src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy

--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Thu Sep 26 12:47:47 1996 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy	Thu Sep 26 12:50:48 1996 +0200
@@ -14,40 +14,41 @@
 
 OtwayRees = Shared + 
 
-consts  otway   :: "event list set"
-inductive otway
+consts  otway   :: "agent set => event list set"
+inductive "otway lost"
   intrs 
          (*Initial trace is empty*)
-    Nil  "[]: otway"
+    Nil  "[]: otway lost"
 
-         (*The enemy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
+         (*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say.  We do not expect him to
            invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1.  Common to
            all similar protocols.*)
-    Fake "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Enemy;  X: synth (analz (sees Enemy evs)) |]
-          ==> Says Enemy B X  # evs : otway"
+    Fake "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Spy;  
+             X: synth (analz (sees lost Spy evs)) |]
+          ==> Says Spy B X  # evs : otway lost"
 
          (*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
-    OR1  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server |]
+    OR1  "[| evs: otway lost;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server |]
           ==> Says A B {|Nonce (newN evs), Agent A, Agent B, 
                          Crypt {|Nonce (newN evs), Agent A, Agent B|} 
                                (shrK A) |} 
-                 # evs : otway"
+                 # evs : otway lost"
 
          (*Bob's response to Alice's message.  Bob doesn't know who 
 	   the sender is, hence the A' in the sender field.
            We modify the published protocol by NOT encrypting NB.*)
-    OR2  "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Server;
+    OR2  "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Server;
              Says A' B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set_of_list evs |]
           ==> Says B Server 
                   {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X, 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Nonce (newN evs), 
                             Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK B)|}
-                 # evs : otway"
+                 # evs : otway lost"
 
          (*The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs
            match.  Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for
            forwarding to Alice.*)
-    OR3  "[| evs: otway;  B ~= Server;
+    OR3  "[| evs: otway lost;  B ~= Server;
              Says B' Server 
                   {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK A), 
@@ -57,27 +58,27 @@
                   {|Nonce NA, 
                     Crypt {|Nonce NA, Key (newK evs)|} (shrK A),
                     Crypt {|Nonce NB, Key (newK evs)|} (shrK B)|}
-                 # evs : otway"
+                 # evs : otway lost"
 
          (*Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with
 	   those in the message he previously sent the Server.*)
-    OR4  "[| evs: otway;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server;
+    OR4  "[| evs: otway lost;  A ~= B;  B ~= Server;
              Says S B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt {|Nonce NB, Key K|} (shrK B)|}
                : set_of_list evs;
              Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X', 
                              Crypt {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|} 
                                    (shrK B)|}
                : set_of_list evs |]
-          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs : otway"
+          ==> Says B A {|Nonce NA, X|} # evs : otway lost"
 
          (*This message models possible leaks of session keys.  Alice's Nonce
            identifies the protocol run.*)
-    Reveal "[| evs: otway;  A ~= Enemy;
+    Reveal "[| evs: otway lost;  A ~= Spy;
                Says B' A {|Nonce NA, Crypt {|Nonce NA, Key K|} (shrK A)|}
                  : set_of_list evs;
                Says A  B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, 
                            Crypt {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} (shrK A)|}
                  : set_of_list evs |]
-            ==> Says A Enemy {|Nonce NA, Key K|} # evs : otway"
+            ==> Says A Spy {|Nonce NA, Key K|} # evs : otway lost"
 
 end