author | paulson |
Tue, 23 Dec 1997 11:47:13 +0100 | |
changeset 4472 | cfa3bd184bc1 |
parent 4449 | df30e75f670f |
child 4477 | b3e5857d8d99 |
permissions | -rw-r--r-- |
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(* Title: HOL/Auth/TLS |
2 |
ID: $Id$ |
|
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Author: Lawrence C Paulson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory |
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Copyright 1997 University of Cambridge |
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||
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Protocol goals: |
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* M, serverK(NA,NB,M) and clientK(NA,NB,M) will be known only to the two |
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parties (though A is not necessarily authenticated). |
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* B upon receiving CertVerify knows that A is present (But this |
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message is optional!) |
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* A upon receiving ServerFinished knows that B is present |
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|
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* Each party who has received a FINISHED message can trust that the other |
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party agrees on all message components, including PA and PB (thus foiling |
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rollback attacks). |
3474 | 18 |
*) |
19 |
||
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open TLS; |
3704 | 21 |
|
4449 | 22 |
set proof_timing; |
3474 | 23 |
HOL_quantifiers := false; |
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||
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(*Automatically unfold the definition of "certificate"*) |
26 |
Addsimps [certificate_def]; |
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(*Injectiveness of key-generating functions*) |
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AddIffs [inj_PRF RS inj_eq, inj_sessionK RS inj_eq]; |
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(* invKey(sessionK x) = sessionK x*) |
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Addsimps [isSym_sessionK, rewrite_rule [isSymKey_def] isSym_sessionK]; |
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(*** clientK and serverK make symmetric keys; no clashes with pubK or priK ***) |
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goal thy "pubK A ~= sessionK arg"; |
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by (rtac notI 1); |
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1); |
40 |
by (Full_simp_tac 1); |
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qed "pubK_neq_sessionK"; |
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goal thy "priK A ~= sessionK arg"; |
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by (rtac notI 1); |
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by (dres_inst_tac [("f","isSymKey")] arg_cong 1); |
46 |
by (Full_simp_tac 1); |
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qed "priK_neq_sessionK"; |
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val keys_distinct = [pubK_neq_sessionK, priK_neq_sessionK]; |
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AddIffs (keys_distinct @ (keys_distinct RL [not_sym])); |
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(**** Protocol Proofs ****) |
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(*Possibility properties state that some traces run the protocol to the end. |
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Four paths and 12 rules are considered.*) |
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(** These proofs assume that the Nonce_supply nonces |
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(which have the form @ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) |
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lie outside the range of PRF. It seems reasonable, but as it is needed |
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only for the possibility theorems, it is not taken as an axiom. |
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**) |
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(*Possibility property ending with ClientAccepts.*) |
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goal thy |
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"!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX SID M. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ClientFinished RS tls.ServerFinished RS |
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tls.ClientAccepts) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
79 |
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(*And one for ServerAccepts. Either FINISHED message may come first.*) |
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goal thy |
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"!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX SID NA PA NB PB M. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.ServerFinished RS tls.ClientFinished RS |
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tls.ServerAccepts) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
93 |
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(*Another one, for CertVerify (which is optional)*) |
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goal thy |
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"!!A B. [| ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] \ |
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\ ==> EX NB PMS. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ Says A B (Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|Nonce NB, Agent B, Nonce PMS|})) : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (rtac (tls.Nil RS tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.Certificate RS |
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tls.ClientKeyExch RS tls.CertVerify) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
106 |
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(*Another one, for session resumption (both ServerResume and ClientResume) *) |
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goal thy |
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"!!A B. [| evs0 : tls; \ |
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\ Notes A {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \ |
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\ Notes B {|Number SID, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce M|} : set evs0; \ |
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\ ALL evs. (@ N. Nonce N ~: used evs) ~: range PRF; \ |
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\ A ~= B |] ==> EX NA PA NB PB X. EX evs: tls. \ |
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\ X = Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M, \ |
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\ Nonce NA, Number PA, Agent A, \ |
