author | berghofe |
Wed, 11 Jul 2007 11:14:51 +0200 | |
changeset 23746 | a455e69c31cc |
parent 16417 | 9bc16273c2d4 |
child 32960 | 69916a850301 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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(* Title: HOL/Auth/NS_Public |
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ID: $Id$ |
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Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory |
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Copyright 1996 University of Cambridge |
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Inductive relation "ns_public" for the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol. |
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Version incorporating Lowe's fix (inclusion of B's identity in round 2). |
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*) |
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header{*Verifying the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol*} |
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theory NS_Public imports Public begin |
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inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set" |
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where |
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(*Initial trace is empty*) |
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Nil: "[] \<in> ns_public" |
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(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to |
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invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to |
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all similar protocols.*) |
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| Fake: "\<lbrakk>evsf \<in> ns_public; X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf))\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> ns_public" |
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(*Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob*) |
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| NS1: "\<lbrakk>evs1 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) |
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# evs1 \<in> ns_public" |
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(*Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce*) |
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| NS2: "\<lbrakk>evs2 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2; |
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Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs2\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) |
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# evs2 \<in> ns_public" |
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(*Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.*) |
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| NS3: "\<lbrakk>evs3 \<in> ns_public; |
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Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs3; |
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Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) |
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\<in> set evs3\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) # evs3 \<in> ns_public" |
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declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim] |
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declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim] |
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declare analz_into_parts [dest] |
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parents:
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declare Fake_parts_insert_in_Un [dest] |
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declare image_eq_UN [simp] (*accelerates proofs involving nested images*) |
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(*A "possibility property": there are traces that reach the end*) |
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lemma "\<exists>NB. \<exists>evs \<in> ns_public. Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs" |
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apply (intro exI bexI) |
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apply (rule_tac [2] ns_public.Nil [THEN ns_public.NS1, THEN ns_public.NS2, |
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THEN ns_public.NS3], possibility) |
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done |
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(** Theorems of the form X \<notin> parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY |
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sends messages containing X! **) |
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(*Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)*) |
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lemma Spy_see_priEK [simp]: |
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"evs \<in> ns_public \<Longrightarrow> (Key (priEK A) \<in> parts (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)" |
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by (erule ns_public.induct, auto) |
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lemma Spy_analz_priEK [simp]: |
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"evs \<in> ns_public \<Longrightarrow> (Key (priEK A) \<in> analz (spies evs)) = (A \<in> bad)" |
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by auto |
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parents:
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subsection{*Authenticity properties obtained from NS2*} |
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(*It is impossible to re-use a nonce in both NS1 and NS2, provided the nonce |
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is secret. (Honest users generate fresh nonces.)*) |
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lemma no_nonce_NS1_NS2 [rule_format]: |
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"evs \<in> ns_public |
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\<Longrightarrow> Crypt (pubEK C) \<lbrace>NA', Nonce NA, Agent D\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Nonce NA \<in> analz (spies evs)" |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all) |
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apply (blast intro: analz_insertI)+ |
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done |
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(*Unicity for NS1: nonce NA identifies agents A and B*) |
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lemma unique_NA: |
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"\<lbrakk>Crypt(pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A \<rbrace> \<in> parts(spies evs); |
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Crypt(pubEK B') \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A'\<rbrace> \<in> parts(spies evs); |
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Nonce NA \<notin> analz (spies evs); evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> A=A' \<and> B=B'" |
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all) |
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(*Fake, NS1*) |
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apply (blast intro: analz_insertI)+ |
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done |
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(*Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg NS1 if A and B are secure |
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The major premise "Says A B ..." makes it a dest-rule, so we use |
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(erule rev_mp) rather than rule_format. *) |
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theorem Spy_not_see_NA: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs; |
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A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Nonce NA \<notin> analz (spies evs)" |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all, spy_analz) |
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apply (blast dest: unique_NA intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)+ |
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done |
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(*Authentication for A: if she receives message 2 and has used NA |
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to start a run, then B has sent message 2.*) |
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lemma A_trusts_NS2_lemma [rule_format]: |
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"\<lbrakk>A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> |
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Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all) |
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(*Fake, NS1*) |
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apply (blast dest: Spy_not_see_NA)+ |
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done |
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theorem A_trusts_NS2: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says A B (Crypt(pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs; |
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Says B' A (Crypt(pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs; |
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A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says B A (Crypt(pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs" |
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by (blast intro: A_trusts_NS2_lemma) |
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(*If the encrypted message appears then it originated with Alice in NS1*) |
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lemma B_trusts_NS1 [rule_format]: |
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"evs \<in> ns_public |
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\<Longrightarrow> Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace> \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Nonce NA \<notin> analz (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs" |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all) |
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(*Fake*) |
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apply (blast intro!: analz_insertI) |
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done |
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paulson
parents:
13956
diff
changeset
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subsection{*Authenticity properties obtained from NS2*} |
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(*Unicity for NS2: nonce NB identifies nonce NA and agents A, B |
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[unicity of B makes Lowe's fix work] |
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[proof closely follows that for unique_NA] *) |
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lemma unique_NB [dest]: |
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"\<lbrakk>Crypt(pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace> \<in> parts(spies evs); |
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Crypt(pubEK A') \<lbrace>Nonce NA', Nonce NB, Agent B'\<rbrace> \<in> parts(spies evs); |
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Nonce NB \<notin> analz (spies evs); evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> A=A' \<and> NA=NA' \<and> B=B'" |
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apply (erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp, erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all) |
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(*Fake, NS2*) |
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apply (blast intro: analz_insertI)+ |
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done |
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(*Secrecy: Spy does not see the nonce sent in msg NS2 if A and B are secure*) |
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theorem Spy_not_see_NB [dest]: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs; |
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A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Nonce NB \<notin> analz (spies evs)" |
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apply (erule rev_mp) |
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apply (erule ns_public.induct, simp_all, spy_analz) |
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apply (blast intro: no_nonce_NS1_NS2)+ |
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done |
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(*Authentication for B: if he receives message 3 and has used NB |
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in message 2, then A has sent message 3.*) |
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lemma B_trusts_NS3_lemma [rule_format]: |
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"\<lbrakk>A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> |
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Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> |
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Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs" |
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by (erule ns_public.induct, auto) |
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theorem B_trusts_NS3: |
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"\<lbrakk>Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs; |
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Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs; |
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A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> |
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\<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB)) \<in> set evs" |
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by (blast intro: B_trusts_NS3_lemma) |
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paulson
parents:
13956
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changeset
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subsection{*Overall guarantee for B*} |
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(*If NS3 has been sent and the nonce NB agrees with the nonce B joined with |
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NA, then A initiated the run using NA.*) |
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theorem B_trusts_protocol: |
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"\<lbrakk>A \<notin> bad; B \<notin> bad; evs \<in> ns_public\<rbrakk> \<Longrightarrow> |
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Crypt (pubEK B) (Nonce NB) \<in> parts (spies evs) \<longrightarrow> |
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Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs \<longrightarrow> |
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Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs" |
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by (erule ns_public.induct, auto) |
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end |