
diff -r 6e11c7bfb9c7 -r ab0a9fbed4c0 src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Mon Jul 14 12:44:09 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Mon Jul 14 12:47:21 1997 +0200
@@ -14,40 +14,40 @@
 
 OtwayRees = Shared + 
 
-consts  otway   :: agent set => event list set
-inductive "otway lost"
+consts  otway   :: event list set
+inductive "otway"
   intrs 
          (*Initial trace is empty*)
-    Nil  "[]: otway lost"
+    Nil  "[]: otway"
 
          (*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
            invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
            all similar protocols.*)
-    Fake "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Spy;  
-             X: synth (analz (sees lost Spy evs)) |]
-          ==> Says Spy B X  # evs : otway lost"
+    Fake "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Spy;  
+             X: synth (analz (sees Spy evs)) |]
+          ==> Says Spy B X  # evs : otway"
 
          (*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
-    OR1  "[| evs: otway lost;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server;  Nonce NA ~: used evs |]
+    OR1  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server;  Nonce NA ~: used evs |]
           ==> Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, 
                          Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} |} 
-                 # evs : otway lost"
+                 # evs : otway"
 
          (*Bob's response to Alice's message.  Bob doesn't know who 
 	   the sender is, hence the A' in the sender field.
            Note that NB is encrypted.*)
-    OR2  "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Server;  Nonce NB ~: used evs;
+    OR2  "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Server;  Nonce NB ~: used evs;
              Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set evs |]
           ==> Says B Server 
                   {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X, 
                     Crypt (shrK B)
                       {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
-                 # evs : otway lost"
+                 # evs : otway"
 
          (*The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs
            match.  Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for
            forwarding to Alice.*)
-    OR3  "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Server;  Key KAB ~: used evs;
+    OR3  "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Server;  Key KAB ~: used evs;
              Says B' Server 
                   {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, 
                     Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|}, 
@@ -57,24 +57,24 @@
                   {|Nonce NA, 
                     Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Key KAB|},
                     Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key KAB|}|}
-                 # evs : otway lost"
+                 # evs : otway"
 
          (*Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with
 	   those in the message he previously sent the Server.*)
-    OR4  "[| evs: otway lost;  A ~= B;  
+    OR4  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B;  
              Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X', 
                              Crypt (shrK B)
                                    {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
                : set evs;
              Says S' B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
                : set evs |]
-          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs : otway lost"
+          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs : otway"
 
          (*This message models possible leaks of session keys.  The nonces
            identify the protocol run.*)
-    Oops "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Spy;
+    Oops "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Spy;
              Says Server B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
                : set evs |]
-          ==> Says B Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evs : otway lost"
+          ==> Says B Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evs : otway"
 
 end