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\ Nonce NB, Number PB, Agent B|} & \ |
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\ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs & \ |
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\ Says B A (Crypt (serverK(NA,NB,M)) X) : set evs"; |
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by (REPEAT (resolve_tac [exI,bexI] 1)); |
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by (etac (tls.ClientHello RS tls.ServerHello RS tls.ServerResume RS |
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tls.ClientResume) 2); |
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by possibility_tac; |
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by (REPEAT (Blast_tac 1)); |
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result(); |
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126 |
|
3474 | 127 |
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128 |
(**** Inductive proofs about tls ****) |
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129 |
||
130 |
(*Nobody sends themselves messages*) |
|
131 |
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> ALL A X. Says A A X ~: set evs"; |
|
132 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
|
133 |
by (Auto_tac()); |
|
134 |
qed_spec_mp "not_Says_to_self"; |
|
135 |
Addsimps [not_Says_to_self]; |
|
136 |
AddSEs [not_Says_to_self RSN (2, rev_notE)]; |
|
137 |
||
138 |
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(*Induction for regularity theorems. If induction formula has the form |
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X ~: analz (spies evs) --> ... then it shortens the proof by discarding |
141 |
needless information about analz (insert X (spies evs)) *) |
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fun parts_induct_tac i = |
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etac tls.induct i |
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THEN |
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REPEAT (FIRSTGOAL analz_mono_contra_tac) |
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146 |
THEN |
4091 | 147 |
fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) i THEN |
148 |
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsplits [expand_if])); |
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150 |
|
3683 | 151 |
(** Theorems of the form X ~: parts (spies evs) imply that NOBODY |
3474 | 152 |
sends messages containing X! **) |
153 |
||
3683 | 154 |
(*Spy never sees another agent's private key! (unless it's bad at start)*) |
3474 | 155 |
goal thy |
3683 | 156 |
"!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : parts (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
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157 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
3474 | 158 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
159 |
qed "Spy_see_priK"; |
|
160 |
Addsimps [Spy_see_priK]; |
|
161 |
||
162 |
goal thy |
|
3683 | 163 |
"!!evs. evs : tls ==> (Key (priK A) : analz (spies evs)) = (A : bad)"; |
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by (auto_tac(claset() addDs [impOfSubs analz_subset_parts], simpset())); |
3474 | 165 |
qed "Spy_analz_priK"; |
166 |
Addsimps [Spy_analz_priK]; |
|
167 |
||
4472 | 168 |
AddSDs [Spy_see_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1), |
169 |
Spy_analz_priK RSN (2, rev_iffD1)]; |
|
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|
171 |
||
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172 |
(*This lemma says that no false certificates exist. One might extend the |
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model to include bogus certificates for the agents, but there seems |
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174 |
little point in doing so: the loss of their private keys is a worse |
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175 |
breach of security.*) |
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176 |
goalw thy [certificate_def] |
3772 | 177 |
"!!evs. [| certificate B KB : parts (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
178 |
\ ==> pubK B = KB"; |
|
179 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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180 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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181 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3772 | 182 |
qed "certificate_valid"; |
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|
183 |
|
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184 |
|
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185 |
(*Replace key KB in ClientKeyExch by (pubK B) *) |
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186 |
val ClientKeyExch_tac = |
3772 | 187 |
forward_tac [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj RS certificate_valid] |
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|
188 |
THEN' assume_tac |
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|
189 |
THEN' hyp_subst_tac; |
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190 |
|
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|
191 |
fun analz_induct_tac i = |
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|
192 |
etac tls.induct i THEN |
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193 |
ClientKeyExch_tac (i+6) THEN (*ClientKeyExch*) |
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|
194 |
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac |
4091 | 195 |
(simpset() addcongs [if_weak_cong] |
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196 |
addsimps (expand_ifs@pushes) |
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197 |
addsplits [expand_if])) THEN |
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|
198 |
(*Remove instances of pubK B: the Spy already knows all public keys. |
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|
199 |
Combining the two simplifier calls makes them run extremely slowly.*) |
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|
200 |
ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac |
4091 | 201 |
(simpset() addcongs [if_weak_cong] |
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202 |
addsimps [insert_absorb] |
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203 |
addsplits [expand_if])); |
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|
204 |
|
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205 |
|
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206 |
(*** Properties of items found in Notes ***) |
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|
207 |
|
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|
208 |
goal thy "!!evs. [| Notes A {|Agent B, X|} : set evs; evs : tls |] \ |
3683 | 209 |
\ ==> Crypt (pubK B) X : parts (spies evs)"; |
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|
210 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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|
211 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
