--- a/src/HOL/SET_Protocol/Merchant_Registration.thy Sat Jan 05 17:00:43 2019 +0100
+++ b/src/HOL/SET_Protocol/Merchant_Registration.thy Sat Jan 05 17:24:33 2019 +0100
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
text\<open>Copmpared with Cardholder Reigstration, \<open>KeyCryptKey\<close> is not
needed: no session key encrypts another. Instead we
prove the "key compromise" theorems for sets KK that contain no private
- encryption keys (@{term "priEK C"}).\<close>
+ encryption keys (\<^term>\<open>priEK C\<close>).\<close>
inductive_set
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@
subsubsection\<open>The merchant's certificates really were created by the CA,
provided the CA is uncompromised\<close>
-text\<open>The assumption @{term "CA i \<noteq> RCA"} is required: step 2 uses
+text\<open>The assumption \<^term>\<open>CA i \<noteq> RCA\<close> is required: step 2 uses
certificates of the same form.\<close>
lemma certificate_merSK_valid_lemma [intro]:
"[|Crypt (priSK (CA i)) \<lbrace>Agent M, Key merSK, onlySig\<rbrace>