# HG changeset patch
# User paulson
# Date 842460055 -7200
# Node ID 1cff1f4fdb8af5b4a092e80a519966b83dcae572
# Parent  eec67972b1bf5b5394681cb5242cc65a7be6e9af
Reformatting

diff -r eec67972b1bf -r 1cff1f4fdb8a src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.thy
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.thy	Wed Sep 11 18:00:53 1996 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.thy	Wed Sep 11 18:40:55 1996 +0200
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@
          (*The enemy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
            invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
            all similar protocols.*)
-    Fake "[| evs: ns_shared;  B ~= Enemy;  X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs))
-          |] ==> Says Enemy B X # evs : ns_shared"
+    Fake "[| evs: ns_shared;  B ~= Enemy;  X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs)) |]
+          ==> Says Enemy B X # evs : ns_shared"
 
          (*Alice initiates a protocol run, requesting to talk to any B*)
-    NS1  "[| evs: ns_shared;  A ~= Server
-          |] ==> Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce (newN evs)|} # evs
+    NS1  "[| evs: ns_shared;  A ~= Server |]
+          ==> Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce (newN evs)|} # evs
                  : ns_shared"
 
          (*Server's response to Alice's message.
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 	   Server doesn't know who the true sender is, hence the A' in
                the sender field.*)
     NS2  "[| evs: ns_shared;  A ~= B;  A ~= Server;
-             Says A' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says Server A 
+             Says A' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says Server A 
                   (Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key (newK evs),   
                            (Crypt {|Key (newK evs), Agent A|} (shrK B))|}
                    (shrK A)) # evs : ns_shared"
@@ -47,14 +47,14 @@
              Says S A (Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} (shrK A)) 
                : set_of_list evs;
              A = Friend i;
-             Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says A B X # evs : ns_shared"
+             Says A Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA|} : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says A B X # evs : ns_shared"
 
          (*Bob's nonce exchange.  He does not know who the message came
            from, but responds to A because she is mentioned inside.*)
     NS4  "[| evs: ns_shared;  A ~= B;  
-             Says A' B (Crypt {|Key K, Agent A|} (shrK B)) : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says B A (Crypt (Nonce (newN evs)) K) # evs : ns_shared"
+             Says A' B (Crypt {|Key K, Agent A|} (shrK B)) : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says B A (Crypt (Nonce (newN evs)) K) # evs : ns_shared"
 
          (*Alice responds with the Nonce, if she has seen the key before.
            We do NOT use N-1 or similar as the Enemy cannot spoof such things.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
     NS5  "[| evs: ns_shared;  A ~= B;  
              Says B' A (Crypt (Nonce N) K) : set_of_list evs;
              Says S  A (Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent B, Key K, X|} (shrK A))
-               : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says A B (Crypt {|Nonce N, Nonce N|} K) # evs : ns_shared"
+               : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says A B (Crypt {|Nonce N, Nonce N|} K) # evs : ns_shared"
 
 end
diff -r eec67972b1bf -r 1cff1f4fdb8a src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Wed Sep 11 18:00:53 1996 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Wed Sep 11 18:40:55 1996 +0200
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@
          (*The enemy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
            invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
            all similar protocols.*)
-    Fake "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Enemy;  X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs))
-          |] ==> Says Enemy B X  # evs : otway"
+    Fake "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Enemy;  X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs)) |]
+          ==> Says Enemy B X  # evs : otway"
 
          (*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
-    OR1  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B
-          |] ==> Says A B {|Nonce (newN evs), Agent A, Agent B, 
+    OR1  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B |]
+          ==> Says A B {|Nonce (newN evs), Agent A, Agent B, 
                             Crypt {|Nonce (newN evs), Agent A, Agent B|} 
                                   (shrK A) |} 
                  # evs : otway"
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
 	   the sender is, hence the A' in the sender field.
            We modify the published protocol by NOT encrypting NB.*)
     OR2  "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Server;
-             Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says B Server 
+             Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says B Server 
                   {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X, Nonce (newN evs), 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK B)|}
                  # evs : otway"
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK A), 
                     Nonce NB, 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK B)|}
-               : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says Server B 
+               : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says Server B 
                   {|Nonce NA, 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Key (newK evs)|} (shrK A),
                     Crypt {|Nonce NB, Key (newK evs)|} (shrK B)|}
@@ -63,15 +63,15 @@
              Says S B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt {|Nonce NB, Key K|} (shrK B)|}
                : set_of_list evs;
              Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X', Nonce NB, X''|}
-               : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> (Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|}) # evs : otway"
+               : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> (Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|}) # evs : otway"
 
          (*Alice checks her Nonce, then sends a dummy message to Bob,
            using the new session key.*)
     OR5  "[| evs: otway;  
              Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Crypt {|Nonce NA, Key K|} (shrK A)|}
                : set_of_list evs;
-             Says A  B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set_of_list evs
-          |] ==> Says A B (Crypt (Agent A) K)  # evs : otway"
+             Says A  B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set_of_list evs |]
+          ==> Says A B (Crypt (Agent A) K)  # evs : otway"
 
 end