4091 | 212 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
3683 | 213 |
qed "Notes_Crypt_parts_spies"; |
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|
214 |
|
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|
215 |
(*C may be either A or B*) |
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216 |
goal thy |
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|
217 |
"!!evs. [| Notes C {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs; \ |
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|
218 |
\ evs : tls \ |
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219 |
\ |] ==> Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs)"; |
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220 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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|
221 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
3711 | 222 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
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|
223 |
(*Fake*) |
4091 | 224 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [parts_insertI]) 1); |
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225 |
(*Client, Server Accept*) |
4091 | 226 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs |
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|
227 |
addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies]) 1)); |
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|
228 |
qed "Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS"; |
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229 |
|
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|
230 |
(*Compared with the theorem above, both premise and conclusion are stronger*) |
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|
231 |
goal thy |
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|
232 |
"!!evs. [| Notes A {|s, Agent A, Agent B, Nonce(PRF(PMS,NA,NB))|} : set evs;\ |
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|
233 |
\ evs : tls \ |
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|
234 |
\ |] ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
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|
235 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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|
236 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
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|
237 |
(*ServerAccepts*) |
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|
238 |
by (Fast_tac 1); (*Blast_tac's very slow here*) |
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|
239 |
qed "Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS"; |
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|
240 |
|
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|
241 |
|
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|
242 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives CertVerify, then A sent it ***) |
3474 | 243 |
|
3745
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|
244 |
(*B can check A's signature if he has received A's certificate.*) |
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|
245 |
goal thy |
3772 | 246 |
"!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs); \ |
247 |
\ X = Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); \ |
|
248 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
|
3745
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|
249 |
\ ==> Says A B X : set evs"; |
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changeset
|
250 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
3480
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diff
changeset
|
251 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
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|
252 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
3474 | 253 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3745
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|
254 |
val lemma = result(); |
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|
255 |
|
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Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents:
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changeset
|
256 |
(*Final version: B checks X using the distributed KA instead of priK A*) |
4c5d3b1ddc75
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parents:
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diff
changeset
|
257 |
goal thy |
3772 | 258 |
"!!evs. [| X : parts (spies evs); \ |
259 |
\ X = Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, pms|}); \ |
|
260 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
261 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
|
3745
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parents:
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|
262 |
\ ==> Says A B X : set evs"; |
4091 | 263 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1); |
3745
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changeset
|
264 |
qed "TrustCertVerify"; |
3474 | 265 |
|
266 |
||
3685
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|
267 |
(*If CertVerify is present then A has chosen PMS.*) |
3506 | 268 |
goal thy |
3772 | 269 |
"!!evs. [| Crypt (priK A) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \ |
270 |
\ : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
271 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
|
3672
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|
272 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
4423 | 273 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
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Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
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|
274 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
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parents:
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changeset
|
275 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3745
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|
276 |
val lemma = result(); |
4c5d3b1ddc75
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|
277 |
|
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parents:
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changeset
|
278 |
(*Final version using the distributed KA instead of priK A*) |
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
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parents:
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diff
changeset
|
279 |
goal thy |
3772 | 280 |
"!!evs. [| Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}) \ |
281 |
\ : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
282 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
283 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad |] \ |
|
3745
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paulson
parents:
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diff
changeset
|
284 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs"; |
