(* Title: HOL/Auth/OtwayRees_Bad.thy
Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory
Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge
*)
section\<open>The Otway-Rees Protocol: The Faulty BAN Version\<close>
theory OtwayRees_Bad imports Public begin
text\<open>The FAULTY version omitting encryption of Nonce NB, as suggested on
page 247 of
Burrows, Abadi and Needham (1988). A Logic of Authentication.
Proc. Royal Soc. 426
This file illustrates the consequences of such errors. We can still prove
impressive-looking properties such as \<open>Spy_not_see_encrypted_key\<close>, yet
the protocol is open to a middleperson attack. Attempting to prove some key
lemmas indicates the possibility of this attack.\<close>
inductive_set otway :: "event list set"
where
Nil: \<comment>\<open>The empty trace\<close>
"[] \<in> otway"
| Fake: \<comment>\<open>The Spy may say anything he can say. The sender field is correct,
but agents don't use that information.\<close>
"[| evsf \<in> otway; X \<in> synth (analz (knows Spy evsf)) |]
==> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> otway"
| Reception: \<comment>\<open>A message that has been sent can be received by the
intended recipient.\<close>
"[| evsr \<in> otway; Says A B X \<in>set evsr |]
==> Gets B X # evsr \<in> otway"
| OR1: \<comment>\<open>Alice initiates a protocol run\<close>
"[| evs1 \<in> otway; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1 |]
==> Says A B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
# evs1 \<in> otway"
| OR2: \<comment>\<open>Bob's response to Alice's message.
This variant of the protocol does NOT encrypt NB.\<close>
"[| evs2 \<in> otway; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2;
Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X\<rbrace> \<in> set evs2 |]
==> Says B Server
\<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X, Nonce NB,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
# evs2 \<in> otway"
| OR3: \<comment>\<open>The Server receives Bob's message and checks that the three NAs
match. Then he sends a new session key to Bob with a packet for
forwarding to Alice.\<close>
"[| evs3 \<in> otway; Key KAB \<notin> used evs3;
Gets Server
\<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>,
Nonce NB,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs3 |]
==> Says Server B
\<lbrace>Nonce NA,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Key KAB\<rbrace>,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Key KAB\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
# evs3 \<in> otway"
| OR4: \<comment>\<open>Bob receives the Server's (?) message and compares the Nonces with
those in the message he previously sent the Server.
Need @{term "B \<noteq> Server"} because we allow messages to self.\<close>
"[| evs4 \<in> otway; B \<noteq> Server;
Says B Server \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B, X', Nonce NB,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs4;
Gets B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs4 |]
==> Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce NA, X\<rbrace> # evs4 \<in> otway"
| Oops: \<comment>\<open>This message models possible leaks of session keys. The nonces
identify the protocol run.\<close>
"[| evso \<in> otway;
Says Server B \<lbrace>Nonce NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evso |]
==> Notes Spy \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Key K\<rbrace> # evso \<in> otway"
declare Says_imp_knows_Spy [THEN analz.Inj, dest]
declare parts.Body [dest]
declare analz_into_parts [dest]
declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest]
text\<open>A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end\<close>
lemma "[| B \<noteq> Server; Key K \<notin> used [] |]
==> \<exists>NA. \<exists>evs \<in> otway.
Says B A \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs"
apply (intro exI bexI)
apply (rule_tac [2] otway.Nil
[THEN otway.OR1, THEN otway.Reception,
THEN otway.OR2, THEN otway.Reception,
THEN otway.OR3, THEN otway.Reception, THEN otway.OR4])
apply (possibility, simp add: used_Cons)
done
lemma Gets_imp_Says [dest!]:
"[| Gets B X \<in> set evs; evs \<in> otway |] ==> \<exists>A. Says A B X \<in> set evs"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, auto)
done
subsection\<open>For reasoning about the encrypted portion of messages\<close>
lemma OR2_analz_knows_Spy:
"[| Gets B \<lbrace>N, Agent A, Agent B, X\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; evs \<in> otway |]
==> X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)"
by blast
lemma OR4_analz_knows_Spy:
"[| Gets B \<lbrace>N, X, Crypt (shrK B) X'\<rbrace> \<in> set evs; evs \<in> otway |]
==> X \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)"
by blast
lemma Oops_parts_knows_Spy:
"Says Server B \<lbrace>NA, X, Crypt K' \<lbrace>NB,K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs
==> K \<in> parts (knows Spy evs)"
by blast
text\<open>Forwarding lemma: see comments in OtwayRees.thy\<close>
lemmas OR2_parts_knows_Spy =
OR2_analz_knows_Spy [THEN analz_into_parts]
text\<open>Theorems of the form @{term "X \<notin> parts (spies evs)"} imply that
NOBODY sends messages containing X!\<close>
text\<open>Spy never sees a good agent's shared key!\<close>
lemma Spy_see_shrK [simp]:
"evs \<in> otway ==> (Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (knows Spy evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by (erule otway.induct, force,
drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
lemma Spy_analz_shrK [simp]:
"evs \<in> otway ==> (Key (shrK A) \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)) = (A \<in> bad)"
by auto
lemma Spy_see_shrK_D [dest!]:
"[|Key (shrK A) \<in> parts (knows Spy evs); evs \<in> otway|] ==> A \<in> bad"
by (blast dest: Spy_see_shrK)
subsection\<open>Proofs involving analz\<close>
text\<open>Describes the form of K and NA when the Server sends this message. Also
for Oops case.\<close>
lemma Says_Server_message_form:
"[| Says Server B \<lbrace>NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs;
evs \<in> otway |]
==> K \<notin> range shrK & (\<exists>i. NA = Nonce i) & (\<exists>j. NB = Nonce j)"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, simp_all)
done
(****
The following is to prove theorems of the form
Key K \<in> analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs)) ==>
Key K \<in> analz (knows Spy evs)
A more general formula must be proved inductively.
