Cosmetic changes: margins, indentation, ...
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.ML Tue Jul 22 11:23:03 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.ML Tue Jul 22 11:26:02 1997 +0200
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@
val lemma = result();
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, K|}|} \
-\ : set evs; \
-\ Says Server B' {|NA',X',Crypt (shrK B') {|NB',K|}|} \
-\ : set evs; \
+ "!!evs. [| Says Server B {|NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, K|}|} : set evs; \
+\ Says Server B' {|NA',X',Crypt (shrK B') {|NB',K|}|} : set evs; \
\ evs : otway |] ==> X=X' & B=B' & NA=NA' & NB=NB'";
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
qed "unique_session_keys";
@@ -277,8 +275,8 @@
(*Crucial property: If the encrypted message appears, and A has used NA
to start a run, then it originated with the Server!*)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| A ~: lost; A ~= Spy; evs : otway |] \
-\ ==> Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|} : parts (sees Spy evs) \
+ "!!evs. [| A ~: lost; A ~= Spy; evs : otway |] \
+\ ==> Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Key K|} : parts (sees Spy evs) \
\ --> Says A B {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, \
\ Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B|}|} \
\ : set evs --> \
@@ -295,8 +293,8 @@
(*OR4*)
by (REPEAT (Safe_step_tac 2));
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [parts_cut]) 3));
-by (fast_tac (!claset addSIs [Crypt_imp_OR1]
- addEs sees_Spy_partsEs) 2);
+by (blast_tac (!claset addSIs [Crypt_imp_OR1]
+ addEs sees_Spy_partsEs) 2);
(*OR3*) (** LEVEL 5 **)
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]) 1);
by (step_tac (!claset delrules [disjCI, impCE]) 1);
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees_AN.ML Tue Jul 22 11:23:03 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees_AN.ML Tue Jul 22 11:26:02 1997 +0200
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*)
goal thy
"!!A B. [| A ~= B; A ~= Server; B ~= Server |] \
-\ ==> EX K. EX NA. EX evs: otway. \
+\ ==> EX K. EX NA. EX evs: otway. \
\ Says B A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}) \
\ : set evs";
by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \
\ : set evs; \
-\ evs : otway |] \
+\ evs : otway |] \
\ ==> K ~: range shrK & (EX i. NA = Nonce i) & (EX j. NB = Nonce j)";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
by (etac otway.induct 1);
@@ -183,9 +183,9 @@
(*** The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message. **)
goal thy
- "!!evs. evs : otway ==> \
-\ EX A' B' NA' NB'. ALL A B NA NB. \
-\ Says Server B \
+ "!!evs. evs : otway ==> \
+\ EX A' B' NA' NB'. ALL A B NA NB. \
+\ Says Server B \
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, K|}, \
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, K|}|} : set evs \
\ --> A=A' & B=B' & NA=NA' & NB=NB'";
@@ -258,12 +258,12 @@
the premises, e.g. by having A=Spy **)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| A ~: lost; B ~: lost; evs : otway |] \
-\ ==> Says Server B \
-\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \
-\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \
-\ : set evs --> \
-\ Says B Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ~: set evs --> \
+ "!!evs. [| A ~: lost; B ~: lost; evs : otway |] \
+\ ==> Says Server B \
+\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \
+\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \
+\ : set evs --> \
+\ Says B Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ~: set evs --> \
\ Key K ~: analz (sees Spy evs)";
by (etac otway.induct 1);
by analz_sees_tac;
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.ML Tue Jul 22 11:23:03 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.ML Tue Jul 22 11:26:02 1997 +0200
@@ -278,8 +278,8 @@
(*B knows, by the first part of A's message, that the Server distributed
the key for A and B. But this part says nothing about nonces.*)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} : parts (sees Spy evs); \
-\ B ~: lost; evs : yahalom |] \
+ "!!evs. [| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|} : parts (sees Spy evs); \
+\ B ~: lost; evs : yahalom |] \
\ ==> EX NA NB. Says Server A \
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, \
\ Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, \
@@ -299,10 +299,10 @@
"!!evs. evs : yahalom \
\ ==> Nonce NB ~: analz (sees Spy evs) --> \
\ Crypt K (Nonce NB) : parts (sees Spy evs) --> \
-\ (EX A B NA. Says Server A \
-\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, \
-\ Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, \
-\ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|} \
+\ (EX A B NA. Says Server A \
+\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, \
+\ Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, \
+\ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Key K|}|} \
\ : set evs)";
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
(*YM3 & Fake*)