--- a/src/HOL/Auth/TLS.thy Tue Feb 27 12:28:42 2001 +0100
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/TLS.thy Tue Feb 27 16:13:23 2001 +0100
@@ -82,14 +82,14 @@
"[]: tls"
Fake (*The spy, an active attacker, MAY say anything he CAN say.*)
- "[| evs: tls; X: synth (analz (spies evs)) |]
- ==> Says Spy B X # evs : tls"
+ "[| evsf \\<in> tls; X \\<in> synth (analz (spies evsf)) |]
+ ==> Says Spy B X # evsf \\<in> tls"
SpyKeys (*The spy may apply PRF & sessionK to available nonces*)
- "[| evsSK: tls;
+ "[| evsSK \\<in> tls;
{Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Nonce M} <= analz (spies evsSK) |]
==> Notes Spy {| Nonce (PRF(M,NA,NB)),
- Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) |} # evsSK : tls"
+ Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) |} # evsSK \\<in> tls"
ClientHello
(*(7.4.1.2)
@@ -97,40 +97,40 @@
It is uninterpreted but will be confirmed in the FINISHED messages.
NA is CLIENT RANDOM, while SID is SESSION_ID.
UNIX TIME is omitted because the protocol doesn't use it.
- May assume NA ~: range PRF because CLIENT RANDOM is 28 bytes
+ May assume NA \\<notin> range PRF because CLIENT RANDOM is 28 bytes
while MASTER SECRET is 48 bytes*)
- "[| evsCH: tls; Nonce NA ~: used evsCH; NA ~: range PRF |]
+ "[| evsCH \\<in> tls; Nonce NA \\<notin> used evsCH; NA \\<notin> range PRF |]
==> Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
- # evsCH : tls"
+ # evsCH \\<in> tls"
ServerHello
(*7.4.1.3 of the TLS Internet-Draft
PB represents CLIENT_VERSION, CIPHER_SUITE and COMPRESSION_METHOD.
SERVER CERTIFICATE (7.4.2) is always present.
CERTIFICATE_REQUEST (7.4.4) is implied.*)
- "[| evsSH: tls; Nonce NB ~: used evsSH; NB ~: range PRF;
+ "[| evsSH \\<in> tls; Nonce NB \\<notin> used evsSH; NB \\<notin> range PRF;
Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
- : set evsSH |]
- ==> Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} # evsSH : tls"
+ \\<in> set evsSH |]
+ ==> Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} # evsSH \\<in> tls"
Certificate
(*SERVER (7.4.2) or CLIENT (7.4.6) CERTIFICATE.*)
- "evsC: tls ==> Says B A (certificate B (pubK B)) # evsC : tls"
+ "evsC \\<in> tls ==> Says B A (certificate B (pubK B)) # evsC \\<in> tls"
ClientKeyExch
(*CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE (7.4.7).
The client, A, chooses PMS, the PREMASTER SECRET.
She encrypts PMS using the supplied KB, which ought to be pubK B.
- We assume PMS ~: range PRF because a clash betweem the PMS
+ We assume PMS \\<notin> range PRF because a clash betweem the PMS
and another MASTER SECRET is highly unlikely (even though
both items have the same length, 48 bytes).
The Note event records in the trace that she knows PMS
(see REMARK at top). *)
- "[| evsCX: tls; Nonce PMS ~: used evsCX; PMS ~: range PRF;
- Says B' A (certificate B KB) : set evsCX |]
+ "[| evsCX \\<in> tls; Nonce PMS \\<notin> used evsCX; PMS \\<notin> range PRF;
+ Says B' A (certificate B KB) \\<in> set evsCX |]
==> Says A B (Crypt KB (Nonce PMS))
# Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|}
- # evsCX : tls"
+ # evsCX \\<in> tls"
CertVerify
(*The optional Certificate Verify (7.4.8) message contains the
@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@
It adds the pre-master-secret, which is also essential!
Checking the signature, which is the only use of A's certificate,
assures B of A's presence*)
- "[| evsCV: tls;
- Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} : set evsCV;
- Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCV |]
+ "[| evsCV \\<in> tls;
+ Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} \\<in> set evsCV;
+ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} \\<in> set evsCV |]
==> Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))
- # evsCV : tls"
+ # evsCV \\<in> tls"
(*Finally come the FINISHED messages (7.4.8), confirming PA and PB
among other things. The master-secret is PRF(PMS,NA,NB).
