--- a/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy Wed Jul 11 11:13:08 2007 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/OtwayRees.thy Wed Jul 11 11:14:51 2007 +0200
@@ -14,31 +14,30 @@
This is the original version, which encrypts Nonce NB.*}
-consts otway :: "event list set"
-inductive "otway"
- intros
+inductive_set otway :: "event list set"
+ where
(*Initial trace is empty*)
Nil: "[] \<in> otway"
(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
- Fake: "[| evsf \<in> otway; X \<in> synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) |]
+ | Fake: "[| evsf \<in> otway; X \<in> synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) |]
==> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> otway"
(*A message that has been sent can be received by the
intended recipient.*)
- Reception: "[| evsr \<in> otway; Says A B X \<in>set evsr |]
+ | Reception: "[| evsr \<in> otway; Says A B X \<in>set evsr |]
==> Gets B X # evsr \<in> otway"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
- OR1: "[| evs1 \<in> otway; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1 |]
+ | OR1: "[| evs1 \<in> otway; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1 |]
==> Says A B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|} |}
# evs1 : otway"
(*Bob's response to Alice's message. Note that NB is encrypted.*)
- OR2: "[| evs2 \<in> otway; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2;
+ | OR2: "[| evs2 \<in> otway; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2;
Gets B {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X|} : set evs2 |]
==> Says B Server
{|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X,
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@
(*The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs
match. Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for
forwarding to Alice.*)
- OR3: "[| evs3 \<in> otway; Key KAB \<notin> used evs3;
+ | OR3: "[| evs3 \<in> otway; Key KAB \<notin> used evs3;
Gets Server
{|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B|},
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@
(*Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with
those in the message he previously sent the Server.
Need B \<noteq> Server because we allow messages to self.*)
- OR4: "[| evs4 \<in> otway; B \<noteq> Server;
+ | OR4: "[| evs4 \<in> otway; B \<noteq> Server;
Says B Server {|Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X',
Crypt (shrK B)
{|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B|}|}
@@ -75,7 +74,7 @@
(*This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces
identify the protocol run.*)
- Oops: "[| evso \<in> otway;
+ | Oops: "[| evso \<in> otway;
Says Server B {|Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Nonce NB, Key K|}|}
: set evso |]
==> Notes Spy {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K|} # evso : otway"