
diff -r bda7527ccf05 -r cc2d676d5395 src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy
--- a/src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy	Wed Dec 26 16:07:28 2018 +0100
+++ b/src/Doc/Tutorial/Protocol/Message.thy	Wed Dec 26 16:25:20 2018 +0100
@@ -20,15 +20,15 @@
 text \<open>
 All protocol specifications refer to a syntactic theory of messages. 
 Datatype
-@{text agent} introduces the constant @{text Server} (a trusted central
+\<open>agent\<close> introduces the constant \<open>Server\<close> (a trusted central
 machine, needed for some protocols), an infinite population of
-friendly agents, and the~@{text Spy}:
+friendly agents, and the~\<open>Spy\<close>:
 \<close>
 
 datatype agent = Server | Friend nat | Spy
 
 text \<open>
-Keys are just natural numbers.  Function @{text invKey} maps a public key to
+Keys are just natural numbers.  Function \<open>invKey\<close> maps a public key to
 the matching private key, and vice versa:
 \<close>
 
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 
 text \<open>
 Datatype
-@{text msg} introduces the message forms, which include agent names, nonces,
+\<open>msg\<close> introduces the message forms, which include agent names, nonces,
 keys, compound messages, and encryptions.  
 \<close>
 
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
 declare MPair_parts [elim!]  parts.Body [dest!]
 text\<open>NB These two rules are UNSAFE in the formal sense, as they discard the
      compound message.  They work well on THIS FILE.  
-  @{text MPair_parts} is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs.
+  \<open>MPair_parts\<close> is left as SAFE because it speeds up proofs.
   The Crypt rule is normally kept UNSAFE to avoid breaking up certificates.\<close>
 
 lemma parts_increasing: "H \<subseteq> parts(H)"
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
   NOTE: the UN versions are no longer used!\<close>
 
 
-text\<open>This allows @{text blast} to simplify occurrences of 
+text\<open>This allows \<open>blast\<close> to simplify occurrences of 
   @{term "parts(G\<union>H)"} in the assumption.\<close>
 lemmas in_parts_UnE = parts_Un [THEN equalityD1, THEN subsetD, THEN UnE] 
 declare in_parts_UnE [elim!]
@@ -344,9 +344,9 @@
 Thus he accumulates additional keys and nonces.  These he can use to
 compose new messages, which he may send to anybody.  
 
-Two functions enable us to formalize this behaviour: @{text analz} and
-@{text synth}.  Each function maps a sets of messages to another set of
-messages. The set @{text "analz H"} formalizes what the adversary can learn
+Two functions enable us to formalize this behaviour: \<open>analz\<close> and
+\<open>synth\<close>.  Each function maps a sets of messages to another set of
+messages. The set \<open>analz H\<close> formalizes what the adversary can learn
 from the set of messages~$H$.  The closure properties of this set are
 defined inductively.
 \<close>
@@ -483,8 +483,8 @@
 by (intro equalityI lemma1 lemma2)
 
 text\<open>Case analysis: either the message is secure, or it is not! Effective,
-but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with @{text "if_split"}; apparently
-@{text "split_tac"} does not cope with patterns such as @{term"analz (insert
+but can cause subgoals to blow up! Use with \<open>if_split\<close>; apparently
+\<open>split_tac\<close> does not cope with patterns such as @{term"analz (insert
 (Crypt K X) H)"}\<close> 
 lemma analz_Crypt_if [simp]:
      "analz (insert (Crypt K X) H) =                 
@@ -577,13 +577,13 @@
 by (blast intro: analz_UN_analz_lemma analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 (*>*)
 text \<open>
-Note the @{text Decrypt} rule: the spy can decrypt a
+Note the \<open>Decrypt\<close> rule: the spy can decrypt a
 message encrypted with key~$K$ if he has the matching key,~$K^{-1}$. 
 Properties proved by rule induction include the following:
 @{named_thms [display,indent=0] analz_mono [no_vars] (analz_mono) analz_idem [no_vars] (analz_idem)}
 
