(* Title: HOL/Auth/Public
ID: $Id$
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
Theory of Public Keys (common to all symmetric-key protocols)
Server keys; initial states of agents; new nonces and keys; function "sees"
*)
Public = Message + List +
consts
pubK :: agent => key
syntax
priK :: agent => key
translations
"priK x" == "invKey(pubK x)"
consts (*Initial states of agents -- parameter of the construction*)
initState :: [agent set, agent] => msg set
primrec initState agent
(*Agents know their private key and all public keys*)
initState_Server "initState lost Server =
insert (Key (priK Server)) (Key `` range pubK)"
initState_Friend "initState lost (Friend i) =
insert (Key (priK (Friend i))) (Key `` range pubK)"
initState_Spy "initState lost Spy =
(Key``invKey``pubK``lost) Un (Key `` range pubK)"
datatype (*Messages, and components of agent stores*)
event = Says agent agent msg
consts
sees1 :: [agent, event] => msg set
primrec sees1 event
(*Spy reads all traffic whether addressed to him or not*)
sees1_Says "sees1 A (Says A' B X) = (if A:{B,Spy} then {X} else {})"
consts
sees :: [agent set, agent, event list] => msg set
primrec sees list
sees_Nil "sees lost A [] = initState lost A"
sees_Cons "sees lost A (ev#evs) = sees1 A ev Un sees lost A evs"
constdefs
(*Set of items that might be visible to somebody: complement of the set
of fresh items*)
used :: event list => msg set
"used evs == parts (UN lost B. sees lost B evs)"
(*Agents generate "random" nonces, uniquely determined by their argument.*)
consts
newN :: nat => nat
rules
(*Public keys are disjoint, and never clash with private keys*)
inj_pubK "inj pubK"
priK_neq_pubK "priK A ~= pubK B"
inj_newN "inj newN"
end