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(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Event
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    ID:         $Id$
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    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
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    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge
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Theory of events for security protocols
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Datatype of events; function "spies"; freshness
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"bad" agents have been broken by the Spy; their private keys and internal
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    stores are visible to him
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*)
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theory Event imports Message
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uses ("Event_lemmas.ML") begin
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consts  (*Initial states of agents -- parameter of the construction*)
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  initState :: "agent => msg set"
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datatype
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  event = Says  agent agent msg
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        | Gets  agent       msg
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        | Notes agent       msg
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consts 
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  bad    :: "agent set"				(*compromised agents*)
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  knows  :: "agent => event list => msg set"
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(*"spies" is retained for compatibility's sake*)
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syntax
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  spies  :: "event list => msg set"
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translations
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  "spies"   => "knows Spy"
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axioms
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  (*Spy has access to his own key for spoof messages, but Server is secure*)
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  Spy_in_bad     [iff] :    "Spy \<in> bad"
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  Server_not_bad [iff] : "Server \<notin> bad"
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primrec
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  knows_Nil:   "knows A [] = initState A"
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  knows_Cons:
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    "knows A (ev # evs) =
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       (if A = Spy then 
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	(case ev of
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	   Says A' B X => insert X (knows Spy evs)
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	 | Gets A' X => knows Spy evs
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	 | Notes A' X  => 
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	     if A' \<in> bad then insert X (knows Spy evs) else knows Spy evs)
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	else
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	(case ev of
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	   Says A' B X => 
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	     if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
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	 | Gets A' X    => 
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	     if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs
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	 | Notes A' X    => 
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	     if A'=A then insert X (knows A evs) else knows A evs))"
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(*
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  Case A=Spy on the Gets event
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  enforces the fact that if a message is received then it must have been sent,
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  therefore the oops case must use Notes
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*)
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consts
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  (*Set of items that might be visible to somebody:
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    complement of the set of fresh items*)
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  used :: "event list => msg set"
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primrec
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  used_Nil:   "used []         = (UN B. parts (initState B))"
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  used_Cons:  "used (ev # evs) =
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		     (case ev of
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			Says A B X => parts {X} Un (used evs)
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		      | Gets A X   => used evs
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		      | Notes A X  => parts {X} Un (used evs))"
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use "Event_lemmas.ML"
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method_setup analz_mono_contra = {*
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    Method.no_args
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      (Method.METHOD (fn facts => REPEAT_FIRST analz_mono_contra_tac)) *}
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    "for proving theorems of the form X \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs) --> P"
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end
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