>
 
 inductive_set
   synth :: "msg set \<Rightarrow> msg set"
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@
 apply (simp (no_asm_use))
 done
 (*>*)
-text {*
+text \<open>
 The set includes all agent names.  Nonces and keys are assumed to be
 unguessable, so none are included beyond those already in~$H$.   Two
 elements of @{term "synth H"} can be combined, and an element can be encrypted
@@ -629,11 +629,11 @@
 @{named_thms [display,indent=0] analz_synth [no_vars] (analz_synth)}
 Rule inversion plays a major role in reasoning about @{text synth}, through
 declarations such as this one:
-*}
+\<close>
 
 inductive_cases Nonce_synth [elim!]: "Nonce n \<in> synth H"
 
-text {*
+text \<open>
 \noindent
 The resulting elimination rule replaces every assumption of the form
 @{term "Nonce n \<in> synth H"} by @{term "Nonce n \<in> H"},
@@ -651,22 +651,22 @@
 use @{text parts} to express general well-formedness properties of a protocol,
 for example, that an uncompromised agent's private key will never be
 included as a component of any message.
-*}
+\<close>
 (*<*)
 lemma synth_increasing: "H \<subseteq> synth(H)"
 by blast
 
-subsubsection{*Unions *}
+subsubsection\<open>Unions\<close>
 
-text{*Converse fails: we can synth more from the union than from the 
-  separate parts, building a compound message using elements of each.*}
+text\<open>Converse fails: we can synth more from the union than from the 
+  separate parts, building a compound message using elements of each.\<close>
 lemma synth_Un: "synth(G) \<union> synth(H) \<subseteq> synth(G \<union> H)"
 by (intro Un_least synth_mono Un_upper1 Un_upper2)
 
 lemma synth_insert: "insert X (synth H) \<subseteq> synth(insert X H)"
 by (blast intro: synth_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 
-subsubsection{*Idempotence and transitivity *}
+subsubsection\<open>Idempotence and transitivity\<close>
 
 lemma synth_synthD [dest!]: "X\<in> synth (synth H) ==> X\<in> synth H"
 by (erule synth.induct, blast+)
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@
 lemma synth_trans: "[| X\<in> synth G;  G \<subseteq> synth H |] ==> X\<in> synth H"
 by (drule synth_mono, blast)
 
-text{*Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe*}
+text\<open>Cut; Lemma 2 of Lowe\<close>
 lemma synth_cut: "[| Y\<in> synth (insert X H);  X\<in> synth H |] ==> Y\<in> synth H"
 by (erule synth_trans, blast)
 
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@
 by (unfold keysFor_def, blast)
 
 
-subsubsection{*Combinations of parts, analz and synth *}
+subsubsection\<open>Combinations of parts, analz and synth\<close>
 
 lemma parts_synth [simp]: "parts (synth H) = parts H \<union> synth H"
 apply (rule equalityI)
@@ -722,13 +722,13 @@
 done
 
 
-subsubsection{*For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces *}
+subsubsection\<open>For reasoning about the Fake rule in traces\<close>
 
 lemma parts_insert_subset_Un: "X\<in> G ==> parts(insert X H) \<subseteq> parts G \<union> parts H"
 by (rule subset_trans [OF parts_mono parts_Un_subset2], blast)
 
-text{*More specifically for Fake.  Very occasionally we could do with a version
-  of the form  @{term"parts{X} \<subseteq> synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"} *}
+text\<open>More specifically for Fake.  Very occasionally we could do with a version
+  of the form  @{term"parts{X} \<subseteq> synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"}\<close>
 lemma Fake_parts_insert:
      "X \<in> synth (analz H) ==>  
       parts (insert X H) \<subseteq> synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"
@@ -742,8 +742,8 @@
       ==> Z \<in>  synth (analz H) \<union> parts H"
 by (blast dest: Fake_parts_insert  [THEN subsetD, dest])
 