4091 | 285 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [certificate_valid] addSIs [lemma]) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
286 |
qed "UseCertVerify"; |
3474 | 287 |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
288 |
|
3672
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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3519
diff
changeset
|
289 |
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce (PRF x)|} ~: set evs"; |
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
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changeset
|
290 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
3745
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changeset
|
291 |
(*ClientKeyExch: PMS is assumed to differ from any PRF.*) |
3672
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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diff
changeset
|
292 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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changeset
|
293 |
qed "no_Notes_A_PRF"; |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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changeset
|
294 |
Addsimps [no_Notes_A_PRF]; |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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changeset
|
295 |
|
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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changeset
|
296 |
|
3683 | 297 |
goal thy "!!evs. [| Nonce (PRF (PMS,NA,NB)) : parts (spies evs); \ |
3672
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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|
298 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
3683 | 299 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
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diff
changeset
|
300 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
301 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
4091 | 302 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [parts_insert_spies]))); |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
303 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
304 |
(*Six others, all trivial or by freshness*) |
4091 | 305 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies] |
4201 | 306 |
addSEs spies_partsEs) 1)); |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
307 |
qed "MS_imp_PMS"; |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
308 |
AddSDs [MS_imp_PMS]; |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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3519
diff
changeset
|
309 |
|
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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parents:
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changeset
|
310 |
|
3474 | 311 |
|
3672
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
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diff
changeset
|
312 |
(*** Unicity results for PMS, the pre-master-secret ***) |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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3506
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changeset
|
313 |
|
3672
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TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
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diff
changeset
|
314 |
(*PMS determines B. Proof borrowed from NS_Public/unique_NA and from Yahalom*) |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
315 |
goal thy |
3683 | 316 |
"!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
3515
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Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
317 |
\ ==> EX B'. ALL B. \ |
3683 | 318 |
\ Crypt (pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs) --> B=B'"; |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
319 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents:
3515
diff
changeset
|
320 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents:
3515
diff
changeset
|
321 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
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paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
322 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
323 |
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 1); |
4091 | 324 |
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1); |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
325 |
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN |
4091 | 326 |
blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
327 |
val lemma = result(); |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
328 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
329 |
goal thy |
3683 | 330 |
"!!evs. [| Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \ |
331 |
\ Crypt(pubK B') (Nonce PMS) : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
332 |
\ Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs); \ |
|
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
333 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
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parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
334 |
\ ==> B=B'"; |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
335 |
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1); |
3704 | 336 |
qed "Crypt_unique_PMS"; |
337 |
||
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
338 |
|
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
339 |
(** It is frustrating that we need two versions of the unicity results. |
3704 | 340 |
But Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} determines both A and B. Sometimes |
341 |
we have only the weaker assertion Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce PMS), which |
|
342 |
determines B alone, and only if PMS is secret. |
|
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
343 |
**) |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
344 |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
345 |
(*In A's internal Note, PMS determines A and B.*) |
3704 | 346 |
goal thy "!!evs. evs : tls \ |
347 |
\ ==> EX A' B'. ALL A B. \ |
|
348 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> A=A' & B=B'"; |
|
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents:
3515
diff
changeset
|
349 |
by (parts_induct_tac 1); |
4091 | 350 |
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]) 1); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
351 |
(*ClientKeyExch: if PMS is fresh, then it can't appear in Notes A X.*) |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
352 |
by (expand_case_tac "PMS = ?y" 1 THEN |
4091 | 353 |
blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies] addSEs partsEs) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
354 |
val lemma = result(); |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
355 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
356 |
goal thy |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
357 |
"!!evs. [| Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
