author | wenzelm |
Wed, 31 Dec 1997 15:17:49 +0100 | |
changeset 4504 | 2f39aa4bebf3 |
parent 4477 | b3e5857d8d99 |
child 4509 | 828148415197 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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(* Title: HOL/Auth/OtwayRees |
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ID: $Id$ |
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Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory |
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Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge |
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Inductive relation "otway" for the Otway-Rees protocol. |
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Simplified version with minimal encryption but explicit messages |
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From page 11 of |
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Abadi and Needham. Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols. |
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IEEE Trans. SE 22 (1), 1996 |
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*) |
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open OtwayRees_AN; |
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4449 | 17 |
set proof_timing; |
2090 | 18 |
HOL_quantifiers := false; |
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4470 | 20 |
AddEs spies_partsEs; |
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AddDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts]; |
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AddDs [impOfSubs Fake_parts_insert]; |
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||
2090 | 24 |
|
2331 | 25 |
(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*) |
2090 | 26 |
goal thy |
2331 | 27 |
"!!A B. [| A ~= B; A ~= Server; B ~= Server |] \ |
3543 | 28 |
\ ==> EX K. EX NA. EX evs: otway. \ |
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\ Says B A (Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}) \ |
3465 | 30 |
\ : set evs"; |
2090 | 31 |
by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (otway.Nil RS otway.OR1 RS otway.OR2 RS otway.OR3 RS otway.OR4) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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result(); |
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(**** Inductive proofs about otway ****) |
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(*Nobody sends themselves messages*) |
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : otway ==> ALL A X. Says A A X ~: set evs"; |
2090 | 41 |
by (etac otway.induct 1); |
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by Auto_tac; |
2090 | 43 |
qed_spec_mp "not_Says_to_self"; |
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Addsimps [not_Says_to_self]; |
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AddSEs [not_Says_to_self RSN (2, rev_notE)]; |
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(** For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages **) |
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goal thy "!!evs. Says S' B {|X, Crypt(shrK B) X'|} : set evs ==> \ |
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\ X : analz (spies evs)"; |
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by (dtac (Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj) 1); |
4470 | 53 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
3683 | 54 |
qed "OR4_analz_spies"; |
2090 | 55 |
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goal thy "!!evs. Says Server B {|X, Crypt K' {|NB, a, Agent B, K|}|} \ |
3683 | 57 |
\ : set evs ==> K : parts (spies evs)"; |
4470 | 58 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
3683 | 59 |
qed "Oops_parts_spies"; |
2090 | 60 |
|
3683 | 61 |
(*OR4_analz_spies lets us treat those cases using the same |
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argument as for the Fake case. This is possible for most, but not all, |
2131 | 63 |
proofs, since Fake messages originate from the Spy. *) |
2090 | 64 |
|
3683 | 65 |
bind_thm ("OR4_parts_spies", |
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OR4_analz_spies RS (impOfSubs analz_subset_parts)); |
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2090 | 67 |
|
3683 | 68 |
(*For proving the easier theorems about X ~: parts (spies evs).*) |
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fun parts_induct_tac i = |
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etac otway.induct i THEN |
3683 | 71 |
forward_tac [Oops_parts_spies] (i+6) THEN |
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forward_tac [OR4_parts_spies] (i+5) THEN |
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prove_simple_subgoals_tac i; |
2090 | 74 |
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||
3683 | 76 |
(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY |
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sends messages containing X! **) |
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||
3683 | 79 |
(*Spy never sees another agent's shared key! (unless it's bad at start)*) |
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goal thy |
3683 | 81 |
"!!evs. evs : otway ==> (Key (shrK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
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by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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by (ALLGOALS Blast_tac); |
2131 | 84 |
qed "Spy_see_shrK"; |
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Addsimps [Spy_see_shrK]; |
|
2090 | 86 |
|
2131 | 87 |
goal thy |
3683 | 88 |
"!!evs. evs : otway ==> (Key (shrK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
4091 | 89 |
by (auto_tac(claset() addDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts], simpset())); |
2131 | 90 |
qed "Spy_analz_shrK"; |
91 |
Addsimps [Spy_analz_shrK]; |
|
2090 | 92 |
|
4470 | 93 |
AddSDs [Spy_see_shrK RSN (2, rev_iffD1), |
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Spy_analz_shrK RSN (2, rev_iffD1)]; |
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2090 | 95 |
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(*Nobody can have used non-existent keys!*) |
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goal thy "!!evs. evs : otway ==> \ |
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\ Key K ~: used evs --> K ~: keysFor (parts (spies evs))"; |
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by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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(*Fake*) |
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by (best_tac |
4091 | 103 |
(claset() addSDs [impOfSubs (parts_insert_subset_Un RS keysFor_mono)] |
4470 | 104 |
