src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad.thy

New example Kerberos_BAN by G Bella

(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad
    ID:         $Id$
    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge

Inductive relation "ns_public" for the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol.
Flawed version, vulnerable to Lowe's attack.

From page 260 of
  Burrows, Abadi and Needham.  A Logic of Authentication.
  Proc. Royal Soc. 426 (1989)
*)

NS_Public_Bad = Public + 

consts  ns_public  :: event list set

inductive ns_public
  intrs 
         (*Initial trace is empty*)
    Nil  "[]: ns_public"

         (*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
           invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
           all similar protocols.*)
    Fake "[| evs: ns_public;  B ~= Spy;  
             X: synth (analz (spies evs)) |]
          ==> Says Spy B X  # evs : ns_public"

         (*Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob*)
    NS1  "[| evs1: ns_public;  A ~= B;  Nonce NA ~: used evs1 |]
          ==> Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|})
                # evs1  :  ns_public"

         (*Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce*)
    NS2  "[| evs2: ns_public;  A ~= B;  Nonce NB ~: used evs2;
             Says A' B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs2 |]
          ==> Says B A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|})
                # evs2  :  ns_public"

         (*Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.*)
    NS3  "[| evs3: ns_public;
             Says A  B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs3;
             Says B' A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) : set evs3 |]
          ==> Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 : ns_public"

  (**Oops message??**)

end