-text{*@{term H} is sometimes @{term"Key ` KK \<union> spies evs"}, so can't put 
-  @{term "G=H"}.*}
+text\<open>@{term H} is sometimes @{term"Key ` KK \<union> spies evs"}, so can't put 
+  @{term "G=H"}.\<close>
 lemma Fake_analz_insert:
      "X\<in> synth (analz G) ==>  
       analz (insert X H) \<subseteq> synth (analz G) \<union> analz (G \<union> H)"
@@ -762,8 +762,8 @@
      "(X \<in> analz H | X \<in> parts H) = (X \<in> parts H)"
 by (blast intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD])
 
-text{*Without this equation, other rules for synth and analz would yield
-  redundant cases*}
+text\<open>Without this equation, other rules for synth and analz would yield
+  redundant cases\<close>
 lemma MPair_synth_analz [iff]:
      "(\<lbrace>X,Y\<rbrace> \<in> synth (analz H)) =  
       (X \<in> synth (analz H) & Y \<in> synth (analz H))"
@@ -775,12 +775,12 @@
 by blast
 
 
-text{*We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!*}
+text\<open>We do NOT want Crypt... messages broken up in protocols!!\<close>
 declare parts.Body [rule del]
 
 
-text{*Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can
-    be pulled out using the @{text analz_insert} rules*}
+text\<open>Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can
+    be pulled out using the @{text analz_insert} rules\<close>
 
 lemmas pushKeys =
   insert_commute [of "Key K" "Agent C"]
@@ -800,14 +800,14 @@
   insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "MPair X' Y"]
   for X K C N X' Y
 
-text{*Cannot be added with @{text "[simp]"} -- messages should not always be
-  re-ordered. *}
+text\<open>Cannot be added with @{text "[simp]"} -- messages should not always be
+  re-ordered.\<close>
 lemmas pushes = pushKeys pushCrypts
 
 
-subsection{*Tactics useful for many protocol proofs*}
+subsection\<open>Tactics useful for many protocol proofs\<close>
 ML
-{*
+\<open>
 val invKey = @{thm invKey};
 val keysFor_def = @{thm keysFor_def};
 val symKeys_def = @{thm symKeys_def};
@@ -858,11 +858,11 @@
        simp_tac ctxt 1,
        REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL (resolve_tac ctxt [allI,impI,notI,conjI,iffI])),
        DEPTH_SOLVE (atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt 1)]) i);
-*}
+\<close>
 
-text{*By default only @{text o_apply} is built-in.  But in the presence of
+text\<open>By default only @{text o_apply} is built-in.  But in the presence of
 eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as @{term "f o g"} will be
-rewritten, and others will not!*}
+rewritten, and others will not!\<close>
 declare o_def [simp]
 
 
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@
 apply (rule synth_analz_mono, blast)   
 done
 
-text{*Two generalizations of @{text analz_insert_eq}*}
+text\<open>Two generalizations of @{text analz_insert_eq}\<close>
 lemma gen_analz_insert_eq [rule_format]:
      "X \<in> analz H ==> ALL G. H \<subseteq> G --> analz (insert X G) = analz G"
 by (blast intro: analz_cut analz_insertI analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
@@ -904,16 +904,16 @@
 
 lemmas Fake_parts_sing_imp_Un = Fake_parts_sing [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]
 
-method_setup spy_analz = {*
-    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o spy_analz_tac) *}
+method_setup spy_analz = \<open>
+    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o spy_analz_tac)\<close>
     "for proving the Fake case when analz is involved"
 
-method_setup atomic_spy_analz = {*
-    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o atomic_spy_analz_tac) *}
+method_setup atomic_spy_analz = \<open>
+    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o atomic_spy_analz_tac)\<close>
     "for debugging spy_analz"
 
-method_setup Fake_insert_simp = {*
-    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o Fake_insert_simp_tac) *}
+method_setup Fake_insert_simp = \<open>
+    Scan.succeed (SIMPLE_METHOD' o Fake_insert_simp_tac)\<close>
     "for debugging spy_analz"