--- a/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public.thy Wed Jul 11 11:13:08 2007 +0200
+++ b/src/HOL/Auth/NS_Public.thy Wed Jul 11 11:14:51 2007 +0200
@@ -11,32 +11,30 @@
theory NS_Public imports Public begin
-consts ns_public :: "event list set"
-
-inductive ns_public
- intros
+inductive_set ns_public :: "event list set"
+ where
(*Initial trace is empty*)
Nil: "[] \<in> ns_public"
(*The spy MAY say anything he CAN say. We do not expect him to
invent new nonces here, but he can also use NS1. Common to
all similar protocols.*)
- Fake: "\<lbrakk>evsf \<in> ns_public; X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf))\<rbrakk>
+ | Fake: "\<lbrakk>evsf \<in> ns_public; X \<in> synth (analz (spies evsf))\<rbrakk>
\<Longrightarrow> Says Spy B X # evsf \<in> ns_public"
(*Alice initiates a protocol run, sending a nonce to Bob*)
- NS1: "\<lbrakk>evs1 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1\<rbrakk>
+ | NS1: "\<lbrakk>evs1 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NA \<notin> used evs1\<rbrakk>
\<Longrightarrow> Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>)
# evs1 \<in> ns_public"
(*Bob responds to Alice's message with a further nonce*)
- NS2: "\<lbrakk>evs2 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2;
+ | NS2: "\<lbrakk>evs2 \<in> ns_public; Nonce NB \<notin> used evs2;
Says A' B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs2\<rbrakk>
\<Longrightarrow> Says B A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>)
# evs2 \<in> ns_public"
(*Alice proves her existence by sending NB back to Bob.*)
- NS3: "\<lbrakk>evs3 \<in> ns_public;
+ | NS3: "\<lbrakk>evs3 \<in> ns_public;
Says A B (Crypt (pubEK B) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Agent A\<rbrace>) \<in> set evs3;
Says B' A (Crypt (pubEK A) \<lbrace>Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B\<rbrace>)
\<in> set evs3\<rbrakk>