358 |
\ Notes A' {|Agent B', Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
359 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
360 |
\ ==> A=A' & B=B'"; |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
361 |
by (prove_unique_tac lemma 1); |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
362 |
qed "Notes_unique_PMS"; |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
363 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
364 |
|
3474 | 365 |
|
3772 | 366 |
(**** Secrecy Theorems ****) |
367 |
||
368 |
(*Key compromise lemma needed to prove analz_image_keys. |
|
369 |
No collection of keys can help the spy get new private keys.*) |
|
370 |
goal thy |
|
371 |
"!!evs. evs : tls ==> \ |
|
372 |
\ ALL KK. (Key(priK B) : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \ |
|
373 |
\ (priK B : KK | B : bad)"; |
|
374 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
|
375 |
by (ALLGOALS |
|
376 |
(asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss |
|
377 |
addsimps (certificate_def::keys_distinct)))); |
|
378 |
(*Fake*) |
|
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
379 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3772 | 380 |
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_priK"; |
381 |
||
382 |
||
383 |
(*slightly speeds up the big simplification below*) |
|
384 |
goal thy "!!evs. KK <= range sessionK ==> priK B ~: KK"; |
|
385 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
|
386 |
val range_sessionkeys_not_priK = result(); |
|
387 |
||
388 |
(*Lemma for the trivial direction of the if-and-only-if*) |
|
389 |
goal thy |
|
390 |
"!!evs. (X : analz (G Un H)) --> (X : analz H) ==> \ |
|
391 |
\ (X : analz (G Un H)) = (X : analz H)"; |
|
4091 | 392 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [impOfSubs analz_mono]) 1); |
3961 | 393 |
val analz_image_keys_lemma = result(); |
3772 | 394 |
|
395 |
(** Strangely, the following version doesn't work: |
|
396 |
\ ALL Z. (Nonce N : analz (Key``(sessionK``Z) Un (spies evs))) = \ |
|
397 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
|
398 |
**) |
|
399 |
||
400 |
goal thy |
|
401 |
"!!evs. evs : tls ==> \ |
|
402 |
\ ALL KK. KK <= range sessionK --> \ |
|
403 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (Key``KK Un (spies evs))) = \ |
|
404 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
|
405 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
|
406 |
by (ClientKeyExch_tac 7); |
|
407 |
by (REPEAT_FIRST (resolve_tac [allI, impI])); |
|
3961 | 408 |
by (REPEAT_FIRST (rtac analz_image_keys_lemma)); |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
409 |
by (ALLGOALS (*18 seconds*) |
3772 | 410 |
(asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss |
3961 | 411 |
addsimps (expand_ifs@pushes) |
3772 | 412 |
addsimps [range_sessionkeys_not_priK, |
413 |
analz_image_priK, certificate_def]))); |
|
4091 | 414 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [insert_absorb]))); |
3772 | 415 |
(*Fake*) |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
416 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3772 | 417 |
qed_spec_mp "analz_image_keys"; |
418 |
||
419 |
(*Knowing some session keys is no help in getting new nonces*) |
|
420 |
goal thy |
|
421 |
"!!evs. evs : tls ==> \ |
|
422 |
\ Nonce N : analz (insert (Key (sessionK z)) (spies evs)) = \ |
|
423 |
\ (Nonce N : analz (spies evs))"; |
|
424 |
by (asm_simp_tac (analz_image_keys_ss addsimps [analz_image_keys]) 1); |
|
425 |
qed "analz_insert_key"; |
|
426 |
Addsimps [analz_insert_key]; |
|
427 |
||
428 |
||
429 |
(*** Protocol goal: serverK(Na,Nb,M) and clientK(Na,Nb,M) remain secure ***) |
|
430 |
||
431 |
(** Some lemmas about session keys, comprising clientK and serverK **) |
|
432 |
||
433 |
||
434 |
(*Lemma: session keys are never used if PMS is fresh. |
|
435 |
Nonces don't have to agree, allowing session resumption. |
|
436 |
Converse doesn't hold; revealing PMS doesn't force the keys to be sent. |
|
437 |
THEY ARE NOT SUITABLE AS SAFE ELIM RULES.*) |
|
438 |
goal thy |
|
439 |
"!!evs. [| Nonce PMS ~: parts (spies evs); \ |
|
440 |
\ K = sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b); \ |
|
441 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
|
442 |
\ ==> Key K ~: parts (spies evs) & (ALL Y. Crypt K Y ~: parts (spies evs))"; |
|
443 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
444 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
|
445 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); |
|
446 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
|
4091 | 447 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSEs spies_partsEs) 3); |
3772 | 448 |
(*Fake*) |
4091 | 449 |
by (simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [parts_insert_spies]) 2); |
3772 | 450 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 2); |
451 |
(** LEVEL 6 **) |
|
452 |
(*Oops*) |
|
4091 | 453 |
by (fast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts] |
3772 | 454 |
addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj] |
4091 | 455 |
addss (simpset())) 6); |
3772 | 456 |
by (REPEAT |
4091 | 457 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
4201 | 458 |
Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS] |
459 |
addSEs spies_partsEs) 1)); |
|
3772 | 460 |
val lemma = result(); |
461 |
||
462 |
goal thy |
|
4472 | 463 |
"!!evs. [| Key (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) : parts (spies evs); \ |
464 |
\ evs : tls |] \ |
|
465 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
|
4091 | 466 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1); |
3772 | 467 |
qed "PMS_sessionK_not_spied"; |
468 |
||
469 |
goal thy |
|
4472 | 470 |
"!!evs. [| Crypt (sessionK((Na, Nb, PRF(PMS,NA,NB)), b)) Y \ |
471 |
\ : parts (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
|
472 |
\ ==> Nonce PMS : parts (spies evs)"; |
|
4091 | 473 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [lemma]) 1); |
3772 | 474 |
qed "PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied"; |
475 |
||
476 |
(*Lemma: write keys are never sent if M (MASTER SECRET) is secure. |
|
477 |
Converse doesn't hold; betraying M doesn't force the keys to be sent! |
|
478 |
The strong Oops condition can be weakened later by unicity reasoning, |
|
479 |
with some effort.*) |
|
480 |
goal thy |
|
481 |
"!!evs. [| ALL A. Says A Spy (Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b))) ~: set evs; \ |
|
482 |
\ Nonce M ~: analz (spies evs); evs : tls |] \ |
|
483 |
\ ==> Key (sessionK((NA,NB,M),b)) ~: parts (spies evs)"; |
|
484 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
485 |
by (etac rev_mp 1); |
|
486 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*17 seconds*) |
|
487 |
(*Oops*) |
|
488 |
by (Blast_tac 4); |
|
489 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
|
4091 | 490 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3); |
3772 | 491 |
(*Fake*) |
492 |
by (spy_analz_tac 2); |
|
493 |
(*Base*) |
|
494 |
by (Blast_tac 1); |
|
495 |
qed "sessionK_not_spied"; |
|
496 |
Addsimps [sessionK_not_spied]; |
