--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public.ML Tue Sep 16 13:58:02 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public.ML Tue Sep 16 14:04:10 1997 +0200
@@ -124,8 +124,7 @@
fun analz_induct_tac i =
etac ns_public.induct i THEN
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac
- (!simpset addsimps [not_parts_not_analz]
- setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
+ (!simpset setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
(*Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg NS1 if A and B are secure*)
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad.ML Tue Sep 16 13:58:02 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public_Bad.ML Tue Sep 16 14:04:10 1997 +0200
@@ -127,8 +127,7 @@
fun analz_induct_tac i =
etac ns_public.induct i THEN
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac
- (!simpset addsimps [not_parts_not_analz]
- setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
+ (!simpset setloop split_tac [expand_if]));
(*Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg NS1 if A and B are secure*)
--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.ML Tue Sep 16 13:58:02 1997 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Shared.ML Tue Sep 16 14:04:10 1997 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
by possibility_tac;
result();
+goal thy
+ "!!A B. [| A ~= B; A ~= Server; B ~= Server |] \
+\ ==> EX evs: ns_shared. \
+\ Says A B (Crypt ?K {|Nonce ?N, Nonce ?N|}) : set evs";
+by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1));
+by (rtac (ns_shared.Nil RS ns_shared.NS1 RS ns_shared.NS2 RS
+ ns_shared.NS3 RS ns_shared.NS4 RS ns_shared.NS5) 2);
+by possibility_tac;
(**** Inductive proofs about ns_shared ****)
@@ -264,8 +272,7 @@
by analz_sees_tac;
by (ALLGOALS
(asm_simp_tac
- (!simpset addsimps ([analz_insert_eq, not_parts_not_analz,
- analz_insert_freshK] @ pushes)
+ (!simpset addsimps ([analz_insert_eq, analz_insert_freshK] @ pushes)
setloop split_tac [expand_if])));
(*Oops*)
by (blast_tac (!claset addDs [unique_session_keys]) 5);