--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad.ML Thu Sep 25 12:13:18 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad.ML Thu Sep 25 12:14:41 1997 +0200
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
(*Unicity for NS1: nonce NA identifies agents A and B*)
goal thy
"!!evs. [| Nonce NA ~: analz (spies evs); evs : ns_public |] \
-\ ==> EX A' B'. ALL A B. \
+\ ==> EX A' B'. ALL A B. \
\ Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} : parts (spies evs) --> \
\ A=A' & B=B'";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
(*NS1*)
by (expand_case_tac "NA = ?y" 2 THEN blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs) 2);
(*Fake*)
-by (step_tac (!claset addSIs [analz_insertI]) 1);
+by (Clarify_tac 1);
by (ex_strip_tac 1);
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
val lemma = result();
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
"!!evs. [| Crypt(pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} : parts(spies evs); \
\ Crypt(pubK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} : parts(spies evs); \
\ Nonce NA ~: analz (spies evs); \
-\ evs : ns_public |] \
+\ evs : ns_public |] \
\ ==> A=A' & B=B'";
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
qed "unique_NA";
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
(*Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg NS1 if A and B are secure*)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| Says A B (Crypt(pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs; \
+ "!!evs. [| Says A B (Crypt(pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs; \
\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : ns_public |] \
\ ==> Nonce NA ~: analz (spies evs)";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
@@ -157,30 +157,30 @@
goal thy
"!!evs. [| Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs; \
\ Says B' A (Crypt(pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}): set evs; \
-\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : ns_public |] \
+\ A ~: bad; B ~: bad; evs : ns_public |] \
\ ==> Says B A (Crypt(pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}): set evs";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
(*prepare induction over Crypt (pubK A) {|NA,NB|} : parts H*)
by (etac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS rev_mp) 1);
by (etac ns_public.induct 1);
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac);
+by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
+(*NS2*)
+by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj,
+ Spy_not_see_NA, unique_NA]) 3);
(*NS1*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs spies_partsEs) 2);
(*Fake*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [impOfSubs Fake_parts_insert]
addDs [Spy_not_see_NA,
impOfSubs analz_subset_parts]) 1);
-(*NS2; not clear why blast_tac needs to be preceeded by Step_tac*)
-by (Step_tac 1);
-by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj,
- Spy_not_see_NA, unique_NA]) 1);
qed "A_trusts_NS2";
(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in NS1*)
goal thy
"!!evs. [| Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} : parts (spies evs); \
\ Nonce NA ~: analz (spies evs); \
-\ evs : ns_public |] \
+\ evs : ns_public |] \
\ ==> Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) : set evs";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
by (etac rev_mp 1);
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@
[proof closely follows that for unique_NA] *)
goal thy
"!!evs. [| Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs); evs : ns_public |] \
-\ ==> EX A' NA'. ALL A NA. \
-\ Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} \
+\ ==> EX A' NA'. ALL A NA. \
+\ Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} \
\ : parts (spies evs) --> A=A' & NA=NA'";
by (etac rev_mp 1);
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
(*NS2*)
by (expand_case_tac "NB = ?y" 2 THEN blast_tac (!claset addSEs partsEs) 2);
(*Fake*)
-by (step_tac (!claset addSIs [analz_insertI]) 1);
+by (Clarify_tac 1);
by (ex_strip_tac 1);
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
val lemma = result();
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
"!!evs. [| Crypt(pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} : parts(spies evs); \
\ Crypt(pubK A'){|Nonce NA', Nonce NB|} : parts(spies evs); \
\ Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs); \
-\ evs : ns_public |] \
+\ evs : ns_public |] \
\ ==> A=A' & NA=NA'";
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1);
qed "unique_NB";
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
by (etac rev_mp 1);
by (analz_induct_tac 1);
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [all_conj_distrib])));
-by clarify_tac;
+by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
(*NS3: because NB determines A*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj, unique_NB]) 4);
(*NS2: by freshness and unicity of NB*)
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@
by (etac (Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS rev_mp) 1);
by (parts_induct_tac 1);
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [ex_disj_distrib])));
-by clarify_tac;
+by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
(*NS3: because NB determines A*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj,
Spy_not_see_NB, unique_NB]) 3);
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
\ ==> Says B A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}) : set evs \
\ --> Nonce NB ~: analz (spies evs)";
by (analz_induct_tac 1);
-by clarify_tac;
+by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac);
(*NS2: by freshness and unicity of NB*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]
addEs [no_nonce_NS1_NS2 RSN (2, rev_notE)]