Changed some variables of type msg to lower case (e.g. from NB to nb
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.ML Fri Jul 04 17:34:55 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom.ML Fri Jul 04 17:36:41 1997 +0200
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
(*Describes the form of K when the Server sends this message. Useful for
Oops as well as main secrecy property.*)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, NA, NB|}, X|} \
+ "!!evs. [| Says Server A {|Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na, nb|}, X|} \
\ : set evs; \
\ evs : yahalom lost |] \
\ ==> K ~: range shrK";
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
goal thy
"!!evs. evs : yahalom lost ==> \
\ EX NA' A' B'. ALL NA A B. \
-\ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, NB|} : parts(sees lost Spy evs) \
+\ Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} : parts(sees lost Spy evs) \
\ --> B ~: lost --> NA = NA' & A = A' & B = B'";
by parts_induct_tac;
(*Fake*)
@@ -474,15 +474,15 @@
THEN Fake_parts_insert_tac 1);
by (asm_simp_tac (!simpset addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1);
(*YM2: creation of new Nonce. Move assertion into global context*)
-by (expand_case_tac "NB = ?y" 1);
+by (expand_case_tac "nb = ?y" 1);
by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI, conjI, impI, refl] 1));
by (blast_tac (!claset addSEs sees_Spy_partsEs) 1);
val lemma = result();
goal thy
- "!!evs.[| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, NB|} \
+ "!!evs.[| Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|} \
\ : parts (sees lost Spy evs); \
-\ Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', NB|} \
+\ Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|} \
\ : parts (sees lost Spy evs); \
\ evs : yahalom lost; B ~: lost; B' ~: lost |] \
\ ==> NA' = NA & A' = A & B' = B";
@@ -493,11 +493,11 @@
(*Variant useful for proving secrecy of NB: the Says... form allows
not_lost_tac to remove the assumption B' ~: lost.*)
goal thy
- "!!evs.[| Says C D {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, NB|}|} \
+ "!!evs.[| Says C D {|X, Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, nb|}|} \
\ : set evs; B ~: lost; \
-\ Says C' D' {|X', Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', NB|}|} \
+\ Says C' D' {|X', Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NA', nb|}|} \
\ : set evs; \
-\ NB ~: analz (sees lost Spy evs); evs : yahalom lost |] \
+\ nb ~: analz (sees lost Spy evs); evs : yahalom lost |] \
\ ==> NA' = NA & A' = A & B' = B";
by (not_lost_tac "B'" 1);
by (blast_tac (!claset addSDs [Says_imp_sees_Spy' RS parts.Inj]
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
goal thy
"!!evs. [| B ~: lost; evs : yahalom lost |] \
\ ==> Nonce NB ~: analz (sees lost Spy evs) --> \
-\ Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NB, NB'|} \
+\ Crypt (shrK B') {|Agent A', Nonce NB, nb'|} \
\ : parts(sees lost Spy evs) \
\ --> Crypt (shrK B) {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} \
\ ~: parts(sees lost Spy evs)";
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.ML Fri Jul 04 17:34:55 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/Yahalom2.ML Fri Jul 04 17:36:41 1997 +0200
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
(*Describes the form of K when the Server sends this message. Useful for
Oops as well as main secrecy property.*)
goal thy
- "!!evs. [| Says Server A {|NB', Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, NA|}, X|} \
+ "!!evs. [| Says Server A {|nb', Crypt (shrK A) {|Agent B, Key K, na|}, X|} \
\ : set evs; \
\ evs : yahalom lost |] \
\ ==> K ~: range shrK & A ~= B";