|
497 |
||
498 |
||
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
499 |
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the PMS will stay secret.*) |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
500 |
goal thy |
3683 | 501 |
"!!evs. [| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
502 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
3683 | 503 |
\ Nonce PMS ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
504 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*11 seconds*) |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
505 |
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS ~: range PRF*) |
4091 | 506 |
by (REPEAT (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 6)); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
507 |
(*ClientHello, ServerHello, ClientKeyExch, ServerResume: |
3687
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
508 |
mostly freshness reasoning*) |
4091 | 509 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs |
4201 | 510 |
addDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
511 |
impOfSubs analz_subset_parts, |
|
512 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 3)); |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
513 |
(*SpyKeys*) |
4091 | 514 |
by (fast_tac (claset() addss (simpset())) 2); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
515 |
(*Fake*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
516 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
517 |
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_PMS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp)); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
518 |
|
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
519 |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
520 |
(*If A sends ClientKeyExch to an honest B, then the MASTER SECRET |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
521 |
will stay secret.*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
522 |
goal thy |
3683 | 523 |
"!!evs. [| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
524 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
3683 | 525 |
\ Nonce (PRF(PMS,NA,NB)) ~: analz (spies evs)"; |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
526 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*13 seconds*) |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
527 |
(*ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts: because PMS was already visible*) |
4091 | 528 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
4201 | 529 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj, |
530 |
Notes_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 6)); |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
531 |
(*ClientHello*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
532 |
by (Blast_tac 3); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
533 |
(*SpyKeys: by secrecy of the PMS, Spy cannot make the MS*) |
4091 | 534 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
535 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 2); |
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
536 |
(*Fake*) |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
537 |
by (spy_analz_tac 1); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
538 |
(*ServerHello and ClientKeyExch: mostly freshness reasoning*) |
4091 | 539 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() addSEs partsEs |
4201 | 540 |
addDs [Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
541 |
impOfSubs analz_subset_parts, |
|
542 |
Says_imp_spies RS analz.Inj]) 1)); |
|
3677
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
543 |
bind_thm ("Spy_not_see_MS", result() RSN (2, rev_mp)); |
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
544 |
|
f2569416d18b
Now with the sessionK constant and new events ClientAccepts and ServerAccepts
paulson
parents:
3676
diff
changeset
|
545 |
|
3704 | 546 |
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of clientK ***) |
547 |
||
548 |
(*If A created PMS then nobody other than the Spy would send a message |
|
549 |
using a clientK generated from that PMS.*) |
|
550 |
goal thy |
|
551 |
"!!evs. [| evs : tls; A' ~= Spy |] \ |
|
552 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
553 |
\ Says A' B' (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs --> \ |
|
554 |
\ A = A'"; |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
555 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*8 seconds*) |
3711 | 556 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 557 |
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*) |
558 |
by (REPEAT |
|
4091 | 559 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS] |
4201 | 560 |
addIs [Notes_unique_PMS RS conjunct1]) 2)); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
561 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 562 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied, |
563 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
|
3704 | 564 |
bind_thm ("Says_clientK_unique", |
565 |
result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp)); |
|
566 |
||
567 |
||
568 |
(*If A created PMS and has not leaked her clientK to the Spy, |
|
569 |
then nobody has.*) |
|
570 |
goal thy |
|
571 |
"!!evs. evs : tls \ |
|
572 |
\ ==> Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \ |
|
573 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
574 |
\ (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) "; |
|
575 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
|
576 |
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*) |
|
577 |
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac); |
|
3711 | 578 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 579 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
580 |
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac); |
|
581 |
(*Oops*) |
|
4091 | 582 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_clientK_unique]) 2); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
583 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 584 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied] |
585 |
addSEs spies_partsEs) 1); |
|
3704 | 586 |
qed_spec_mp "clientK_Oops_ALL"; |
587 |
||
588 |
||
589 |
||
590 |
(*** Weakening the Oops conditions for leakage of serverK ***) |
|
591 |
||
592 |
(*If A created PMS for B, then nobody other than B or the Spy would |
|
593 |
send a message using a serverK generated from that PMS.*) |
|
594 |
goal thy |
|
595 |
"!!evs. [| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad; B' ~= Spy |] \ |
|
596 |
\ ==> Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
597 |
\ Says B' A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) Y) : set evs --> \ |
|
598 |
\ B = B'"; |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
599 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*9 seconds*) |
3711 | 600 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 601 |
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*) |
602 |
by (REPEAT |
|