@@ -153,101 +153,101 @@
rule's applying when the Spy has satisfied the "Says A B" by
repaying messages sent by the true client; in that case, the
Spy does not know PMS and could not send ClientFinished. One
- could simply put A~=Spy into the rule, but one should not
+ could simply put A\\<noteq>Spy into the rule, but one should not
expect the spy to be well-behaved.*)
- "[| evsCF: tls;
+ "[| evsCF \\<in> tls;
Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
- : set evsCF;
- Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} : set evsCF;
- Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCF;
+ \\<in> set evsCF;
+ Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} \\<in> set evsCF;
+ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} \\<in> set evsCF;
M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB) |]
==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
(Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
- # evsCF : tls"
+ # evsCF \\<in> tls"
ServerFinished
(*Keeping A' and A'' distinct means B cannot even check that the
two messages originate from the same source. *)
- "[| evsSF: tls;
+ "[| evsSF \\<in> tls;
Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}
- : set evsSF;
- Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} : set evsSF;
- Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) : set evsSF;
+ \\<in> set evsSF;
+ Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} \\<in> set evsSF;
+ Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) \\<in> set evsSF;
M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB) |]
==> Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
(Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
- # evsSF : tls"
+ # evsSF \\<in> tls"
ClientAccepts
(*Having transmitted ClientFinished and received an identical
message encrypted with serverK, the client stores the parameters
needed to resume this session. The "Notes A ..." premise is
used to prove Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS.*)
- "[| evsCA: tls;
- Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evsCA;
+ "[| evsCA \\<in> tls;
+ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} \\<in> set evsCA;
M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|};
- Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsCA;
- Says B' A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsCA |]
+ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) \\<in> set evsCA;
+ Says B' A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) \\<in> set evsCA |]
==>
- Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsCA : tls"
+ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsCA \\<in> tls"
ServerAccepts
(*Having transmitted ServerFinished and received an identical
message encrypted with clientK, the server stores the parameters
needed to resume this session. The "Says A'' B ..." premise is
used to prove Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS.*)
- "[| evsSA: tls;
- A ~= B;
- Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) : set evsSA;
+ "[| evsSA \\<in> tls;
+ A \\<noteq> B;
+ Says A'' B (Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS)) \\<in> set evsSA;
M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB);
X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|};
- Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsSA;
- Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evsSA |]
+ Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) \\<in> set evsSA;
+ Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) \\<in> set evsSA |]
==>
- Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsSA : tls"
+ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} # evsSA \\<in> tls"
ClientResume
(*If A recalls the SESSION_ID, then she sends a FINISHED message
using the new nonces and stored MASTER SECRET.*)
- "[| evsCR: tls;
+ "[| evsCR \\<in> tls;
Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}: set evsCR;
- Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} : set evsCR;
- Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evsCR |]
+ Says B' A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} \\<in> set evsCR;
+ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} \\<in> set evsCR |]
==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M))
(Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|}))
- # evsCR : tls"
+ # evsCR \\<in> tls"
ServerResume
(*Resumption (7.3): If B finds the SESSION_ID then he can send
a FINISHED message using the recovered MASTER SECRET*)
- "[| evsSR: tls;
+ "[| evsSR \\<in> tls;
Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Number SID, Number PA|}: set evsSR;
- Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} : set evsSR;
- Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evsSR |]
+ Says B A {|Nonce NB, Number SID, Number PB|} \\<in> set evsSR;
+ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} \\<in> set evsSR |]
==> Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M))
(Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M,
Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A,
Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|})) # evsSR
- : tls"
+ \\<in> tls"
Oops
(*The most plausible compromise is of an old session key. Losing
the MASTER SECRET or PREMASTER SECRET is more serious but
- rather unlikely. The assumption A ~= Spy is essential: otherwise
+ rather unlikely. The assumption A \\<noteq> Spy is essential: otherwise
the Spy could learn session keys merely by replaying messages!*)
- "[| evso: tls; A ~= Spy;
- Says A B (Crypt (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) X) : set evso |]
- ==> Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role))) # evso : tls"
+ "[| evso \\<in> tls; A \\<noteq> Spy;
+ Says A B (Crypt (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role)) X) \\<in> set evso |]
+ ==> Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),role))) # evso \\<in> tls"
end