src/HOL/Auth/Shared.thy
author paulson
Wed, 24 May 2000 18:44:19 +0200
changeset 8954 4fbdda40bb5f
parent 5183 89f162de39cf
child 10833 c0844a30ea4e
permissions -rw-r--r--
rewrote a very long proof (Key_analz_image_Key) because it had stopped working

(*  Title:      HOL/Auth/Shared
    ID:         $Id$
    Author:     Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
    Copyright   1996  University of Cambridge

Theory of Shared Keys (common to all symmetric-key protocols)

Shared, long-term keys; initial states of agents
*)

Shared = Event + Finite +

consts
  shrK    :: agent => key  (*symmetric keys*)

rules
  isSym_keys "isSymKey K"	(*All keys are symmetric*)
  inj_shrK   "inj shrK"		(*No two agents have the same long-term key*)

primrec
        (*Server knows all long-term keys; other agents know only their own*)
  initState_Server  "initState Server     = Key `` range shrK"
  initState_Friend  "initState (Friend i) = {Key (shrK (Friend i))}"
  initState_Spy     "initState Spy        = Key``shrK``bad"


rules
  (*Unlike the corresponding property of nonces, this cannot be proved.
    We have infinitely many agents and there is nothing to stop their
    long-term keys from exhausting all the natural numbers.  The axiom
    assumes that their keys are dispersed so as to leave room for infinitely
    many fresh session keys.  We could, alternatively, restrict agents to
    an unspecified finite number.*)
  Key_supply_ax  "finite KK ==> EX K. K ~: KK & Key K ~: used evs"

end