****)
text\<open>Session keys are not used to encrypt other session keys\<close>
text\<open>The equality makes the induction hypothesis easier to apply\<close>
lemma analz_image_freshK [rule_format]:
"evs \<in> otway ==>
\<forall>K KK. KK <= -(range shrK) -->
(Key K \<in> analz (Key`KK Un (knows Spy evs))) =
(K \<in> KK | Key K \<in> analz (knows Spy evs))"
apply (erule otway.induct)
apply (frule_tac [8] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [7] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (drule_tac [5] OR2_analz_knows_Spy, analz_freshK, spy_analz, auto)
done
lemma analz_insert_freshK:
"[| evs \<in> otway; KAB \<notin> range shrK |] ==>
(Key K \<in> analz (insert (Key KAB) (knows Spy evs))) =
(K = KAB | Key K \<in> analz (knows Spy evs))"
by (simp only: analz_image_freshK analz_image_freshK_simps)
text\<open>The Key K uniquely identifies the Server's message.\<close>
lemma unique_session_keys:
"[| Says Server B \<lbrace>NA, X, Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>NB, K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs;
Says Server B' \<lbrace>NA',X',Crypt (shrK B') \<lbrace>NB',K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs;
evs \<in> otway |] ==> X=X' & B=B' & NA=NA' & NB=NB'"
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule rev_mp)
apply (erule otway.induct, simp_all)
apply blast+ \<comment>\<open>OR3 and OR4\<close>
done
text\<open>Crucial secrecy property: Spy does not see the keys sent in msg OR3
Does not in itself guarantee security: an attack could violate
the premises, e.g. by having @{term "A=Spy"}\<close>
lemma secrecy_lemma:
"[| A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> otway |]
==> Says Server B
\<lbrace>NA, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Key K\<rbrace>,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs -->
Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs -->
Key K \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force)
apply (frule_tac [7] Says_Server_message_form)
apply (drule_tac [6] OR4_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (drule_tac [4] OR2_analz_knows_Spy)
apply (simp_all add: analz_insert_eq analz_insert_freshK pushes)
apply spy_analz \<comment>\<open>Fake\<close>
apply (blast dest: unique_session_keys)+ \<comment>\<open>OR3, OR4, Oops\<close>
done
lemma Spy_not_see_encrypted_key:
"[| Says Server B
\<lbrace>NA, Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Key K\<rbrace>,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs;
Notes Spy \<lbrace>NA, NB, Key K\<rbrace> \<notin> set evs;
A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> otway |]
==> Key K \<notin> analz (knows Spy evs)"
by (blast dest: Says_Server_message_form secrecy_lemma)
subsection\<open>Attempting to prove stronger properties\<close>
text\<open>Only OR1 can have caused such a part of a message to appear. The premise
@{term "A \<noteq> B"} prevents OR2's similar-looking cryptogram from being picked
up. Original Otway-Rees doesn't need it.\<close>
lemma Crypt_imp_OR1 [rule_format]:
"[| A \<notin> bad; A \<noteq> B; evs \<in> otway |]
==> Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace> \<in> parts (knows Spy evs) -->
Says A B \<lbrace>NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs"
by (erule otway.induct, force,
drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all, blast+)
text\<open>Crucial property: If the encrypted message appears, and A has used NA
to start a run, then it originated with the Server!
The premise @{term "A \<noteq> B"} allows use of \<open>Crypt_imp_OR1\<close>\<close>
text\<open>Only it is FALSE. Somebody could make a fake message to Server
substituting some other nonce NA' for NB.\<close>
lemma "[| A \<notin> bad; A \<noteq> B; evs \<in> otway |]
==> Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Key K\<rbrace> \<in> parts (knows Spy evs) -->
Says A B \<lbrace>NA, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs -->
(\<exists>B NB. Says Server B
\<lbrace>NA,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>NA, Key K\<rbrace>,
Crypt (shrK B) \<lbrace>NB, Key K\<rbrace>\<rbrace> \<in> set evs)"
apply (erule otway.induct, force,
drule_tac [4] OR2_parts_knows_Spy, simp_all)
apply blast \<comment>\<open>Fake\<close>
apply blast \<comment>\<open>OR1: it cannot be a new Nonce, contradiction.\<close>
txt\<open>OR3 and OR4\<close>
apply (simp_all add: ex_disj_distrib)
prefer 2 apply (blast intro!: Crypt_imp_OR1) \<comment>\<open>OR4\<close>
txt\<open>OR3\<close>
apply clarify
(*The hypotheses at this point suggest an attack in which nonce NB is used
in two different roles:
Gets Server
\<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent Aa, Agent A,
Crypt (shrK Aa) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent Aa, Agent A\<rbrace>, Nonce NB,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent Aa, Agent A\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs3
Says A B
\<lbrace>Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B,
Crypt (shrK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NB, Agent A, Agent B\<rbrace>\<rbrace>
\<in> set evs3;
*)
(*Thus the key property A_can_trust probably fails too.*)
oops
end