4091 | 603 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts] |
4201 | 604 |
addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, |
605 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj] |
|
606 |
addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
|
607 |
Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
|
608 |
Crypt_unique_PMS]) 2)); |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
609 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 610 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied, |
611 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
|
3704 | 612 |
bind_thm ("Says_serverK_unique", |
613 |
result() RSN(2,rev_mp) RSN(2,rev_mp)); |
|
614 |
||
615 |
(*If A created PMS for B, and B has not leaked his serverK to the Spy, |
|
616 |
then nobody has.*) |
|
617 |
goal thy |
|
618 |
"!!evs. [| evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
|
619 |
\ ==> Says B Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs --> \ |
|
620 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
621 |
\ (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB)))) ~: set evs) "; |
|
622 |
by (etac tls.induct 1); |
|
623 |
(*This roundabout proof sequence avoids looping in simplification*) |
|
624 |
by (ALLGOALS Simp_tac); |
|
3711 | 625 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 626 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
627 |
by (ALLGOALS Asm_simp_tac); |
|
628 |
(*Oops*) |
|
4091 | 629 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [Says_serverK_unique]) 2); |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
630 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 631 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_sessionK_not_spied] |
632 |
addSEs spies_partsEs) 1); |
|
3704 | 633 |
qed_spec_mp "serverK_Oops_ALL"; |
634 |
||
635 |
||
636 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
637 |
(*** Protocol goals: if A receives ServerFinished, then B is present |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
638 |
and has used the quoted values PA, PB, etc. Note that it is up to A |
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
639 |
to compare PA with what she originally sent. |
3474 | 640 |
***) |
641 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
642 |
(*The mention of her name (A) in X assures A that B knows who she is.*) |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
643 |
goal thy |
3772 | 644 |
"!!evs. [| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) \ |
3758
188a4fbfaf55
Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents:
3745
diff
changeset
|
645 |
\ (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M, \ |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
646 |
\ Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A, \ |
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
647 |
\ Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \ |
3676
cbaec955056b
Addition of SessionIDs to the Hello and Finished messages
paulson
parents:
3672
diff
changeset
|
648 |
\ M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
3772 | 649 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
650 |
\ ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \ |
|
651 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
652 |
\ X : parts (spies evs) --> Says B A X : set evs"; |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
653 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
654 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*26 seconds*) |
4091 | 655 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [all_conj_distrib]))); |
3711 | 656 |
(*proves ServerResume*) |
657 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
|
4472 | 658 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
659 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
660 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
3683 | 661 |
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1); |
4091 | 662 |
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
663 |
not_parts_not_analz]) 2); |
3474 | 664 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3772 | 665 |
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result()); |
3704 | 666 |
|
667 |
(*Final version*) |
|
668 |
goal thy |
|
669 |
"!!evs. [| X = Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) \ |
|
3758
188a4fbfaf55
Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents:
3745
diff
changeset
|
670 |
\ (Hash{|Number SID, Nonce M, \ |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
671 |
\ Nonce Na, Number PA, Agent A, \ |
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
672 |
\ Nonce Nb, Number PB, Agent B|}); \ |
3704 | 673 |
\ M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
674 |
\ X : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
675 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
|
676 |
\ Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \ |
|
677 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
|
678 |
\ ==> Says B A X : set evs"; |
|
4091 | 679 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma] |
4201 | 680 |
addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1); |
3474 | 681 |
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerFinished"; |
682 |
||
683 |
||
3704 | 684 |
|
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
685 |
(*This version refers not to ServerFinished but to any message from B. |
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
686 |
We don't assume B has received CertVerify, and an intruder could |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
687 |
have changed A's identity in all other messages, so we can't be sure |
3519
ab0a9fbed4c0
Changing "lost" from a parameter of protocol definitions to a constant.
paulson
parents:
3515
diff
changeset
|
688 |
that B sends his message to A. If CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE were augmented |
3704 | 689 |
to bind A's identity with PMS, then we could replace A' by A below.*) |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
690 |
goal thy |
3772 | 691 |
"!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
692 |
\ ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \ |
|
693 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
3683 | 694 |
\ Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs) --> \ |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
695 |
\ (EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs)"; |
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
696 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
3686
4b484805b4c4
First working version with Oops event for session keys
paulson
parents:
3685
diff
changeset
|
697 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*20 seconds*) |
4091 | 698 |
by (ALLGOALS (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [ex_disj_distrib]))); |
3711 | 699 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 700 |
(*ServerResume, ServerFinished: by unicity of PMS*) |
701 |
by (REPEAT |
|
4091 | 702 |
(blast_tac (claset() addSEs [MPair_parts] |
4201 | 703 |
addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Crypt_PMS, |
704 |
Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj] |
|
705 |
addDs [Spy_not_see_PMS, |
|
706 |
Notes_Crypt_parts_spies, |
|
707 |
Crypt_unique_PMS]) 3)); |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
708 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
4472 | 709 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
710 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
3683 | 711 |
by (subgoal_tac "Key (serverK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1); |
4091 | 712 |
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, |
4201 | 713 |
not_parts_not_analz]) 2); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
714 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3772 | 715 |
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result()); |
3704 | 716 |
|
717 |
(*Final version*) |
|
718 |
goal thy |
|
719 |
"!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
|
720 |
\ Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
721 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
|
722 |
\ Says B Spy (Key (serverK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \ |
|
723 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
|
724 |
\ ==> EX A'. Says B A' (Crypt (serverK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
|
4091 | 725 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma] |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
726 |
addEs [serverK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
727 |
qed_spec_mp "TrustServerMsg"; |
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
728 |
|
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
729 |
|
3704 | 730 |
|
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
731 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives any message encrypted with clientK |
3672
56e4365a0c99
TLS now with a distinction between premaster secret and master secret
paulson
parents:
3519
diff
changeset
|
732 |
then A has sent it, ASSUMING that A chose PMS. Authentication is |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
733 |
assumed here; B cannot verify it. But if the message is |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
734 |
ClientFinished, then B can then check the quoted values PA, PB, etc. |
3506 | 735 |
***) |
3704 | 736 |
|
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
737 |
goal thy |
3772 | 738 |
"!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
739 |
\ ==> (ALL A. Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs) --> \ |
|
740 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs --> \ |
|
741 |
\ Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs) --> \ |
|
742 |
\ Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
|
743 |
by (hyp_subst_tac 1); |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
744 |
by (analz_induct_tac 1); (*15 seconds*) |
3711 | 745 |
by (ALLGOALS Clarify_tac); |
3704 | 746 |
(*ClientFinished, ClientResume: by unicity of PMS*) |
4091 | 747 |
by (REPEAT (blast_tac (claset() delrules [conjI] |
4201 | 748 |
addSDs [Notes_master_imp_Notes_PMS] |
749 |
addDs [Notes_unique_PMS]) 3)); |
|
4472 | 750 |
(*ClientKeyExch*) |
751 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSDs [PMS_Crypt_sessionK_not_spied]) 2); |
|
3480
d59bbf053258
More realistic model: the Spy can compute clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3474
diff
changeset
|
752 |
(*Fake: the Spy doesn't have the critical session key!*) |
3683 | 753 |
by (subgoal_tac "Key (clientK(Na,Nb,PRF(PMS,NA,NB))) ~: analz(spies evsa)" 1); |
4091 | 754 |
by (asm_simp_tac (simpset() addsimps [Spy_not_see_MS, |
4422
21238c9d363e
Simplified proofs using rewrites for f``A where f is injective
paulson
parents:
4201
diff
changeset
|
755 |
not_parts_not_analz]) 2); |
3474 | 756 |
by (Fake_parts_insert_tac 1); |
3772 | 757 |
val lemma = normalize_thm [RSmp] (result()); |
3704 | 758 |
|
759 |
(*Final version*) |
|
760 |
goal thy |
|
3772 | 761 |
"!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
762 |
\ Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y : parts (spies evs); \ |
|
3704 | 763 |
\ Notes A {|Agent B, Nonce PMS|} : set evs; \ |
3772 | 764 |
\ Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs; \ |
3704 | 765 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
3772 | 766 |
\ ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
4091 | 767 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addIs [lemma] |
4201 | 768 |
addEs [clientK_Oops_ALL RSN(2, rev_notE)]) 1); |
3772 | 769 |
qed "TrustClientMsg"; |
3506 | 770 |
|
771 |
||
3685
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
772 |
|
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
773 |
(*** Protocol goal: if B receives ClientFinished, and if B is able to |
5b8c0c8f576e
Full version of TLS including session resumption, but no Oops
paulson
parents:
3683
diff
changeset
|
774 |
check a CertVerify from A, then A has used the quoted |
3729
6be7cf5086ab
Renamed XA, XB to PA, PB and removed the certificate from Client Verify
paulson
parents:
3711
diff
changeset
|
775 |
values PA, PB, etc. Even this one requires A to be uncompromised. |
3506 | 776 |
***) |
777 |
goal thy |
|
3772 | 778 |
"!!evs. [| M = PRF(PMS,NA,NB); \ |
779 |
\ Says A Spy (Key(clientK(Na,Nb,M))) ~: set evs;\ |
|
780 |
\ Says A' B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs; \ |
|
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
781 |
\ certificate A KA : parts (spies evs); \ |
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
782 |
\ Says A'' B (Crypt (invKey KA) (Hash{|nb, Agent B, Nonce PMS|}))\ |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
783 |
\ : set evs; \ |
3683 | 784 |
\ evs : tls; A ~: bad; B ~: bad |] \ |
3772 | 785 |
\ ==> Says A B (Crypt (clientK(Na,Nb,M)) Y) : set evs"; |
4091 | 786 |
by (blast_tac (claset() addSIs [TrustClientMsg, UseCertVerify] |
4201 | 787 |
addDs [Says_imp_spies RS parts.Inj]) 1); |
3515
d8a71f6eaf40
Now uses the Notes constructor to distinguish the Client (who has chosen M)
paulson
parents:
3506
diff
changeset
|
788 |
qed "AuthClientFinished"; |
3687
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
789 |
|
fb7d096d7884
Simplified SpyKeys to use sessionK instead of clientK and serverK
paulson
parents:
3686
diff
changeset
|
790 |
(*22/9/97: loads in 622s, which is 10 minutes 22 seconds*) |
3711 | 791 |
(*24/9/97: loads in 672s, which is 11 minutes 12 seconds [stronger theorems]*) |
3745
4c5d3b1ddc75
Client, Server certificates now sent using the separate Certificate rule,
paulson
parents:
3729
diff
changeset
|
792 |
(*29/9/97: loads in 481s, after removing Certificate from ClientKeyExch*) |
3758
188a4fbfaf55
Exchanged the M and SID fields of the FINISHED messages to simplify proofs;
paulson
parents:
3745
diff
changeset
|
793 |
(*30/9/97: loads in 476s, after removing unused theorems*) |
3760
77f71f650433
Strengthened the possibility property for resumption so that it could have
paulson
parents:
3758
diff
changeset
|
794 |
(*30/9/97: loads in 448s, after fixing ServerResume*) |