diff -r febb8e5d2a9d -r 890d736b93a5 src/HOL/Auth/Guard/OtwayRees.thy
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Guard/OtwayRees.thy	Wed Aug 21 15:53:30 2002 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+(******************************************************************************
+date: march 2002
+author: Frederic Blanqui
+email: blanqui@lri.fr
+webpage: http://www.lri.fr/~blanqui/
+
+University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory
+William Gates Building, JJ Thomson Avenue
+Cambridge CB3 0FD, United Kingdom
+******************************************************************************)
+
+header{*Otway-Rees Protocol*}
+
+theory OtwayRees = Guard_Shared:
+
+subsection{*messages used in the protocol*}
+
+syntax nil :: "msg"
+
+translations "nil" == "Number 0"
+
+syntax or1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event"
+
+translations "or1 A B NA"
+=> "Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
+               Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|}"
+
+syntax or1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => msg => event"
+
+translations "or1' A' A B NA X"
+=> "Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|}"
+
+syntax or2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event"
+
+translations "or2 A B NA NB X"
+=> "Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
+                    Ciph B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}"
+
+syntax or2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event"
+
+translations "or2' B' A B NA NB"
+=> "Says B' Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
+                     Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|},
+                     Ciph B {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}"
+
+syntax or3 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event"
+
+translations "or3 A B NA NB K"
+=> "Says Server B {|Nonce NA, Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Key K|},
+                    Ciph B {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}"
+
+syntax or3':: "agent => msg => agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event"
+
+translations "or3' S Y A B NA NB K"
+=> "Says S B {|Nonce NA, Y, Ciph B {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}"
+
+syntax or4 :: "agent => agent => nat => msg => event"
+
+translations "or4 A B NA X" => "Says B A {|Nonce NA, X, nil|}"
+
+syntax or4' :: "agent => agent => nat => msg => event"
+
+translations "or4' B' A NA K" =>
+"Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Ciph A {|Nonce NA, Key K|}, nil|}"
+
+subsection{*definition of the protocol*}
+
+consts or :: "event list set"
+
+inductive or
+intros
+
+Nil: "[]:or"
+
+Fake: "[| evs:or; X:synth (analz (spies evs)) |] ==> Says Spy B X # evs:or"
+
+OR1: "[| evs1:or; Nonce NA ~:used evs1 |] ==> or1 A B NA # evs1:or"
+
+OR2: "[| evs2:or; or1' A' A B NA X:set evs2; Nonce NB ~:used evs2 |]
+==> or2 A B NA NB X # evs2:or"
+
+OR3: "[| evs3:or; or2' B' A B NA NB:set evs3; Key K ~:used evs3 |]
+==> or3 A B NA NB K # evs3:or"
+
+OR4: "[| evs4:or; or2 A B NA NB X:set evs4; or3' S Y A B NA NB K:set evs4 |]
+==> or4 A B NA X # evs4:or"
+
+subsection{*declarations for tactics*}
+
+declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
+declare Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]
+declare initState.simps [simp del]
+
+subsection{*general properties of or*}
+
+lemma or_has_no_Gets: "evs:or ==> ALL A X. Gets A X ~:set evs"
+by (erule or.induct, auto)
+
+lemma or_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct or"
+by (auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: or_has_no_Gets)
+
+lemma or_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step or"
+by (unfold one_step_def, clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs:or", auto)
+
+lemma or_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs:or ==>
+ev:set evs --> (EX A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
+by (erule or.induct, auto)
+
+lemma or_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says or"
+by (auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: or_has_only_Says')
+
+subsection{*or is regular*}
+
+lemma or1'_parts_spies [dest]: "or1' A' A B NA X:set evs
+==> X:parts (spies evs)"
+by blast
+
+lemma or2_parts_spies [dest]: "or2 A B NA NB X:set evs
+==> X:parts (spies evs)"
+by blast
+
+lemma or3_parts_spies [dest]: "Says S B {|NA, Y, Ciph B {|NB, K|}|}:set evs
+==> K:parts (spies evs)"
+by blast
+
+lemma or_is_regular [iff]: "regular or"
+apply (simp only: regular_def, clarify)
+apply (erule or.induct, simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps)
+by (auto dest: parts_sub)
+
+subsection{*guardedness of KAB*}
+
+lemma Guard_KAB [rule_format]: "[| evs:or; A ~:bad; B ~:bad |] ==>
+or3 A B NA NB K:set evs --> GuardK K {shrK A,shrK B} (spies evs)" 
+apply (erule or.induct)
+(* Nil *)
+apply simp_all
+(* Fake *)
+apply (clarify, erule in_synth_GuardK, erule GuardK_analz, simp)
+(* OR1 *)
+apply blast
+(* OR2 *)
+apply safe
+apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies, blast)
+(* OR3 *)
+apply blast
+apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
+apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
+(* OR4 *)
+by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies in_GuardK_kparts)
+
+subsection{*guardedness of NB*}
+
+lemma Guard_NB [rule_format]: "[| evs:or; B ~:bad |] ==>
+or2 A B NA NB X:set evs --> Guard NB {shrK B} (spies evs)" 
+apply (erule or.induct)
+(* Nil *)
+apply simp_all
+(* Fake *)
+apply safe
+apply (erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp)
+(* OR1 *)
+apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+(* OR2 *)
+apply blast
+apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
+apply (drule_tac n=NA in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+apply (blast intro!: No_Nonce dest: used_parts)
+apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
+apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
+apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
+apply (drule_tac n=NB and A=B in Nonce_neq, simp+)
+apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
+apply (drule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+(* OR3 *)
+apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
+apply (frule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
+apply (case_tac "Aa=B", clarsimp)
+apply (case_tac "NAa=NB", clarsimp)
+apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
+apply (drule_tac Y="{|Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba|}"
+                 and K="shrK Aa" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
+apply (simp add: No_Nonce) 
+apply (case_tac "Ba=B", clarsimp)
+apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
+apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
+apply (drule_tac Y="{|Nonce NAa, Nonce NB, Agent Aa, Agent Ba|}"
+                 and K="shrK Ba" in in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
+apply (simp add: No_Nonce) 
+(* OR4 *)
+by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)+
+
+end