author | paulson |
Thu, 26 Mar 2009 14:10:48 +0000 | |
changeset 30730 | 4d3565f2cb0e |
parent 30549 | d2d7874648bd |
child 32960 | 69916a850301 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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(* ID: $Id$ |
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Author: Giampaolo Bella, Catania University |
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*) |
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header{*Bella's version of the Otway-Rees protocol*} |
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theory OtwayReesBella imports Public begin |
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text{*Bella's modifications to a version of the Otway-Rees protocol taken from |
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the BAN paper only concern message 7. The updated protocol makes the goal of |
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key distribution of the session key available to A. Investigating the |
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principle of Goal Availability undermines the BAN claim about the original |
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protocol, that "this protocol does not make use of Kab as an encryption key, |
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so neither principal can know whether the key is known to the other". The |
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updated protocol makes no use of the session key to encrypt but informs A that |
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B knows it.*} |
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inductive_set orb :: "event list set" |
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where |
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Nil: "[]\<in> orb" |
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| Fake: "\<lbrakk>evsa\<in> orb; X\<in> synth (analz (knows Spy evsa))\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says Spy B X # evsa \<in> orb" |
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| Reception: "\<lbrakk>evsr\<in> orb; Says A B X \<in> set evsr\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Gets B X # evsr \<in> orb" |
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| OR1: "\<lbrakk>evs1\<in> orb; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, |
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Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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# evs1 \<in> orb" |
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| OR2: "\<lbrakk>evs2\<in> orb; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2; |
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Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X\<rbrace> \<in> set evs2\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says B Server |
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\<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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# evs2 \<in> orb" |
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| OR3: "\<lbrakk>evs3\<in> orb; Key KAB \<notin> used evs3; |
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Gets Server |
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\<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, |
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Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs3\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Key KAB\<rbrace>, |
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Nonce NB, Key KAB\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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# evs3 \<in> orb" |
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(*B can only check that the message he is bouncing is a ciphertext*) |
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(*Sending M back is omitted*) |
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| OR4: "\<lbrakk>evs4\<in> orb; B \<noteq> Server; \<forall> p q. X \<noteq> \<lbrace>p, q\<rbrace>; |
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Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X', |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs4; |
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Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce NB, Key KAB\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs4\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce M, X\<rbrace> # evs4 \<in> orb" |
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| Oops: "\<lbrakk>evso\<in> orb; |
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Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Key KAB\<rbrace>, |
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Nonce NB, Key KAB\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evso\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Notes Spy \<lbrace>Agent A, Agent B, Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key KAB\<rbrace> # evso |
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\<in> orb" |
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declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim] |
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declare analz_into_parts [dest] |
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declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest] |
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text{*Fragile proof, with backtracking in the possibility call.*} |
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lemma possibility_thm: "\<lbrakk>A \<noteq> Server; B \<noteq> Server; Key K \<notin> used[]\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> \<exists> evs \<in> orb. |
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Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs" |
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apply (intro exI bexI) |
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apply (rule_tac [2] orb.Nil |
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[THEN orb.OR1, THEN orb.Reception, |
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THEN orb.OR2, THEN orb.Reception, |
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THEN orb.OR3, THEN orb.Reception, THEN orb.OR4]) |
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apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons) |
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done |
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lemma Gets_imp_Says : |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> \<exists>A. Says A B X \<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule orb.induct) |
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apply auto |
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done |
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lemma Gets_imp_knows_Spy: |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> X \<in> knows Spy evs" |
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by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_Says Says_imp_knows_Spy) |
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declare Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, dest] |
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lemma Gets_imp_knows: |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> X \<in> knows B evs" |
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apply (case_tac "B = Spy") |
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apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy) |
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apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_agents) |
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done |
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lemma OR2_analz_knows_Spy: |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)" |
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by (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]) |
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lemma OR4_parts_knows_Spy: |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key Kab\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> X \<in> parts (knows Spy evs)" |
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by blast |
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lemma Oops_parts_knows_Spy: |
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"Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt K' \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs |
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\<Longrightarrow> K \<in> parts (knows Spy evs)" |
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by blast |
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lemmas OR2_parts_knows_Spy = |
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OR2_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts, standard] |
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ML |
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{* |
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fun parts_explicit_tac i = |
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forward_tac [@{thm Oops_parts_knows_Spy}] (i+7) THEN |
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forward_tac [@{thm OR4_parts_knows_Spy}] (i+6) THEN |
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forward_tac [@{thm OR2_parts_knows_Spy}] (i+4) |
