src/HOL/Auth/Event.thy
changeset 45605 a89b4bc311a5
parent 41693 47532fe9e075
child 46471 2289a3869c88
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Event.thy	Sun Nov 20 20:59:30 2011 +0100
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Event.thy	Sun Nov 20 21:05:23 2011 +0100
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 (*Simplifying   
  parts(insert X (knows Spy evs)) = parts{X} \<union> parts(knows Spy evs).
   This version won't loop with the simplifier.*)
-lemmas parts_insert_knows_A = parts_insert [of _ "knows A evs", standard]
+lemmas parts_insert_knows_A = parts_insert [of _ "knows A evs"] for A evs
 
 lemma knows_Spy_Says [simp]:
      "knows Spy (Says A B X # evs) = insert X (knows Spy evs)"
@@ -138,10 +138,10 @@
 text{*Elimination rules: derive contradictions from old Says events containing
   items known to be fresh*}
 lemmas Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy = 
-       Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN revcut_rl, standard] 
+       Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN parts.Inj, THEN revcut_rl] 
 
 lemmas knows_Spy_partsEs =
-     Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy parts.Body [THEN revcut_rl, standard]
+     Says_imp_parts_knows_Spy parts.Body [THEN revcut_rl]
 
 lemmas Says_imp_analz_Spy = Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj]
 
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
     intro: analz_subset_parts [THEN subsetD] parts_mono [THEN [2] rev_subsetD])
 
 
-lemmas analz_impI = impI [where P = "Y \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs)", standard]
+lemmas analz_impI = impI [where P = "Y \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs)"] for Y evs
 
 ML
 {*
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@
 
 subsubsection{*Useful for case analysis on whether a hash is a spoof or not*}
 
-lemmas syan_impI = impI [where P = "Y \<notin> synth (analz (knows Spy evs))", standard]
+lemmas syan_impI = impI [where P = "Y \<notin> synth (analz (knows Spy evs))"] for Y evs
 
 ML
 {*