# HG changeset patch # User paulson # Date 874507252 -7200 # Node ID 597efdb7decb0f3199b4271b6ceb02e42e225b94 # Parent 61c7469fd0b0df3fbaeb92116207ac4502f9d942 Deleted the redundant identifier Says_imp_sees_Spy' diff -r 61c7469fd0b0 -r 597efdb7decb src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.ML --- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.ML Wed Sep 17 16:39:43 1997 +0200 +++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.ML Wed Sep 17 16:40:52 1997 +0200 @@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ proof_timing:=true; HOL_quantifiers := false; -(*Replacing the variable by a constant improves speed*) -val Says_imp_sees_Spy' = Says_imp_sees_Spy; - - (*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*) goal thy "!!A B. [| A ~= B; A ~= Server; B ~= Server |] \ @@ -49,7 +45,7 @@ (*Lets us treat YM4 using a similar argument as for the Fake case.*) goal thy "!!evs. Says S A {|NB, Crypt (shrK A) Y, X|} : set evs ==> \ \ X : analz (sees Spy evs)"; -by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS analz.Inj]) 1); +by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy RS analz.Inj]) 1); qed "YM4_analz_sees_Spy"; bind_thm ("YM4_parts_sees_Spy", @@ -59,7 +55,7 @@ goal thy "!!evs. Says S A {|NB, Crypt (shrK A) {|B,K,NA|}, X|} : set evs ==> \ \ K : parts (sees Spy evs)"; by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs - addSDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj]) 1); + addSDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj]) 1); qed "YM4_Key_parts_sees_Spy"; (*For proving the easier theorems about X ~: parts (sees Spy evs).*) @@ -313,7 +309,7 @@ \ Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|}, \ \ Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K, Agent A|}|} \ \ : set evs"; -by (etac (Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1); +by (etac (Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1); by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [B_trusts_YM4_shrK]) 1); qed "B_trusts_YM4"; @@ -349,7 +345,7 @@ (*YM3*) by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [B_Said_YM2] addSEs [MPair_parts] - addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj]) 3); + addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj]) 3); (*Fake, YM2*) by (ALLGOALS Blast_tac); val lemma = result() RSN (2, rev_mp) RS mp |> standard; @@ -391,7 +387,7 @@ by (not_lost_tac "Aa" 1); by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [MPair_parts] addSDs [A_trusts_YM3, B_trusts_YM4_shrK] - addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj, + addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj, unique_session_keys]) 1); val lemma = normalize_thm [RSspec, RSmp] (result()) |> standard; @@ -404,12 +400,12 @@ \ (ALL NA. Says A Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} ~: set evs); \ \ A ~: lost; B ~: lost; evs : yahalom |] \ \ ==> EX X. Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} : set evs"; -by (etac (Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1); +by (etac (Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj RS MPair_parts) 1); by (dtac B_trusts_YM4_shrK 1); by (safe_tac (!claset)); by (rtac lemma 1); by (rtac Spy_not_see_encrypted_key 2); by (REPEAT_FIRST assume_tac); by (ALLGOALS (blast_tac (!claset addSEs [MPair_parts] - addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj]))); + addDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy RS parts.Inj]))); qed_spec_mp "YM4_imp_A_Said_YM3";