--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.thy Fri Nov 29 17:58:18 1996 +0100
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.thy Fri Nov 29 18:03:21 1996 +0100
@@ -48,25 +48,25 @@
: set_of_list evs |]
==> Says Server A
{|Nonce NB,
- Crypt {|Agent B, Key (newK evs), Nonce NA|} (shrK A),
- Crypt {|Nonce NB, Key (newK evs), Agent A|} (shrK B)|}
+ Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key (newK evs), Nonce NA|},
+ Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key (newK evs), Agent A|}|}
# evs : yahalom lost"
(*Alice receives the Server's (?) message, checks her Nonce, and
uses the new session key to send Bob his Nonce.*)
YM4 "[| evs: yahalom lost; A ~= Server; A ~= B;
- Says S A {|Nonce NB, Crypt {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|} (shrK A),
+ Says S A {|Nonce NB, Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
X|}
: set_of_list evs;
Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} : set_of_list evs |]
- ==> Says A B {|X, Crypt (Nonce NB) K|} # evs : yahalom lost"
+ ==> Says A B {|X, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|} # evs : yahalom lost"
(*This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces
identify the protocol run. Quoting Server here ensures they are
correct. *)
Oops "[| evs: yahalom lost; A ~= Spy;
Says Server A {|Nonce NB,
- Crypt {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|} (shrK A),
+ Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA|},
X|} : set_of_list evs |]
==> Says A Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evs : yahalom lost"