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*} |
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method_setup parts_explicit = {* |
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Scan.succeed (K (SIMPLE_METHOD' parts_explicit_tac)) *} |
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"to explicitly state that some message components belong to parts knows Spy" |
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lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]: |
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"evs \<in> orb \<Longrightarrow> (Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A \<in> bad)" |
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by (erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all, blast+) |
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lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]: |
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"evs \<in> orb \<Longrightarrow> (Key (shrK A) \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A \<in> bad)" |
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by auto |
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lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]: |
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"[|Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (knows Spy evs); evs \<in> orb|] ==> A \<in> bad" |
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by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK) |
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lemma new_keys_not_used [simp]: |
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"\<lbrakk>Key K \<notin> used evs; K \<in> symKeys; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> K \<notin> keysFor (parts (knows Spy evs))" |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all) |
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apply (force dest!: keysFor_parts_insert) |
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apply (blast+) |
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done |
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subsection{* Proofs involving analz *} |
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text{*Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message. Also |
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for Oops case.*} |
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lemma Says_Server_message_form: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> K \<notin> range shrK & (\<exists> A Na. X=(Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>))" |
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by (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all) |
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lemma Says_Server_imp_Gets: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>, |
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Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Gets Server \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, |
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Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs" |
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by (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all) |
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lemma A_trusts_OR1: |
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"\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace> \<in> parts (knows Spy evs); |
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A \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all) |
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apply (blast) |
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done |
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lemma B_trusts_OR2: |
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"\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace> |
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\<in> parts (knows Spy evs); B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> (\<exists> X. Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X, |
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Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs)" |
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all) |
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apply (blast+) |
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done |
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lemma B_trusts_OR3: |
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"\<lbrakk>Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace> \<in> parts (knows Spy evs); |
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B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> \<exists> M. Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> |
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\<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all) |
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apply (blast+) |
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done |
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lemma Gets_Server_message_form: |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> (K \<notin> range shrK & (\<exists> A Na. X = (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>))) |
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| X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)" |
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apply (case_tac "B \<in> bad") |
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apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, |
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THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Fst]) |
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prefer 3 apply blast |
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prefer 3 apply (blast dest!: Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN |
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parts.Snd, THEN B_trusts_OR3] |
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Says_Server_message_form) |
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apply simp_all |
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done |
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lemma unique_Na: "\<lbrakk>Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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Says A B' \<lbrace>Nonce M', Agent A, Agent B', Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M', Agent A, Agent B'\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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A \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> B=B' & M=M'" |
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by (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all, blast+) |
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lemma unique_Nb: "\<lbrakk>Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, X, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce Nb, Nonce M, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce M', Agent A', Agent B, X', Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce Nb,Nonce M', Nonce M', Agent A', Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> M=M' & A=A' & X=X'" |
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by (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, simp_all, blast+) |
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lemma analz_image_freshCryptK_lemma: |
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"(Crypt K X \<in> analz (Key`nE \<union> H)) \<longrightarrow> (Crypt K X \<in> analz H) \<Longrightarrow> |
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(Crypt K X \<in> analz (Key`nE \<union> H)) = (Crypt K X \<in> analz H)"; |
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by (blast intro: analz_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD]) |
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ML |
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{* |
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structure OtwayReesBella = |
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struct |
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val analz_image_freshK_ss = |
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@{simpset} delsimps [image_insert, image_Un] |
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delsimps [@{thm imp_disjL}] (*reduces blow-up*) |
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addsimps @{thms analz_image_freshK_simps} |
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end |
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*} |
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method_setup analz_freshCryptK = {* |
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Scan.succeed (fn ctxt => |
30510
4120fc59dd85
unified type Proof.method and pervasive METHOD combinators;
wenzelm
parents:
24122
diff
changeset
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(SIMPLE_METHOD |
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(EVERY [REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, ballI, impI]), |
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REPEAT_FIRST (rtac @{thm analz_image_freshCryptK_lemma}), |
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ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac |
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(Simplifier.context ctxt OtwayReesBella.analz_image_freshK_ss))]))) *} |