 The set of fake messages that an intruder could invent
-starting from~@{text H} is @{text "synth(analz H)"}, where @{text "synth H"}
+starting from~\<open>H\<close> is \<open>synth(analz H)\<close>, where \<open>synth H\<close>
 formalizes what the adversary can build from the set of messages~$H$.  
 \<close>
 
@@ -624,10 +624,10 @@
 elements of @{term "synth H"} can be combined, and an element can be encrypted
 using a key present in~$H$.
 
-Like @{text analz}, this set operator is monotone and idempotent.  It also
-satisfies an interesting equation involving @{text analz}:
+Like \<open>analz\<close>, this set operator is monotone and idempotent.  It also
+satisfies an interesting equation involving \<open>analz\<close>:
 @{named_thms [display,indent=0] analz_synth [no_vars] (analz_synth)}
-Rule inversion plays a major role in reasoning about @{text synth}, through
+Rule inversion plays a major role in reasoning about \<open>synth\<close>, through
 declarations such as this one:
 \<close>
 
@@ -639,16 +639,16 @@
 @{term "Nonce n \<in> synth H"} by @{term "Nonce n \<in> H"},
 expressing that a nonce cannot be guessed.  
 
-A third operator, @{text parts}, is useful for stating correctness
+A third operator, \<open>parts\<close>, is useful for stating correctness
 properties.  The set
 @{term "parts H"} consists of the components of elements of~$H$.  This set
-includes~@{text H} and is closed under the projections from a compound
+includes~\<open>H\<close> and is closed under the projections from a compound
 message to its immediate parts. 
-Its definition resembles that of @{text analz} except in the rule
-corresponding to the constructor @{text Crypt}: 
+Its definition resembles that of \<open>analz\<close> except in the rule
+corresponding to the constructor \<open>Crypt\<close>: 
 @{thm [display,indent=5] parts.Body [no_vars]}
 The body of an encrypted message is always regarded as part of it.  We can
-use @{text parts} to express general well-formedness properties of a protocol,
+use \<open>parts\<close> to express general well-formedness properties of a protocol,
 for example, that an uncompromised agent's private key will never be
 included as a component of any message.
 \<close>
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@
 
 
 text\<open>Rewrites to push in Key and Crypt messages, so that other messages can
-    be pulled out using the @{text analz_insert} rules\<close>
+    be pulled out using the \<open>analz_insert\<close> rules\<close>
 
 lemmas pushKeys =
   insert_commute [of "Key K" "Agent C"]
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@
   insert_commute [of "Crypt X K" "MPair X' Y"]
   for X K C N X' Y
 
-text\<open>Cannot be added with @{text "[simp]"} -- messages should not always be
+text\<open>Cannot be added with \<open>[simp]\<close> -- messages should not always be
   re-ordered.\<close>
 lemmas pushes = pushKeys pushCrypts
 
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@
        DEPTH_SOLVE (atomic_spy_analz_tac ctxt 1)]) i);
 \<close>
 
-text\<open>By default only @{text o_apply} is built-in.  But in the presence of
+text\<open>By default only \<open>o_apply\<close> is built-in.  But in the presence of
 eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as @{term "f o g"} will be
 rewritten, and others will not!\<close>
 declare o_def [simp]
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@
 apply (rule synth_analz_mono, blast)   
 done
 
-text\<open>Two generalizations of @{text analz_insert_eq}\<close>
+text\<open>Two generalizations of \<open>analz_insert_eq\<close>\<close>
 lemma gen_analz_insert_eq [rule_format]:
      "X \<in> analz H \<Longrightarrow> \<forall>G. H \<subseteq> G \<longrightarrow> analz (insert X G) = analz G"
 by (blast intro: analz_cut analz_insertI analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])




