(* Title: HOL/Auth/WooLam
ID: $Id$
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
Inductive relation "woolam" for the Woo-Lam protocol.
Simplified version from page 11 of
Abadi and Needham. Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols.
IEEE Trans. S.E. 22(1), 1996, pages 6-15.
Note: this differs from the Woo-Lam protocol discussed by Lowe in his paper
Some New Attacks upon Security Protocols.
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1996.
*)
WooLam = Shared +
consts lost :: agent set (*No need for it to be a variable*)
woolam :: event list set
inductive woolam
intrs
(*Initial trace is empty*)
Nil "[]: woolam"
(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
Fake "[| evs: woolam; B ~= Spy;
X: synth (analz (sees lost Spy evs)) |]
==> Says Spy B X # evs : woolam"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run*)
WL1 "[| evs: woolam; A ~= B |]
==> Says A B (Agent A) # evs : woolam"
(*Bob responds to Alice's message with a challenge.*)
WL2 "[| evs: woolam; A ~= B;
Says A' B (Agent A) : set_of_list evs |]
==> Says B A (Nonce NB) # evs : woolam"
(*Alice responds to Bob's challenge by encrypting NB with her key.
B is *not* properly determined -- Alice essentially broadcasts
her reply.*)
WL3 "[| evs: woolam; A ~= B;
Says A B (Agent A) : set_of_list evs;
Says B' A (Nonce NB) : set_of_list evs |]
==> Says A B (Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)) # evs : woolam"
(*Bob forwards Alice's response to the Server.*)
WL4 "[| evs: woolam; B ~= Server;
Says A' B X : set_of_list evs;
Says A'' B (Agent A) : set_of_list evs |]
==> Says B Server {|Agent A, Agent B, X|} # evs : woolam"
(*Server decrypts Alice's response for Bob.*)
WL5 "[| evs: woolam; B ~= Server;
Says B' Server {|Agent A, Agent B, Crypt (shrK A) (Nonce NB)|}
: set_of_list evs |]
==> Says Server B (Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NB|})
# evs : woolam"
end