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"for proving useful rewrite rule" |
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method_setup disentangle = {* |
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Scan.succeed |
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(K (SIMPLE_METHOD |
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(REPEAT_FIRST (eresolve_tac [asm_rl, conjE, disjE] |
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ORELSE' hyp_subst_tac)))) *} |
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"for eliminating conjunctions, disjunctions and the like" |
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lemma analz_image_freshCryptK [rule_format]: |
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"evs \<in> orb \<Longrightarrow> |
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Key K \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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(\<forall> KK. KK \<subseteq> - (range shrK) \<longrightarrow> |
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(Crypt K X \<in> analz (Key`KK \<union> (knows Spy evs))) = |
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(Crypt K X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)))" |
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apply (erule orb.induct) |
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apply (analz_mono_contra) |
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apply (frule_tac [7] Gets_Server_message_form) |
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apply (frule_tac [9] Says_Server_message_form) |
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apply disentangle |
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apply (drule_tac [5] Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd]) |
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prefer 8 apply clarify |
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apply (analz_freshCryptK, spy_analz, fastsimp) |
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done |
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lemma analz_insert_freshCryptK: |
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"\<lbrakk>evs \<in> orb; Key K \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs); |
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Seskey \<notin> range shrK\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> |
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(Crypt K X \<in> analz (insert (Key Seskey) (knows Spy evs))) = |
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(Crypt K X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs))" |
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by (simp only: analz_image_freshCryptK analz_image_freshK_simps) |
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lemma analz_hard: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, |
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Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in>set evs; |
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Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace> \<in> analz (knows Spy evs); |
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A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule orb.induct) |
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apply (frule_tac [7] Gets_Server_message_form) |
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apply (frule_tac [9] Says_Server_message_form) |
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apply disentangle |
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txt{*letting the simplifier solve OR2*} |
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apply (drule_tac [5] Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Snd]) |
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apply (simp_all (no_asm_simp) add: analz_insert_eq pushes split_ifs) |
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apply (spy_analz) |
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txt{*OR1*} |
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apply blast |
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txt{*Oops*} |
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prefer 4 apply (blast dest: analz_insert_freshCryptK) |
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txt{*OR4 - ii*} |
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prefer 3 apply (blast) |
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txt{*OR3*} |
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(*adding Gets_imp_ and Says_imp_ for efficiency*) |
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apply (blast dest: |
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A_trusts_OR1 unique_Na Key_not_used analz_insert_freshCryptK) |
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txt{*OR4 - i *} |
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apply clarify |
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apply (simp add: pushes split_ifs) |
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apply (case_tac "Aaa\<in>bad") |
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apply (blast dest: analz_insert_freshCryptK) |
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apply clarify |
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apply simp |
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apply (case_tac "Ba\<in>bad") |
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apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd, THEN analz.Decrypt, THEN analz.Fst] , assumption) |
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apply (simp (no_asm_simp)) |
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apply clarify |
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apply (frule Gets_imp_knows_Spy |
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[THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, THEN B_trusts_OR3], |
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assumption, assumption, assumption, erule exE) |
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apply (frule Says_Server_imp_Gets |
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[THEN Gets_imp_knows_Spy, THEN parts.Inj, THEN parts.Snd, |
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THEN parts.Snd, THEN parts.Snd, THEN parts.Fst, THEN A_trusts_OR1], |
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assumption, assumption, assumption, assumption) |
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apply (blast dest: Says_Server_imp_Gets B_trusts_OR2 unique_Na unique_Nb) |
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done |
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350 |
||
351 |
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lemma Gets_Server_message_form': |
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"\<lbrakk>Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>X, Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> K \<notin> range shrK & (\<exists> A Na. X = (Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>))" |
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by (blast dest!: B_trusts_OR3 Says_Server_message_form) |
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357 |
||
358 |
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359 |
lemma OR4_imp_Gets: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> (\<exists> Nb. Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>, |
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Nonce Nb, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs)" |
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364 |
apply (erule rev_mp, erule orb.induct, parts_explicit, simp_all) |
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365 |
prefer 3 apply (blast dest: Gets_Server_message_form') |
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366 |
apply blast+ |
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367 |
done |
|
368 |
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369 |
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370 |
lemma A_keydist_to_B: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B, |
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372 |
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Nonce M, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in>set evs; |
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373 |
Gets A \<lbrace>Nonce M, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce Na, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; |
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374 |
A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> orb\<rbrakk> |
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375 |
\<Longrightarrow> Key K \<in> analz (knows B evs)" |
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376 |
apply (drule Gets_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, THEN analz.Snd], assumption) |
|
377 |
apply (drule analz_hard, assumption, assumption, assumption, assumption) |
|
378 |
apply (drule OR4_imp_Gets, assumption, assumption) |
|
379 |
apply (erule exE) |
|
380 |
(*blast doesn't do because it can't infer that Key (shrK P) \<in> (knows P evs)*) |
|
381 |
apply (fastsimp dest!: Gets_imp_knows [THEN analz.Inj] analz.Decrypt) |
|
382 |
done |
|
383 |
||
384 |
||
385 |
text{*Other properties as for the original protocol*} |
|
386 |
||
387 |
||
388 |
end |