addIs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts] |
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addDs [impOfSubs (analz_subset_parts RS keysFor_mono)] |
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addss (simpset())) 1); |
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(*OR3*) |
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by (Blast_tac 1); |
2160 | 109 |
qed_spec_mp "new_keys_not_used"; |
2090 | 110 |
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bind_thm ("new_keys_not_analzd", |
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[analz_subset_parts RS keysFor_mono, |
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new_keys_not_used] MRS contra_subsetD); |
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Addsimps [new_keys_not_used, new_keys_not_analzd]; |
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(*** Proofs involving analz ***) |
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2131 | 121 |
(*Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message.*) |
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goal thy |
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"!!evs. [| Says Server B \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
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\ : set evs; \ |
3543 | 127 |
\ evs : otway |] \ |
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\ ==> K ~: range shrK & (EX i. NA = Nonce i) & (EX j. NB = Nonce j)"; |
2131 | 129 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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by (etac otway.induct 1); |
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3102 | 131 |
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac); |
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by (Blast_tac 1); |
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2131 | 133 |
qed "Says_Server_message_form"; |
2090 | 134 |
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||
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(*For proofs involving analz.*) |
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val analz_spies_tac = |
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dtac OR4_analz_spies 6 THEN |
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forward_tac [Says_Server_message_form] 7 THEN |
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assume_tac 7 THEN |
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REPEAT ((eresolve_tac [exE, conjE] ORELSE' hyp_subst_tac) 7); |
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(**** |
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The following is to prove theorems of the form |
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3683 | 147 |
Key K : analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) ==> |
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Key K : analz (spies evs) |
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2090 | 149 |
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A more general formula must be proved inductively. |
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****) |
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(** Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys **) |
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(*The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply*) |
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goal thy |
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"!!evs. evs : otway ==> \ |
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\ ALL K KK. KK <= Compl (range shrK) --> \ |
3683 | 160 |
\ (Key K : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \ |
161 |
\ (K : KK | Key K : analz (spies evs))"; |
|
2090 | 162 |
by (etac otway.induct 1); |
3683 | 163 |
by analz_spies_tac; |
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by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI])); |
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by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac analz_image_freshK_lemma )); |
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by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac analz_image_freshK_ss)); |
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(*Fake*) |
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by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
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qed_spec_mp "analz_image_freshK"; |
2090 | 170 |
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goal thy |
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"!!evs. [| evs : otway; KAB ~: range shrK |] ==> \ |
3683 | 174 |
\ Key K : analz (insert (Key KAB) (spies evs)) = \ |
175 |
\ (K = KAB | Key K : analz (spies evs))"; |
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by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_freshK_ss addsimps [analz_image_freshK]) 1); |
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qed "analz_insert_freshK"; |
2090 | 178 |
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||
4155 | 180 |
(*** The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message. **) |
2090 | 181 |
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goal thy |
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3543 | 183 |
"!!evs. evs : otway ==> \ |
184 |
\ EX A' B' NA' NB'. ALL A B NA NB. \ |
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\ Says Server B \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, K|}, \ |
3465 | 187 |
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, K|}|} : set evs \ |
2090 | 188 |
\ --> A=A' & B=B' & NA=NA' & NB=NB'"; |
189 |
by (etac otway.induct 1); |
|
4091 | 190 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]))); |
3730 | 191 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
2090 | 192 |
(*Remaining cases: OR3 and OR4*) |
193 |
by (ex_strip_tac 2); |
|
3102 | 194 |
by (Blast_tac 2); |
2090 | 195 |
by (expand_case_tac "K = ?y" 1); |
196 |
by (REPEAT (ares_tac [refl,exI,impI,conjI] 2)); |
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(*...we assume X is a recent message and handle this case by contradiction*) |
4470 | 198 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
2090 | 199 |
val lemma = result(); |
200 |
||
201 |
||
202 |
goal thy |
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203 |
"!!evs. [| Says Server B \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, K|}, \ |
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\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, K|}|} \ |
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\ : set evs; \ |
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\ Says Server B' \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A') {|NA', Agent A', Agent B', K|}, \ |
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\ Crypt (shrK B') {|NB', Agent A', Agent B', K|}|} \ |
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\ : set evs; \ |
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211 |
\ evs : otway |] \ |
2090 | 212 |
\ ==> A=A' & B=B' & NA=NA' & NB=NB'"; |
2417 | 213 |
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1); |
2090 | 214 |
qed "unique_session_keys"; |
215 |
||
216 |
||
217 |
||
218 |
(**** Authenticity properties relating to NA ****) |
|
219 |
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220 |
(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server!*) |
|
221 |
goal thy |
|
3683 | 222 |
"!!evs. [| A ~: bad; evs : otway |] \ |
223 |
\ ==> Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|} : parts (spies evs) \ |
|
2331 | 224 |
\ --> (EX NB. Says Server B \ |
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225 |
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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226 |
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
3465 | 227 |
\ : set evs)"; |
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228 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
4470 | 229 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
4091 | 230 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]))); |
2090 | 231 |
(*OR3*) |
3102 | 232 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
2090 | 233 |
qed_spec_mp "NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg"; |
234 |
||
235 |
||
2454 | 236 |
(*Corollary: if A receives B's OR4 message then it originated with the Server. |
237 |
Freshness may be inferred from nonce NA.*) |
|
2090 | 238 |
goal thy |
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239 |
"!!evs. [| Says B' A (Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}) \ |
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240 |
\ : set evs; \ |
3683 | 241 |
\ A ~: bad; evs : otway |] \ |
2090 | 242 |
\ ==> EX NB. Says Server B \ |
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243 |
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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244 |
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
3465 | 245 |
\ : set evs"; |
4470 | 246 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [NA_Crypt_imp_Server_msg]) 1); |
2331 | 247 |
qed "A_trusts_OR4"; |
2090 | 248 |
|
249 |
||
250 |
(** Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg OR3 |
|
251 |
Does not in itself guarantee security: an attack could violate |
|
252 |
the premises, e.g. by having A=Spy **) |
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253 |
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254 |
goal thy |
|
3683 | 255 |
"!!evs. [| A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : otway |] \ |
3543 | 256 |
\ ==> Says Server B \ |
257 |
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
|
258 |
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
|
259 |
\ : set evs --> \ |
|
260 |
\ Says B Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ~: set evs --> \ |
|
3683 | 261 |
\ Key K ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
2090 | 262 |
by (etac otway.induct 1); |
3683 | 263 |
by analz_spies_tac; |
2090 | 264 |
by (ALLGOALS |
4091 | 265 |
(asm_simp_tac (simpset() addcongs [conj_cong, if_weak_cong] |
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266 |
addsimps [analz_insert_eq, analz_insert_freshK] |
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addsimps (pushes@expand_ifs)))); |
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268 |
(*Oops*) |
4091 | 269 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [unique_session_keys]) 4); |
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(*OR4*) |
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by (Blast_tac 3); |
2090 | 272 |
(*OR3*) |
4470 | 273 |
by (Blast_tac 2); |
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274 |
(*Fake*) |
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by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
2090 | 276 |
val lemma = result() RS mp RS mp RSN(2,rev_notE); |
277 |
||
278 |
goal thy |
|
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"!!evs. [| Says Server B \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
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\ : set evs; \ |
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\ Says B Spy {|NA, NB, Key K|} ~: set evs; \ |
3683 | 284 |
\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : otway |] \ |
285 |
\ ==> Key K ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
|
2090 | 286 |
by (forward_tac [Says_Server_message_form] 1 THEN assume_tac 1); |
4091 | 287 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs [lemma]) 1); |
2090 | 288 |
qed "Spy_not_see_encrypted_key"; |
289 |
||
290 |
||
291 |
(**** Authenticity properties relating to NB ****) |
|
292 |
||
293 |
(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with the Server!*) |
|
294 |
goal thy |
|
3683 | 295 |
"!!evs. [| B ~: bad; evs : otway |] \ |
296 |
\ ==> Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|} : parts (spies evs) \ |
|
2090 | 297 |
\ --> (EX NA. Says Server B \ |
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\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
3465 | 300 |
\ : set evs)"; |
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Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
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301 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
4470 | 302 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
4091 | 303 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]))); |
2090 | 304 |
(*OR3*) |
3102 | 305 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
2090 | 306 |
qed_spec_mp "NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg"; |
307 |
||
308 |
||
2454 | 309 |
(*Guarantee for B: if it gets a well-formed certificate then the Server |
310 |
has sent the correct message in round 3.*) |
|
2090 | 311 |
goal thy |
3683 | 312 |
"!!evs. [| B ~: bad; evs : otway; \ |
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313 |
\ Says S' B {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
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\ : set evs |] \ |
2106 | 315 |
\ ==> EX NA. Says Server B \ |
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316 |
\ {|Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}, \ |
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317 |
\ Crypt (shrK B) {|NB, Agent A, Agent B, Key K|}|} \ |
3465 | 318 |
\ : set evs"; |
4470 | 319 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [NB_Crypt_imp_Server_msg]) 1); |
2331 | 320 |
qed "B_trusts_OR3"; |